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INTRODUCTION
There can be no disagreement on an initial premise: [Television] programmers and [television] operators engage in and transmit speech,
and they are entitled to the protection of the speech and press provisions of the First Amendment. Through "original programming or by
exercising editorial discretion over which ... programs to include in
its repertoire," [television] programmers and operators "see[k] to
communicate messages on a wide variety of topics and in a wide variety offormats."
-Turner Broadcasting Systems, Inc. v. Fee•
It is urged that motion pictures do not fall within the First Amendment's aegis because their production, distribution, and exhibition is
a large-scale business conducted for private profit. We cannot agree.
That books, newspapers, and magazines are published and sold for
profit does not prevent them from being a form of expression whose
liberty is safeguarded by the First Amendment. We fail to see why
operation for profit should have any different effect in the case of motion pictures.

-Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson2
We can surely agree that no one can raise a cry of deprivation of free
speech if he is compelled to prove that there is something more than
naked commercial selfishness in his purpose.
-Then-Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover3

Commercial television broadcasters have been subject to a
range of regulations restricting their freedom to present programming to the viewing public. Those restrictions have included the Prime Time Access Rule,4 the Children's Television
Act of 1990,s and the Fairness Doctrine.6 Indeed, the funda1. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 636 (1994) (citations
omitted) (Turner I).
2. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501-02 (1952) (footnote
omitted).
3. Speech by then-Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover at the National Radio Conference (Nov. 9, 1925), quoted in Harry Kalven, Jr., Broadcasting, Public Policy, and the First Amendment, 10 J.L. & ECON. 15, 16
(1967).
4. In the Matter of Amendment of Part 73 of the Commission's Rules and
Regulations With Respect to Competition and Responsibility in Network Television Broadcasting, 23 F.C.C.2d 382, 384 (1970). The rule prohibited the
broadcast of more than three hours of programming produced by or for television networks in any of the top fift;y markets during the four "prime-time"
hours of the day-i.e., 7 p.m. to 11 p.m. Id. The FCC intended to protect the
viability of non-network produced syndicated programming. Id. at 385-87.
5. Pub. L. No. 104-437, 104 Stat. 996 (1990). Congress directed the FCC
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mental requirement that broadcasters serve the "public interest" in order to retain their licenses from the FCC itself impinges programming discretion. 7 Cable television outlets have
been subjected to the Must Carry Rule. 8 Today, some proponents of campaign finance reform seek to compel television
broadcasters to provide free time to candidates for political advertising.9
Every effort to regulate television programming decisions
has been opposed on both constitutional grounds and policy
grounds. Dominant among policy objections are the notions of
market efficiency that underlie a broader opposition to government regulation of economic relationships. Social welfare is
maximized, the argument goes, when freely-bargaining actors
can agree upon transactions that enhance the self-defined welfare of each participant. Some have argued, for example, that
regulations of broadcast television programming should be
evaluated according to whether "they interfere with the free
market's ability to maximize consumer satisfaction or to promote most effectively consumer sovereignty." 10 They suggest
that "telecommunications goods and markets" should be
treated as are "most other goods and markets." 11
Accompanying these policy objections to the regulation of
television programming decisions are arguments that invoke
the First Amendment's prohibition of laws that "abridge the
freedom of speech." If the government tells CBS that it may
not present more than three hours of network-created programming during primetime hours or that it must present at
least a minimum amount of children's programming, the network's freedom to choose its preferred programming is restricted. If the government were to tell the networks to provide

to consider whether stations had provided programming "specifically designed
to serve the educational and informational needs of children." Id. § 103(b)(2),
104 Stat. at 997.
6. See infra Part I.A.
7. The Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064
(1934), requires that broadcast licensees operate "in the public interest" and
empowers the FCC to grant and renew licenses according to the needs of "the
public convenience, interest, or necessity." Id.§ 307(a), 48 Stat. at 1083.
8. Such rules require cable television providers to carry local broadcast
network affiliate stations. See infra Part LB.
9. See infra Part IV.A.
10. THOMAS G. KRA'ITENMAKER & LUCAS A. POWE, JR., REGULATING
BROADCAST PROGRAMMING 45 (1994).
11. See id. at 49, 277-96.
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free air time to political candidates, the freedom to choose their
preferred programming would be restricted. Broadcasters argue that this freedom to choose programming is "editorial discretion" or "journalistic discretion" protected by the First
Amendment. It amounts to the freedom to say what one wants
to say and not to say what one wishes to refrain from saying. 12
The free-market policy argument against regulation has
not persuaded everyone-whether as a general matter or in its
particular application to television-though it today has a
stronghold in political debate. 13 It is nearly universally accepted, however, among judges, politicians, bureaucrats, and
scholars, 14 that the programming decisions of television broadcasters and cable providers are exercises of "editorial discretion" protected by the First Amendment. 15 This presumption of
constitutional privilege has inhibited political experimentation.
The FCC repealed the Fairness Doctrine in part because of
these constitutional concerns. Proposals to mandate free television time for political candidates have foundered in part because of concerns about intruding on the constitutionally protected "editorial discretion" of television broadcasters. And; of
course, the presumption of constitutional privilege threatens
judicial invalidation of those experiments that the political
process manages to enact into law.
Should television programming decisions continue to be
viewed as a core part of "the freedom of speech" protected by
the First Amendment? Should the First Amendment be
deemed to supplement, and sometimes to supersede, the range

12. "[W]e reaffirm unequivocally the protection afforded to editorial judgment. . . . [A] compulsion to publish that which reason tells [newspapers]
should not be published is unconstitutional." Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 255-56 (1974) (quotations omitted).
13. "It [is] time to move away from thinking about broadcasters as trustees. It [is] time to treat them the way almost everyone else in society doesthat is, as businesses. [T]elevision is just another appliance. It's a toaster
with pictures." Then-FCC Chairman Mark Fowler, justifying the repeal of the
fairness doctrine regulations, quoted in CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND
THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 49 (1993) (footnote omitted).
14. See, e.g., LILLIAN R. BEVIER, Is FREE TV FOR FEDERAL CANDIDATES
CONSTITUTIONAL? 33-34 (1998); id. at 46 (arguing that requiring broadcasters
to "provide free TV time would restrict their speech-or at least their editorial
discretion"); KRATI'ENMAKER & POWE, supra note 10, at 235; RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 672-74 (1992); SUNSTEIN, supra note
13, at 103-05; Jonathan Weinberg, Broadcasting and Speech, 81 CAL. L. REV.
1101, 1105 n.8 (1993).
15. See infra Part LB.
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of policy arguments for, and against, regulation of television
programming decisions? Conventional wisdom, from the right
to the left, barely acknowledges these questions.1 6 The task of
this Article is to explore them.
Policy arguments against the regulation of television programming decisions have relied on an economio model that
views television broadcasters as producers and sellers acting in
a normative context of "consumer sovereignty." Constitutional
arguments have relied largely on a political model that views
television broadcasters as speakers exercising editorial discretion in a normative context of citizen sovereignty and "the freedom of speech." Those who have critiqued the regulation of
programming decisions by invoking both the constitutional and
policy perspectives see a consistency-even a synergy-between
them.
Forty years ago, for example, Ronald Coase argued that the
FCC's power to grant and renew broadcast licenses conditioned
on whether a licensee serves the "public interest, convenience,
or necessity'' involves oversight of the applicant's programming
decisions and, therefore, clashes with the First Amendment. 17
From this perspective, he argued that the FCC's power to license broadcasters was as much an intrusion on the First
Amendment as licensing newspapers would be. At the same
time, Coase viewed broadcasters as commercial actors, motivated by the same forces that shape the decisions of other producers and merchants. From this perspective, he suggested
that the allocation of broadcast licenses, like the allocation of
other resources, "should be determined by the forces of the
market rather than as a result of government decisions." 18
Thus, he argued that broadcasters should be treated under the
First Amendment as are other speakers (that is, free to exercise
editorial discretion) 19 and should be treated under market theory as are "other businessmen"20 (that is, largely free to make
whatever production and distribution decisions they wish). 21
16. See supra text accompanying notes 1-3.
17. See R.H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. &
ECON. 1, 7-12 (1959).
18. Id. at 18.
19. See id. at 7.
20. Id. at 30.
21. Indeed, more recently, Coase has made a stronger and more radical
claim: government should be restricted in its power to regulate the market for
goods and services as it has been restricted in its power to regulate the market
for ideas, because no persuasive justification exists to distinguish the impor-
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Following Coase, Thomas Krattenmaker and Lucas Powe
have argued that a free-market economic analysis of programming discretion supports a finding of protection by the First
Amendment: "[A] focus on [economic] markets reveals that direct regulation of programming is virtually always an unnecessary intrusion into broadcasters' rights of free speech, and that
the [Federal Communications] Commission can attain truly
sensible goals without overseeing stations' editorial decisions."22
This Article suggests that there is no synergy between
viewing programming decisions as properly governed by market forces in a regime of consumer sovereignty and viewing
them as protected by the First Amendment's freedom of speech.
Indeed, the two models of television broadcasting on which opponents of regulation have simultaneously relied are incompatible. Rather, to the extent that, and because, commercial
television programming decisions are economically driven by a
desire to satisfy market demand, they should not be viewed as
protected by the First Amendment's freedom of speech.
Part I describes the prevailing presumption, both in politics and law, from the right23 and from the left,24 that the programming decisions of television broadcasters and cable providers are exercises of "editorial discretion" protected as part of
the First Amendment's "freedom of speech."
Part II examines decisionmaking by television network executives. It distinguishes among decisions made by the series
of actors involved in the creation, production, and dissemination of such programming, and considers the extent to which
such programming decisions flow from the pursuit of profit. It
concludes that Coase, Posner, and other market theorists are
quite right in suggesting that much-indeed, most, if not allof such programming decisions involve creating programming
that will generate profits by satisfying consumer demand.
Part III analyzes the constitutional significance of the
proposition that commercial television programmers behave as
tance of free speech from that of free trade in goods and services. R.H. Coase,
Aduertising and Free Speech, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 3-8, 13-15 (1977).
22. KRA'ITENMAKER & POWE, supra note 10, at 283 (emphasis added).
23. Id. at 235.
24. Weinberg, supra note 14, at 1114 ("Broadcasting is speech.").
Weinberg develops his critiques of First Amendment doctrine and broadcasting by "[r]elying on insights developed by authors associated with critical legal
studies." Id. at 1109.
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do other entrepreneurs in responding to market incentives.
Part III begins by distinguishing two categories of message that
people might choose to disseminate. The actor who chooses to
construct the content of a message by referring to the beliefs
and values of an anticipated audience, and who does so because
he believes that the message will be popular, or that the consumer will buy it, or that it will produce profits, has created the
market-driven message. The actor who constructs the content
of a message by considering what she, herself, believes has created the speaker-driven message.
Part III also describes three categories of motive for disseminating messages. A person might disseminate messages
with no concern about persuading people about the worth of the
idea, but simply as a product to be sold for profit; or might disseminate an idea to persuade people of the merits of the idea.
This section posits that an actor might choose to profit by selling a market-driven message-in other words, to sell; or might
endeavor to persuade others with a market-driven message-in
other words, to pander; or might endeavor to persuade others
with speaker-driven self-expression-in other words, to
enlighten.
Part III then considers whether an actor's choice to sell the
market-driven message, as contrasted with an actor's choice to
enlighten with speaker-driven self-expression, should be
deemed protected by the First Amendment. Having raised this
agenda, Part III recognizes that the flow of discussion may be
interrupted by the reader's objections. Few people speak in a
way that reflects pure self-expression or in a way that reflects a
pure pursuit of economic profit. Given the complexities of reality, what is the point of exploring the implications of two categories of purpose-a purpose to enlighten through selfexpression and a purpose to profit through the sale of a marketdriven message-that, in their pure forms, must be so rare?
In response, Part III suggests that by exploring the implications of categories that are theoretically pure, but perhaps
rare in reality, one has a basis for distinguishing the constitutional significance of more complex human choices that are, in
fact, common. A television programming executive like Rupert
Murdoch, for example, may seek primarily to create a television
program lineup that will attract large audiences but secondarily-reluctantly-may choose to forgo potentially popular (and
profitable) programming that excessively offends his own sensibilities. An artist like Michelangelo, for example, may pri-
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marily seek to create his vision of truth but secondarilygrudgingly-placate his patron's conflicting preferences. Both
act with a mixture of purposes-to communicate in a way that
expresses his own values and to profit from market demand.
But a Murdoch might strike quite a different balance than
would a Michelangelo. Should the difference be deemed constitutionally significant? Should the entrepreneur and the artist
be understood as warranting equal entitlement as a participant
in the freedom of speech? Without exploring the normative
significance of opposing poles that might be pure and rare, one
cannot explore the normative significance of the far more common varieties of mixed motives lying in the continuum between
them. 25
Thus, Part III explores the constitutional significance of
choices to enlighten with speaker-driven self-expression and
choices to profit from the sale of a market-driven message from
the perspective of four normative frameworks relevant to the
freedom of speech. The first two normative contexts rest on the
proposition that the freedom of speech is constitutionally protected because it is necessary for democratic self-government.26
25. Motive and purpose are legally relevant in many contexts. Where the
law has made motive and purpose relevant, those who make and interpret the
law must confront the problem of mixed motives and purposes and, indeed,
have done so. In the area of Equal Protection, for example, the Supreme Court
has determined that laws enacted because of purposes reflecting racial prejudice are unconstitutional. In giving doctrinal shape to this principle, the
Court has decided that "[r]arely can it be said that a legislature ... made a
decision motivated solely by a single concern, or even that a single purpose
was the 'dominant' or 'primary' one." Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro.
Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66 (1977). Thus, one who challenges a
facially neutral law on grounds of unconstitutional racial discrimination must
prove that an impermissible racially discriminatory purpose was "a motivating
factor in the decision." Id. If a challenger meets that burden, the state must
show "that the same decision would have resulted even had the impermissible
purpose not been considered." Id. at 271 n.21. This is not to suggest that this
sort of "but for" principle is appropriate for determining whether one who
seeks to sell a market-driven message should be deemed protected by the First
Amendment. It is to suggest, however, that the law has made motive and
purpose dispositive in many contexts, and the task of defining the extent to
which a motive or purpose must have influenced a decision in order to be legally significant is in no way novel.
26. See, e.g., Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) ("Whatever differences may exist about interpretations of the First Amendment, there is
practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment was
to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs."); ALExANDER
MEIBLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GoVERNMENT 26-27
(1948) ("The principle of the freedom of speech springs from the necessities of
the program of self-government. It is not a Law of Nature or of Reason in the
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Democracy is a theme on which there has been a range of normative and practical variations. Thus, Part III considers the
constitutional status of decisions to sell the market-driven message and decisions to enlighten with speaker-driven selfexpression from the perspective of two conceptions of democracy prominent in our constitutional history: republicanism and
pluralism. The analysis from the perspective of pluralism is
the more difficult. Because pluralism better reflects American
political practice than does republicanism, it also provides the
more important analytical framework.
The third normative context rests on the proposition that
the freedom of speech is constitutionally protected because it
contributes to personal autonomy and fulfillment. The fourth
normative context is provided by Congress's copyright power
and its implications for the First Amendment's prohibition of
laws abridging the freedom of speech.
Consistent with conventional doctrinal notions that certain
categories of expression are of high value warranting the fullest
constitutional protection (such as a dissident's speech about
public policy) and other categories of expression are of low
value warranting little or no constitutional protection (such as
obscenity, defamation, and fighting words), this section concludes as follows: in each of these normative contexts, efforts to
enlighten by disseminating speaker-driven self-expression are
fundamentally valuable and warrant full protection under the
First Amendment. In contrast, there is serious reason to question whether entrepreneurial choices to sell the market-driven
message as a product-in the way that many television broadcasters might treat their programming decisions-warrant special constitutional protection as speech. 27 Indeed, this section
suggests that choices to create programming by anticipating
audience tastes and to disseminate such programming for ecoabstract. It is a deduction from the basic American agreement that public issues shall be decided by universal suffrage."); SUNSTEIN, supra note 13, at xvii
("My goal in this book is to evaluate the current system in light of the relationship between political sovereignty and the free speech principle."); Robert H.
Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1,
26 (1971) (arguing that only "explicitly and predominantly political speech" is
entitled to constitutional protection).
27. Cass Sunstein has addressed similar questions concerning whether
the speech disseminated by profit-seeking broadcasters should be deemed protected by the First Amendment. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 13, at 17-19. Sunstein limits his analysis to a republican framework. For a discussion of Sunstein's analysis, and its limitations, see infra notes 175-83 and accompanying
text.
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nomic profit-like any other entrepreneurial production decision in a regime of "consumer sovereignty''-should be deemed
beyond "the freedom of speech" and, therefore, unprotected by
the First Amendment.
Along the way, Part III confronts the most extreme argument made by proponents of laissez faire. Aaron Director and
Ronald Coase, for example, have argued that no adequate conceptual distinction can be made between the marketplace of
ideas and the marketplace for products to justify the very different constitutional status accorded to individual liberty in
each context.28 There is, they argue, a "parity'' of markets-in
speech and property.29 Richard Epstein has built on this notion
and has suggested that courts should just as vigorously protect
property under the Fifth Amendment from regulation as they
protect speech under the First Amendment.30 These are not
arguments that transactions in the economic marketplace
should be protected by the First Amendment as speech but that
the liberty to engage in property transactions should be deemed
to have the same foundational status as has the freedom of
speech.
These views depart radically from conventional wisdom
about constitutional law. Conventional wisdom holds, in large
part, that speech has been constitutionally protected because it
is necessary for democratic self-government, that Madisonian
majoritarianism is foundational, and that rules governing
property are largely derivative of those democratic processes.
Thus, transactions in property are not speech under the First
Amendment, nor is the Fifth Amendment's protection of property rights as rigorous as is the First Amendment's protection
of speech rights. In short, the conventional wisdom holds that
Lochner v. New York was fundamentally wrong, while New
York Times v. Sullivan is essentially correct. These propositions of constitutional law span the views of scholars who otherwise have very different perspectives, from Frank Michelman31 and Cass Sunstein32 to Raou.J Berger33 and Robert
28. See Coase, supra note 21, at 2-8, 13-15; Aaron Director, The Parity of
the Economic Marketplace, 7 J.L. & ECON. 1, 6-10 (1964).
29. See Director, supra note 28, at 6.
30. See Richard A. Epstein, Property, Speech, and the Politics of Distrust,
59 U. CHI. L. REV. 41, 42 (1992).
31. See Frank I. Michelman, Liberties, Fair Values, and Constitutional
Method, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 91, 114 (1992). Michelman sees arguments about
the parity of speech and property arguments as "failing to take account of
relevant differences among the ways in which various classes of liberties func-
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Bork. 34 Yet, an inseparable element of this conventional wisdom has been the largely unexamined notion that the programming choices of commercial television corporations should
be protected as "editorial discretion" under the First Amendment. 35
In directly confronting this notion of broadcaster privilege,
Part III concludes that the market theorists such as Director,
Coase, and Epstein are correct in viewing the behavior of commercial television programmers as rational profit maximizers
in a regime of consumer sovereignty. They are wrong, however,
about the constitutional significance of this fact. Not only is it
true, as they acknowledge, that economic production is not
speech under the First Amendment, but beyond this, there is
no constitutional parity of markets. On the other hand, while
the constitutional theorists such as Michelman and Sunsteinas well as nearly a century of Supreme Court decisions-are
tion in American society and what they signify." Id.
32. Arguing that concentrations of private power in speech have changed
the context in which the traditional dangers of government regulation of
speech were conceived, Sunstein has suggested that government should be
deemed free to regulate television programming, "so long as [such regulations]
do not intrude on anything that is properly characterized as a right."
SUNSTEIN, supra note 13, at 73. He has failed, however, to address the broadcaster claim that their "editorial discretion" to construct and select programming does amount to a right. For more on Sunstein's views about the relationship between consumer sovereignty and the First Amendment, see infra note
136; text accompanying notes 175-83.
33. See RAOUL BERGER, GoVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 266 (1977). Berger has
called the Court's decision in Lochner and similar cases "usurped power in the
economic sphere." Id. at 287.
34. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL
SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 44-49, 168-69 (1990). On Lochner, Bork noted,
In his 1905 Lochner opinion, Justice Peckham, defending liberty from
what he conceived to be a "mere meddlesome interference," asked
rhetorically, "[A]re we all ... at the mercy of legislative majorities?"
The correct answer, where the Constitution is silent, must be "yes."
Being "at the mercy oflegislative majorities" is merely another way of
describing the basic American plan: representative democracy.
Id. at 49 (footnote omitted). On Sullivan, Bork suggested that while the particular rules developed by the Court might be questioned, the general "enterprise" making it more difficult for public figures to maintain defamation actions was legitimate. Id. at 168-69; see Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 993,
995-96 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en bane) (Bork, J., concurring).
35. Bork, however, might argue that commercial television programs are
not protected, since most do not convey "expressly political" speech. See Bork,
supra note 26, at 20. For an argument that Bork too narrowly conceives the
definition of speech that is relevant to self-government, see infra text accompanying note 168.
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correct in viewing the freedom of speech as constitutionally
foundational, and property rights as politically derivative, they
have failed to explore the implications of this dichotomy for the
question of whether the programming decisions of profitseeking media corporations should be deemed part of "the freedom of speech" protected by the First Amendment. They have
erroneously assumed that the programming decisions of commercial television executives qualify as "editorial discretion"
protected by the First Amendment.
Precisely because product design, manufacture, and sales
decisions in the commercial marketplace do not constitute "editorial discretion" protected by the First Amendment, the programming decisions of commercial television corporations
should be deemed to be something quite other than "editorial
discretion" protected by the First Amendment. 36 Thus, proponents of the parity of markets should press for constitutional
protection of commercial television programming decisions in
the same way they press for constitutionally protecting the
production and sales decisions of other entrepreneurs-that is,
as a property interest under the Fifth Amendment, rather than
as speech protected by the First Amendm~nt.
Furthermore, those who embrace the conventional wisdom
that denies a constitutional parity between the marketplace of
ideas and the marketplace for products should recognize the inconsistency in treating decisions to sell the market-driven message as protected by the First Amendment. Indeed, from all
four normative frameworks relevant to the First Amendmentrepublican self-government, pluralist self-government, personal
fulfillment, and Congress's copyright power-the reasons that
Coase and Director are wrong about the constitutional "parity"
of the marketplace of ideas and the marketplace for products
underlie the reasons that commercial television programming
36. This argument is unlikely to persuade the market theorists that there
is no parity of markets. It should, however, persuade them that they are
wrong to employ the conventional notion that television programming decisions should be protected as "editorial discretion" under the First Amendment.
Rather, these market theorists should follow through with their recognition
that liberties in speech and in property-though of equal value-are not the
same. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 30, at 46-47 (noting that while there are
many issues common to both speech and property, important differences exist
in the areas of compensation and economic concerns). Though there may be a
"parity" of markets, the marketplace of ideas and the marketplace for products
surely are distinguishable. Thus, their arguments for protecting the programming discretion of commercial television corporations should be rooted in
Fifth Amendment property, rather than in First Amendment speech.
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decisions should be understood as ordinary property rights, not
part of "the freedom of speech."
Part N explores how a denial-or dilution-of protection
for the entrepreneurially motivated dissemination of the market-driven message might, despite real difficulties, be implemented. For example, how could a court adjudicate a challenge
to a measure requiring broadcasters to provide free television
time to political candidates? Should an actor who disseminates
material for mixed purposes-partially entrepreneurial and
partially pedagogical-be deemed protected by the First
Amendment? How could a court determine whether an actor
disseminated material primarily as a market-driven message
for sale or a speaker-driven message for enlightenment? This
section cautions that a court should not lightly conclude that
one who claims the protection of the First Amendment was, in
fact, engaged in market-driven entrepreneurial activity and,
therefore, is not entitled to constitutional protection of his "editorial discretion." Rather, the government should bear a heavy
burden of proving that a First Amendment claimant was acting
predominantly as an entrepreneur in selling a market-driven
message. The section suggests five indicia for proving this fact
in the television programming context.
Part V explores the implications of the "market-driven
message principle" for regulations of violence and "indecency"
in commercial television. If decisions to sell the market-driven
message are deemed not part of "the freedom of speech," should
the government be deemed free to engage in content-motivated
regulation of such entrepreneurial activity?37 This is an important question, and the answer here is a contingent no.38
37. Part V also addresses broader cultural critiques of commercial television and the First Amendment. See, e.g., RONALD KL. COLLINS & DAVID M.
SKOVER, THE DEATH OF DISCOURSE 205-16 (1996) (discussing a "cultural approach" to the First Amendment that discards "deliberate lies" and "Madisonian principles" for the unrestrained conventions of popular culture); Ronald
Collins & David Skover, The First Amendment in an Age of Paratroopers, 68
TEX. L. REV. 1087, 1088 (1990) (noting that "[p]ublic discourse is increasingly
taking a distinctive and aestheticized form consistent with the look and feel of
commercial television"). For further discussion of the Collins and Skover cultural critique, see infra Part V.B.
38. Indeed, the import of my analysis concerns the propriety of asserting
personal rights under the First Amendment's freedom of speech-the right to
exercise "editorial discretion." If the government requires a commercial television station to provide air time for a politician to express her views, or for a
concerned member of the community to express his, should one view the station's rights to engage in the freedom of speech as having been infringed?
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Unlike current doctrine, the analysis presented in this Article does not depend on physical characteristics (such as
bandwidth scarcity) of the technologies for transacting commerce in entertainment--whether broadcast television, cable
television, the internet, or technologies yet to be developed. 39
Rather, the analysis focuses on the nature of human choices.40
Should such a regulation be deemed to violate the Supreme Court's prohibition, laid out in Buckley v. Valeo, against laws that "restrict the speech of some
elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others"? 424
U.S. 1, 48 (1976) (per curiam). A regulation displacing one actor's commercial
activity with another actor's speech-for a content-neutral purpose of promoting the freedom of speech-would be permissible. In contrast, a regulation
displacing one actor's market-driven message motivated by governmental disapproval of the ideas contained in that message would be impermissible-not
because the regulation intrudes on the personal First Amendment rights of the
regulated entrepreneur but because of prophylactic concerns about governmental domination as a participant in the marketplace of ideas. See discussion infra Part V.A.
39. See, e.g., Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 396-400 (1969)
(upholding the bandwidth scarcity rationale for distinguishing electronic and
print media in First Amendment analysis); see also COLLINS & SKOVER, supra
note 37, at 73-81 (focusing on differences in \:Ommunication by picture versus
communication by written word).
Furthermore, unlike other critiques of doctrines that accord First
Amendment protection to the broadcast media, this Article's analysis does not
depend on making value judgments about the quality of ideas disseminated on
television or through other media. Cf. Collins & Skover, supra note 37, at
1097-104; Martin H. Redish, Killing the First Amendment with Kindness: A
Troubled Reaction to Collins and Skover, 68 TEX. L. REV. 1147, 1149-50 (1990)
("[M]uch of television's programming is not designed to 'appeal to the viewer's
higher intellectual interests. But for almost every My Mother the Car there
has been a Masterpiece Theater . ... mf a governmental body were to undertake such a screening process of the content of the electronic media, no logical
grounds would exist for failing to give identical treatment to the print media."). Rather, this Article's analysis is concerned with whether an actor has
intended to persuade others with his own ideas or simply to sell to others that
which they desire.
40. In this regard, technologies for dissemination might be legally relevant not as categorical determinants of regulatory discretion, but as contextual indicia that a First Amendment claimant was, or was not, predominantly
engaged in entrepreneurial choices to sell market-driven messages. Furthermore, the technologies used by the disseminators, and the consumption habits
of the public, may serve as contextual indicia of whether particular governmental attempts to regulate "editorial discretion" are undertaken for permissible purposes or simply to censor ideas that regulators find offensive.
Commercial television, whether broadcast or cable, may be unique, both
in the extent to which programming decisions can be proved to be rooted in
entrepreneurial motives to sell market-driven messages, and in the extent to
which it represents a context in which government may well have legitimate
reasons for intruding upon "editorial discretion." The viewing habits of the
public render television (at least for now) the best means of effective commu-
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Indeed, although this Article focuses on the constitutional
status of commercial television programming decisions, its enterprise rests on more fundamental concerns. It reflects concerns that the freedom of speech not be obscured and overwhelmed by an increasingly pervasive commerce in
entertainment-that our constitutional law identify and maintain clear principles to distinguish choices and activities that
warrant special constitutional protection as "speech" from those
which, superficially, might look like "speech," but have a fundamentally different nature. This is important not only for law
itself but also for maintaining a clearer cultural sense of the hierarchy of values in the American constitutional tradition.
Legal categories require definition. This is no less true for
the First Amendment's category of "speech" than for any other.
The unexamined assumption that anything spoken, anything
written, anything painted, photographed, recorded, or filmed,
whether or not distributed, and no matter why distributed, is
entitled to special constitutional solicitude as speech obscures
essential distinctions that ought to be made. This is a time in
which Americans are so much more engaged in the consumption of products than they were when the First Amendment
was framed. It is also a time in which Americans, having unprecedented leisure time, are more than ever engaged in the
consumption of products for entertainment. Because we are
thinking beings, much of our entertainment involves words,
pictures, and other vehicles for triggering thoughts that the
consumer wishes to experience. With this demand for entertainment comes entrepreneurial choices to respond-to provide
the products that people want.
In suggesting that like other entrepreneurial choices, decisions to sell market-driven messages do not warrant vigorous
protection as part of "the freedom of speech," this Article does
not argue that commercial television programs are necessarily
unworthy, or dangerous, or that they should be subject to any
particular sort of regulation. From the perspective of the
healthy respect accorded to free and vigorous commerce
throughout our political history, the profit-motivated choices
that producers make to satisfy market demand are generally to
nication. Regulations displacing commercial programming with speech by
candidates or other concerned members of the public can well be understood
as pursuing the legitimate purpose of enhancing the freedom of speech by increasing the amount of speech available to the public. See infra text accompanying notes 267-70.
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be celebrated. Those who argue that media corporations should
remain free to make whatever programming decisions they
wish, to maximize viewer utility in a regime of consumer sovereignty, would remain fully free to make this policy argument,
and to win the day in political competition.
But from the more demanding perspective that must identify choices warranting special constitutional protection, the
Article suggests that decisions to sell the market-driven message-like other entrepreneurial choices in the regime of consumer sovereignty-do not .warrant protection as speech. Indeed, the worth of commerce in entertainment comprised of
pictures or words-like the worth of commerce in other products-should be more freely debated, and determined politically, by people engaging in speech that is of special constitutional significance-the expression and exchange of their
personal views for the purposes of forging agreement, identifying disagreement, and providing mutual understanding.

I. TELEVISION PROGRAMMING DECISIONS AS PART OF
THE FIRST AMENDMENT'S "FREEDOM OF SPEECH":
THE CONVENTIONAL VIEW
A. IN CONGRESS AND THE FCC:
"EDITORIAL DISCRETION" AND THE "FAIRNESS DOCTRINE"
The fairness doctrine consisted of two components. First,
broadcasters were required to present discussion of public issues. Second, the discussion of public issues presented was to
be balanced.41 Television broadcasters opposed the requirements by arguing that their programming decisionmaking involves the exercise of "editorial discretion" protected by the
First Amendment.42 During the mid-1980s, when the FCC was
considering whether the fairness doctrine should be repealed,
broadcasters repeated arguments they made twenty years ear-

41. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 378 (1969).
42. In Red Lion, broadcasters challenged the fairness doctrine on the
grounds that
the First Amendment protects their desire to use their allotted frequencies continuously to broadcast whatever they choose, and to exclude whomever they choose from ever using that frequency. No man
may be prevented from saying or publishing what he thinks, or from
refusing in his speech or other utterances to give equal weight to the
views ofhis opponents.
Id. at386.
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lier in Red Lion. The FCC noted that ''broadcasters perceive
that the fairness doctrine involves significant burdens"43-in
particular, intrusions on the broadcasters' programming discretion.44
Minority voices within the FCC had long decried the doctrine's intrusion on the editorial discretion of broadcasters and
the resulting abridgement of First Amendment values. In
1964, for example, the FCC scrutinized a local television station in Oregon for failing to provide for "balanced programming." Two Commissioners objected to the inquiry:
The Commission is clearly making a choice between competing interests and values. Presumed quality and "balance" of television programming is one choice and preservation of a wider area of freedom of
expression for the broadcaster is the other.... mfthe principle is established that the Commission has the right and power to prescribe,
either directly or indirectly, the kind and quality of programs that
must be carried by broadcast licensees, then the vital interests of society, the nation, and perhaps the world, in the fullest freedom of
communications and the expression of ideas, in whatever form, may
be compromised.... A lack of satisfying programs on television would
be a small price to pay for the maintenance of the fullest freedom of
communications and the unimpaired vigor of those private rights
which thinkers from Milton, Jefferson, and Mill to the present Supreme Court have declared to be fundamental to the existence and
preservation of a free and democratic society.45

These dissenting views prevailed in the 1980s as the FCC
justified repeal of the fairness doctrine in significant part because of concerns for the "editorial discretion" of broadcasters.
Although the FCC expressed concern about both prongs of the
doctrine, it was more concerned with the requirement that
broadcasters provide balanced coverage of public issues than
the obligation to present discussion of public issues. The requirement of balanced coverage could inhibit the choice to present discussion of controversial public issues, on the supposition that some broadcasters would prefer to say nothing about
43. Report, In the Matter of Inquiry into Section 73.1910 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations Concerning the General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast Licensees, 102 F.C.C.2d 145, 159 (1985) (emphasis omitted, citations omitted, capitalization altered) [hereinafter Report].
44. See id. at 163-64 ("[U]pon a finding that a licensee has violated the
fairness doctrine, we order the broadcaster to provide additional programming.... Since broadcast time is a valuable resource, such a requirement imposes costs upon the licensee. In order to avoid these costs, a broadcaster may
be inhibited from presenting more than a minimal amount of controversial issue programming.").
45. In re Lee Roy McCourry, 2 R.R.2d 895, 907 (1964) (Loevinger, J., dissenting).
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a public issue than to provide a balanced presentation of that
issue. "A licensee may be inhibited from presenting controversial issues of public importance by operation of the fairness doctrine even though the first prong of that doctrine affirmatively
requires the licensee to broadcast such issues."46
The FCC was less concerned about the requirement to discuss public issues, but only because this obligation had never
been vigorously enforced. "[W]ith respect to the affirmative obligation to cover controversial issues of public importance, '[a]
presumption of compliance exists.' ... Indeed, a United States
Court of Appeals has characterized this requirement as one
which is 'not extensive and [can be] met by presenting a minimum of controversial subject matter.'"47 The FCC explicitly rejected more vigorous enforcement of the affirmative coverage
requirement as a solution to the "chill" caused by the balanced
coverage requirement, because the resulting intrusion on the
"editorial discretion" of broadcasters would be exacerbated:
We do not believe that more stringent enforcement of the first prong
would be an appropriate remedial response to the existence of a "chilling effect[.]" Indeed, such an approach increases the severity of major
detriments associated with the fairness doctrine. For example, contrary to the principles of the First Amendment, a stricter regulatory
approach would increase the government's intrusion into the editorial
decision making process of [broadcasters]. 48

It is important to note the type of "editorial discretion" affected by each prong of the fairness doctrine. The obligation of
balanced coverage intrudes on broadcasters' discretion when
they do choose to present discussion of public issues. It affects
how a broadcaster chooses to cover a public issue. The obligation of affirmative coverage intrudes on the programming discretion of broadcasters only if they otherwise would not present
discussion of public issues. 49 It affects whether a broadcaster
chooses to present discussion of a controversial public issue or
to present another type of programming. Thus, in rejecting a
more stringent application of the affirmative requirement to
cover public issues, which could have been imposed without the
requirement of balanced coverage, the FCC elevated as constitutionally protected "editorial discretion" a .decision whether to
46. Report, supra note 43, at 159.
47. Id. at 160 (citations omitted).
48. Inquiry into §73.1910 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations
Concerning the General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast Licensees,
58 R.R.2d 1137, 1152 n.66 (1985).
49. Id. at 1151.
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present a program discussing the state of inner city schools or
to present a soap opera or a situation comedy.
Although both houses of Congress voted to codify the fairness doctrine in The Fairness in Broadcasting Act of 1987,50
concerns about the "editorial discretion" of broadcasters ultimately prevailed. President Reagan vetoed the bill. In his veto
message, the President said that the fairness doctrine amounts
to the "content-based regulation by the Federal Government" of
speech and is, therefore, "antagonistic to the freedom of expression guaranteed by the First Amendment."5 1 He viewed the
doctrine as an effort to "polic[e] the editorial judgment of journalists" that would be "unthinkable" if applied "[i]n any other
medium besides broadcasting'':52
[W]e must not ignore the obvious intent of the First Amendment,
which is to promote vigorous public debate and a diversity of viewpoints in the public forum .... History has shown that the dangers of
an overly timid or biased press cannot be averted through bureaucratic regulation, but only through the freedom and competition that
the First Amendment sought to guarantee. S. 742 ... is, in my judgment, unconstitutional. Well-intentioned as S. 742 may be, it would
be inconsistent with the First Amendment and with the American
tradition of independent journalism.53

This point presupposes that a decision to produce and broadcast an episode of Bosom Buddies rather than an expose on
malpractice in breast cancer detection involves the exercise of
journalistic discretion in a context of public debate.

B. IN THE SUPREME COURT:
"EDITORIAL DISCRETION" AND ''MUST-CARRY" REQUIREMENTS

In Turner Broadcasting v. FCC, the Supreme Court considered a challenge to portions of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 199254 requiring cable
broadcasters to carry certain local broadcast stations. Cable
system operators claimed that these "must-carry rules" infringed their freedom of speech by intruding on their protected
"editorial discretion" and "journalistic discretion" to decide

50. S. 742, lOOth Cong. (1987).
51. President's Message to the Senate Returning Without Approval the
Fairness in Broadcasting Bill, 1 RONALD REAGAN, PUB. PAPERS 690, 690-91
(June 19, 1987) (1989).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 690-91.
54. Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (1992).
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what speech is carried through their lines and what speech is
not.
The controversy first reached the Supreme Court when the
Turner Broadcasting System appealed the District Court's decision granting the government's motion for summary judgment. The Court vacated the District Court's judgment in
Turner 155 on the ground that issues of material fact remained
unresolved in the record and remanded the case for further
proceedings.
The controversy next reached the Supreme Court after the
District Court again granted the government's motion for
summary judgment based on additional fact finding. In Turner
JJ5 6 , the Court found that summary judgment for the government was appropriate and affirmed the district court's decision.
In both cases, members of the Court disagreed about
whether the challenged provisions of the Act were contentneutral or content-based and, therefore, about the appropriate
burden of proof under the First Amendment. Although the
government ultimately prevailed, all members of the Court did
agree that the regulations in question intruded on the cable
broadcasters' "editorial discretion" protected by the First
Amendment and, therefore, imposed on the government a special burden of justification.
In Turner I, Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Blackmun, O'Connor, Scalia, Souter,
Thomas, and Ginsburg, stated the following:
There can be no disagreement on an initial premise: Cable programmers and cable operators engage in and transmit speech, and they are
entitled to the protection of the speech and press provisions of the
First Amendment. . . . Through "original programming or by exercising editorial discretion over which stations or programs to include in its repertoire," cable programmers and operators "see[k) to
communicate messages on a wide variety of topics and in a wide variety of formats." By requiring cable systems to set-aside a portion of
their channels for local broadcasters, the must-carry rules regulate
cable speech in two respects: The rules reduce the number of channels
over which cable operators exercise unfettered control, and they render it more difficult for cable programmers to compete for carriage on
the limited channels remaining.57
55. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
56. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997).
57. Turner I, 512 U.S. 622, 636-37 (1994) (citations omitted); see also
Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 444 (1991) ("Cable television provides to its
subscribers news, information, and entertainment. It is engaged in 'speech'
under the First Amendment, and is, in much of its operation, part of the
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These Justices rooted their view of First Amendment rights
largely in the notion that speech is protected because it is essential for democratic self-government. ss
Justice Stevens did not join this part of the Court's opinion
in Turner I, but not because he disagreed with the premise that
a broadcaster's decisions about what programs to carry are constitutionally protected as part of the freedom of speech. He
noted,
[t]he must-carry obligations may be broader than necessary to protect
vulnerable broadcasters, but that alone would not be enough to demonstrate that they violate the First Amendment. Thus, for instance,
to the extent that §§ 4 and 5 obligate cable operators to carry broadcasters they would have carried even in the absence of a statutory obligation, any impairment of operators' freedom of choice, or on cable
programmers' ability to secure carriage, would be negligible. 59

Stevens thus implicitly acknowledges that when the regulation
does require a cable operator to carry programming it otherwise would not carry, the government would be intruding on
the operator's "freedom of choice" protected by the First
Amendment.
Justice Breyer was not involved in Turner I. In Turner II,
however, he stated,
I do not deny that the compulsory carriage that creates the "guarantee" extracts a serious First Amendment price. It interferes with the
protected interests of the cable operators to choose their own programming; it prevents displaced cable program providers from obtaining an audience; and it will sometimes prevent some cable viewers
from watching what, in its absence, would have been their preferred
set of programs. This "price" amounts to a "suppression ofspeech."60

Breyer viewed these interests of the cable providers, and the
interests of the local broadcasters that Congress was seeking to
protect, as rooted in a policy that "seeks to facilitate the public
discussion and informed deliberation, which . . . democratic

'press.'"). Although the Court was talking about cable programmers and
broadcasters in particular, it is clear that it views the programming and
transmission activities of television broadcasters as "speech" protected by the
First Amendment.
58. See Turner I, 512 U.S. at 641 ("At the heart of the First Amendment
lies the principle that each person should decide for himself or herself the
ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, and adherence. Our
political system and cultural life rest upon this ideal.").
59. Id. at 673 n.6 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (emphasis added).
60. Turner II, 520 U.S. 180, 226 (1997).
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government presupposes and the First Amendment seeks to
achieve."61
As the Court found the "editorial discretion" of cable operators protected by the First Amendment, it has found the programming decisions of broadcast television stations and networks to be part of "the freedom of speech" as well. In CBS u.
FCC,62 for example, the Court considered whether the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) violated congressional intent or the First Amendment by ordering television broadcast
networks to carry, against their will, a paid political advertisement for President Carter's reelection. All three major television networks argued that the FCC had "violate[d] the First
Amendment rights of broadcasters by unduly circumscribing
their editorial discretion."63 In particular, the networks were
concerned about the "disruption of regular programming"
caused by the Carter-Mondale campaign request and "the potential equal time requests from rival candidates."64
Chief Justice Burger's opinion for the Court accepted that
the broadcasters had a constitutionally protected interest in
exercising "editorial discretion" over programming decisions,
but reasoned that such rights had to be weighed against competing public interests which themselves had constitutional
magnitude. He noted that "[a]lthough the broadcasting industry is entitled . . . to exercise the widest journalistic freedom
consistent with its public [duties], ... it is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is
paramount."65 Because broadcast media are characterized by a
61. Id. at 227. Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices Scalia, Thomas, and
Ginsburg, began with the premise that "[t]he must-carry requirements ...
burden an operator's First Amendment freedom to exercise unfettered control
over a number of channels in its system, whether or not the operator's present
choice is aligned with that of the Government." Id. at 250; see also Leathers v.
Medlock, 499 U.S. at 444 ("Cable television provides to its subscribers news,
information, and entertainment. It is engaged in 'speech' under the First
Amendment, and is, in much of its operation, part of the 'press.'"); City of Los
Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 494 (1986)
("Through original programming or by exercising editorial discretion over
which stations or programs to include in its repertoire, respondent seeks to
communicate messages on a wide variety of topics and in a wide variety of
formats."); FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 707 (1979) (stating that
cable operators have "a significant amount of editorial discretion regarding
what their programming will include").
62. 453 U.S. 367 (1981).
63. Id. at 394.
64. Id. at 393.
65. Id. at 395 (quotations and citations omitted).
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physical scarcity that precludes many who wish to speak from
doing so, and because some regulation of the use of broadcast
frequencies is necessary to prevent chaotic cacophony, the
Court has held that Congress has greater discretion to impinge
upon the protected rights of broadcasters than it does with respect to other speakers66_including, for example, cable television operators. 67 Whatever the merits of the analysis based on
the physical characteristics of broadcast media, 68 the important
point for present purposes is the Court's point of departure:
when television broadcasters make programming decisions,
they are exercising "editorial discretion" or 'journalistic discretion" protected by the First Amendment.69

66. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389-90 (1969).
67. See Turner I, 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
68. The free-market theorists have lodged a devastating attack on the
proposition that broadcast television should be subject to different First
Amendment rules than are other media based on physical characteristics of
the broadcast spectrum. See, e.g., BEVIER, supra note 14, at 21-28 (arguing
that scarcity "does not support the broad proposition for which it is most commonly advanced"); KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 10, at 203 (noting that
the Court's distinctions between broadcasting and print media are criticized
extensively by modern commentators); POSNER, supra note 14, at 672-74 (describing the Court's scarcity justification for distinguishing between broadcast
and print media as "economic nonsense"); Matthew L. Spitzer, The Constitutionality of Licensing Broadcasters, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 990, 1007-28 (1989) (examining and criticizing the various rationales that have been posited for providing less First Amendment protection to broadcasters than to print media).
The Court might well find that the circumstances of broadcast technology today are so different from those prevailing when Red Lion was decided that it
would no longer invoke the notice of spectrum scarcity for evaluating the constitutionality of new intrusions on the programming discretion of broadcasters. See infra note 87 and accompanying text.
69. In Miami Herald Publishing Co. u. Tornillo, the Court invalidated a
Florida statute that imposed criminal penalties on newspaper editors who
failed to provide a right of reply to candidates for public office after attacking
the "personal character" of those candidates. 418 U.S. 241 (1974). The Court
said that "we reaffirm unequivocally the protection afforded to editorial judgment.... Any such a compulsion to publish that which reason tells [newspapers] should not be published is unconstitutional." Id. at 255-56 (quotations
omitted). Furthermore,
[t]he choice of material to go into a newspaper, and the decisions
made as to limitations on the size and content of the paper, and
treatment of public issues and public officials-whether fair or unfair-constitute the exercise of editorial control and judgment. It has
yet to be demonstrated how governmental regulation of this crucial
process can be exercised consistent with First Amendment guarantees
of a free press as they have evolved to this time.
Id. at258.
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Justice White, joined by Justices Rehnquist and Stevens,
dissented from the Court's decision upholding the FCC's intrusion on the programming preferences of the three major broadcast networks. Justice White was convinced that Congress had
not intended to authorize the FCC to impose on broadcasters'
discretion in this way. In his view, Congress wished '"to leave
broad journalistic discretion with the licensee."'70 "'[T]he policy
of the Act [was] to preserve editorial control of programming in
the licensee."'71 White found these congressional policies rooted
in the First Amendment itself:
These policies have been so clear and are so obviously grounded in
constitutional considerations that in the absence of unequivocal legislative intent to the contrary, it should not be assumed that
§ 312(a)(7) was designed to make the kind of substantial inroads in
these basic considerations that the Commission has now mandated. 72

Thus, expressing concern with the potential for a "substantial
disruption of regular programming,"73 Justice White found
that the FCC's regulation of the programming discretion of
television broadcasters intruded upon their constitutionally
protected "journalistic discretion" and that Congress had not
intended to authorize the FCC to tread around or beyond these
boundaries of constitutional permissibility.74
C. DOCTRINAL CONSEQUENCES OF VIEWING TELEVISION
PROGRAMMING DECISIONS AS NOT PART OF "THE FREEDOM OF
SPEECH": A PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION

Turner and CBS indicate that even if programming decisions are viewed as "editorial discretion" protected as part of
the "freedom of speech," the government is not entirely precluded from requiring television networks to carry materials
they otherwise would not present. This does not mean, however, that the matter is without doctrinal significance. CBS
was decided within the Red Lion framework. Broadcasters'
protected editorial discretion was subordinated to the rights of
the audience, which the Court deemed to be amplified by the
scarcity of available broadcast frequencies. Yet, the scarcity ra-

70. CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 400 (1981) (quoting CBS, Inc. v.
Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 105 (1973)).
71. Id. at 401 (quoting FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 705
(1979)).
72. Id. at 402.
73. Id. at 415.
74. See id. at 418.
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tionale for according a different constitutional status to the
regulation of broadcasters has itself come under withering attack. 75 Turner was decided by a Court that had not yet determined-as it still has not-whether the speech interests of cable television providers are more like those of television
broadcasters or newspaper publishers or, for that matter,
whether broadcasters will continue to be accorded a different
constitutional status than are newspaper editors.
Indeed, the Court has invalidated regulations requiring
newspapers to carry content contrary to their own editorial
preferences. In Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, a
newspaper challenged a Florida statute requiring it to publish
a response from a political candidate whose "personal character" the newspaper had attacked. Florida endeavored to justify
the statute based on arguments similar to those underlying the
fairness doctrine.76
The Court determined that this statute intruded into the
"editorial judgment" of the newspaper, 77 which is at the core of
the First Amendment's protections. Chief Justice Burger's
opinion for the Court declared that any "compulsion exerted by
government on a newspaper to print that which it would not
otherwise print"-any compulsion "to publish that which reason tells them should not be published"-is unconstitutional.78
Burger found this principle determinative regardless of
whether the regulation had the effect of displacing material the
newspaper otherwise would have published or of requiring the
newspaper simply to print more material than it otherwise
would have published.
Assuming the first scenario, not only is the newspaper required to carry what it does not want to carry, it is prevented
from presenting material that it does want to present. Assuming the second scenario, "[e]ven if a newspaper would face no
additional costs to comply with a compulsory access law,"79 it is
simply the right of a speaker not to speak that is infringed.
Chief Justice Burger and the Court determined that this aspect
75. See supra note 68.
76. Florida argued that newspapers broadly influence public opinion, that
they have become big business controlled by relatively few wealthy corporations, and that access to these vehicles for effective communication is severely
restricted. Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 247-255 (1974).
77. Id. at 256.
78. Id. (quotations omitted).
79. Id. at 258.
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of constitutionally protected "editorial discretion" was sufficiently significant to warrant invalidation of the Florida statute:
A newspaper is more than a passive receptacle or conduit for news,
comment, and advertising. The choice of material to go into a newspaper, and the decisions made as to limitations on the size and content of the paper, and treatment of public issues and public officialswhether fair or unfair-constitute the exercise of editorial control and
judgment.80

In contrast with such solicitous concern for a newspaper's
right not to publish "that which reason tells them should not be
published," the Court has been virtually dismissive of the claim
that property owners who were engaged not in speech, but in
commerce, have a right protected by the First Amendment to
exclude speakers from their property. In Pruneyard Shopping
Center v. Robins,81 shopping mall owners challenged an interpretation of the California Constitution requiring them to permit access for those who wish to engage in "speech and petitioning." The property owners argued that their freedom of speech
under the First Amendment had been abridged because they
had been "forced by the State to use [their] property as a forum
for the speech of others."82 They based their argument, in part,
on Tornillo. The Court rejected this argument out of hand, noting that Tornillo "rests on the principle that the State cannot
tell a newspaper what it must print.... The statute was found
to be an 'intrusion into the function of editors.' These concerns
obviously are not present here.''83
The Court has been struggling to determine whether cable
television providers should be treated more like television
broadcasters (that is, pursuant to Red Lion, subject to more
regulation of editorial discretion under a broadcast spectrum
scarcity rationale) or like newspaper publishers (that is, pursuant to Tornillo, subject, at most, to de minimus regulation of
editorial discretion under a traditional speaker's discretion rationale). Indeed, three members of the Court have declared
that cable television should be accorded the First Amendment
rights of newspapers. 84
Justice Thomas, Chief Justice
Rehnquist, and Justice Scalia finally resolved for themselves
80. Id.
81. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
82. Id. at 85.
83. Id. at 88 (quoting Tomillo, 418 U.S. at 258).
84. Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727,
814 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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the status of cable television providers and aligned their First
Amendment rights with those of newspapers:
The Red Lion standard does not apply to cable television. . . . In
Turner, by adopting much of the print paradigm, and by rejecting Red
Lion, we adopted with it a considerable body of precedent that governs the respective First Amendment rights of competing speakers.
In Red Lion, we had legitimized consideration of the public interest
and emphasized the rights of viewers, at least in the abstract. Under
that view, "[i]t is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right
of the broadcasters, which is paramount." After Turner, however,
that view can no longer be given any credence in the cable context. It
is the operator's right that is preeminent. 85

In determining that Pruneyard was inapplicable to regulatory
intrusions on the programming discretion of cable operators,
Thomas noted that "we permitted California's compelled access
rule only because it did not burden or conflict with the mall
owner's own speech."86 Thus, for Thomas, Rehnquist, and
Scalia, the cable operator's constitutionally protected editorial
discretion to choose programming was to be determined by reference to the rights of newspaper editors as conceived in Tornillo.
At the same time, the FCC has determined that the physical scarcity rationale may no longer be applicable to broadcasting, or persuasive even if applicable, and that perhaps even
television broadcasters should be understood as possessing constitutionally protected editorial discretion akin to that enjoyed
by newspaper publishers. 87 Members of the Court have at least
intimated as much, recognizing how quickly telecommunications technologies are changing and the potential need for doctrinal adjustments in response to technological evolution. 88
85. Id. at 815-16 (quoting Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390).
86. Id. at 820 n.5.
87. In determining that the fairness doctrine should be repealed, the FCC
rejected the notion that scarcity of broadcast frequencies justifies intruding on
a broadcaster's "editorial discretion." The FCC determined that the availability of cable television, satellite television, newspapers, and other information
sources together "provid[e] the public with suitable access to the marketplace
of ideas so as to render the fairness doctrine unnecessary." In the Matter of
Inquiry into Section 73.1910 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations Concerning the General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast Licensees, 102
F.C.C.2d 142, 197 (1985). Even without viewing broadcast television in context with other forms of television and print information sources, the development of digital broadcast television could itself destroy the scarcity rationale
for diluted protection for the "editorial discretion" of broadcasters.
88. Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens, O'Connor, and Souter, declined to identify a standard of review in a challenge to provisions of the Cable
Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992. These provi-
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Given the attack on the rationales for treating broadcast television differently from other technologies for communication, the
day may soon come when the Court determines that not only
cable television, but broadcast television as well, should be
given the same protection under the First Amendment as newspaper publishers. 89
The analysis to be presented in this Article develops a perspective with doctrinal consequences for the protection of television programmers that move in the opposite direction. The
analysis will not depend on the technological characteristics of
the medium at issue. Rather, it will depend on the nature of
human choices as they relate to constitutional norms.
The following sections will explore the following proposition: television networks-whether broadcast or cable-to the
extent that they are acting as entrepreneurs responding to the
economic market forces of consumer sovereignty should be
viewed as not possessing the First Amendment rights of editorial discretion akin to those of traditional newspaper editors.
Rather, such television networks should be viewed as possessing rights akin to those of Pruneyard's shopping center owners-that is, property owners engaged not in speech, but in
commerce, who wish to maintain control of their property for
commercial rather than for communicative reasons.
II. TELEVISION PROGRAMMING DECISIONS AND
CONSUMER SOVEREIGNTY
We have used [the First Amendment] for the protection of private,
possessive interests with which it has no concern. It is misinterpretations such as this which, in our use of the radio, the moving picture,

sions permitted cable operators to refuse to carry "patently offensive" sexual
programs on their public access channels. Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Constortium, 518 U.S. at 738. These four Justices determined that it would be
"unwise" and "premature" to choose a "specific set of [doctrinal] words now,"
because '"[t]he broadcast industry is dynamic in terms of technological change;
solutions adequate a decade ago are not necessarily so now, and those acceptable today may be outmoded ten years hence.'" Id. at 738-42 (quoting CBS v.
Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 102 (1973)). Reluctance, based on technological change, to identify a doctrinal approach to adjudicating the constitutionality of regulations of the cable industry applies as well to maintaining a
decades-old doctrinal approach to adjudicating the constitutionality of regulations of the broadcast industry. Indeed, Justice Breyer specifically referred to
the dynamic nature of broadcasting, even though the case at hand involved
regulation of cable operators.
89. See, e.g., KRA'ITENMAKER & POWE, supra note 10, at 55; POSNER, supra note 14, at 672-74; Spitzer, supra note 68, at 1007-28.
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the newspaper and other forms of publication, are giving the name
"freedoms" to the most flagrant enslavements of our minds and wills.
-Alexander Meiklejohn90
It [is] time to move away from thinking about broadcasters as trustees. It [is] time to treat them the way almost everyone else in society
does-that is, as businesses. [T]elevision is just another appliance.
It's a toaster with pictures.
-Then-FCC Chairman Mark Fowler91

A. A TAXONOMY OF ACTORS IN THE DISSEMINATION OF
TELEVISION PROGRAMMING

Many people are involved in the ultimate dissemination of
television programming: writers, directors, camera operators,
actors, producers, editors, and the corporate executives who decide which programs to order and to put on the air.9 2 The
writer might conceive her role as artist. She might seek to express her view of truth, or beauty, or an ugly reality. So might
the directors, the camera, lighting, and sound technicians, the
actors, and the producers. There may be countless creative
production teams, all endeavoring to create some version of
truth through television programming as an art form.
Many, however, do not. Muriel Cantor has studied the
ways in which television producers choose story lines and has
considered the extent to which these actors seek to please their
own sense of creativity, their sense of what the viewing audience wants, or their sense of what the television networks and
advertisers want. She concludes that "[w]hen selecting content,
producers have to consider the organizations who finance and
control the series, the craft groups who work alongside them, as
well as the viewing audience."93 Cantor notes that while "it
is ... possible that [some] television producers make decisions
with only their own aesthetic standards as reference points, "94
other "creators make decisions based both on what the network

90. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 26, at 104-05.
91. Then-FCC Chairman Mark Fowler, justifying the repeal of the fairness doctrine regulations, quoted in SUNSTEIN, supra note 13, at 49 (footnote
omitted).
92. MURIEL G. CANTOR, THE HOLLYWOOD TV PRODUCER: HIS WORK AND
HIS AUDIENCE 92 (1983).
93. Id. at 38.
94. Id. at 31-32.
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officials want and on their own intuitive judgment of what the
audience wants."95
Indeed, in the end, the goals and purposes of producers,
writers, and other "creative" participants are of practical irrelevance for determining the content of the television programming that is actually presented to the viewing public.
These are relatively powerless players-at the mercy of those
who select which programs to carry-much as is the ordinary
citizen who herself might wish to say something to the nation
but who cannot gain access to the broadcast signal or cable.
The discretion of the television programmer impinges upon the
"creative" participants' interests, or serves their interests, depending on what "editorial" choices the programmer makes in
service of the media corporation's :ri.eeds.96 Indeed, the fairness
95. Id. at 29; see also Jaime Wolf, The Blockbuster Script Factory, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 23, 1998 (Magazine), at 32, 35. Wolf describes "the blockbuster

way of thinking" in movie production. From this perspective,
a script is far less a literary or an imaginative undertaking than it is
a business plan for a start-up company that requires some ... $100
million in initial capitalizaj;ion. In essence, studios are investment
banks that specialize in financing this kind of venture; their executives are experts in evaluating such plans in terms of particular elements that are thought to guarantee a good return.
Id. As for other expensive and complex manufacturing enterpnses, there is a
specialization and division of function in writing these blockbusters. "Screenwriters who labor to get a movie green-lighted merely stand at the head of a
conveyor belt designed by producers and studios to precision-tool hits, sending
their scripts along for subsequent handling by a small army of additional writers," each one with a different specific skill and function. Id. at 32.
96. Gitlin describes the structure and players involved in the television
programming process:
Each network contains an entertainment division, within which there
are development departments for drama, comedy, and movies for
television. They plant ideas for shows with producers, or with the
major suppliers-studios and production companies-who hire the
right producers and writers for the project; ·and they take ideas"pitches"-directly from writers and producers.
TODD GITLIN, INSIDE PRIME TIME 20 (1983). And he describes the principle by
which they determine what shows to produce: "If they think the characters,
the relationships, and the premises will resonate with a mass audience, they
underwrite a script." Id.
The television programmer chooses among countless programming options
in a highly selective way. The television programmer, and the higher executives to which the programmer is accountable, evaluate some three thousand
program ideas per year. From those three thousand ideas, she will order one
hundred scripts. Among those scripts, twenty-five pilots might be produced.
Among those pilots, five or ten might be selected for produced and broadcasting. And among those new productions, one or two might be renewed for another season. Id. at 20-21; see also CANTOR, supra note 92, at 32 ("If a producer is successful it may be that his choices are in agreement with a number
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doctrine, the cable must-carry rules, the Prime Time Access
Rules, or possible mandates of free air time for political candidates impinge upon the discretion of the programmer, not upon
the writer, the director, the actor, or others who might claim to
be engaging in speaker-driven self-expression. 97 It is, in short,
the programmer who is the operative decision maker and the
object of past and potential governmental regulations. It is the
programmer, as agent of the media corporation's interests, who
asserts constitutionally privileged "editorial discretion" when
such regulations are challenged under the First Amendment.
of subgroups and publics who make up the audience. If the producer is unable
to communicate to a large enough segment of the audience, his series is
dropped.")
97. Even writers and producers, to a surprising extent, are purposefully
engaged in an entrepreneurial pursuit of a mass audience by creating products
shaped by the forces of consumer sovereignty, as they understand the agenda
of the networks and advertisers to whom they are accountable. According to
Gitlin, "[e]pisode writers are usually modest and often embarrassed by their
labors." GITLIN, supra note 96, at 71. He quotes one comedy writer: "You
don't have to have talent to write for television.... I thought it was writing,
but it's not. It's a craft. It's like a tailor. You want cuffs? You've got cuffs."
Id.
Soon after the Supreme Court decided Brown v. Board of Education, Rod
Serling wrote a story for television inspired by the murder of a black youth in
Mississippi by two whites who were angered because their victim had apparently whistled at a white woman.
By the time Serling took the idea to the Theater Guild for production
on the U.S. Steel Hour, he was already trimming.... [T]he victim was
now an old pawnbroker, the killer a neurotic.... To avert the slightest hint that Serling's unspecified location might be the South, the executives insisted that the show open with a shot of a white church
spire, New England style.
GITLIN, supra note 96, at 182. Significantly, Serling, himself, anticipated the
need to cater to the perceived desires of the audience, stripping the story of its
essence, of the elements that inspired him-racism in the American South of
the 1950s.
Even Norman Lear, creator and producer of All in the Family, a show that
seemed to have so much ideological content in the early 1970s, was more engaged in creating a market-driven message than in self-expression. "When
Lear Americanized All in the Family from its English prototype, he says, 'I
was one hundred percent interested in creaming an audience.'" Id. at 212.
Yet there remain protestations of personal creativity and agenda among
some writers and producers:
The medium's leading writers and producers insist that they can cater to the audience's tastes without pandering to them. In the words
of [producer] Leonard Goldberg, ... "I think it is the responsibility of
television not only to entertain, but present contemporary problems
facing our society and to offer some guidance, some hope, and just to
make people think about them."
S. ROBERT LICHTER ET AL., WATCHING AMERICA 10 (1991).
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B. TELEVISION PROGRAMMERS AS RATIONAL PROFIT
MAxlMIZERS IN THE REGIME OF CONSUMER SOVEREIGNTY
Leading free-market theorists suppose that profit-seeking
media corporations respond to market forces as does any other
sort of profit-seeking corporation. Krattenmaker and Powe, for
example, criticize FCC efforts to improve the "quality" of broadcast programming. "Quality is a function of viewers' desires
and broadcasters' resources, elements the FCC cannot control."98 Thus, "to succeed, a broadcaster, like any entrepreneur,
[must] know what customers want. "99
Richard Posner also supposes that television networks develop and select programming in an entrepreneurial fashion to
maximize profit. In considering whether monopoly or competition could produce more "diversity'' in television programming,
Judge Posner reasoned from the premise that programming decisions are made by reference to anticipated viewer preferences:
[M]onopoly in broadcasting could actually promote rather than retard
programming diversity. If all the television channels in a particular
market were owned by a single firm, its optimal programming strategy would be to put on a sufficiently varied menu of programs in each
time slot to appeal to every substantial group of potential television
viewers in the market, not just the largest group. For that would be
the strategy that maximized the size of the station's audience. Suppose, as a simple example, that there were only two television broadcast frequencies (and no cable television), and that 90 percent of the
viewers in the market wanted to watch comedy from 7 to 8 p.m. and
10 percent wanted to watch ballet. The monopolist would broadcast
comedy over one frequency and ballet over the other, and thus gain
100 percent of the potential audience. If the frequencies were licensed to two competing firms, each firm would broadcast comedy in
the 7 to 8 p.m. time slot, because its expected audience share would
be 45 percent (one half of 90 percent), which is greater than 10 percent. Each prime-time slot would be filled with "popular" programming targeted on the median viewer, and minority tastes would go
unserved. Some critics of television believe that this is a fair description of prime-time network television. Each network vies to put on
the most popular programs and as a result minority tastes are ill
served. 100

From the opposite end of the political spectrum, and basing
his opinion on observation as much as on theory, Todd Gitlin is
also among those who interpret programming decisions as
driven by an entrepreneurial desire to identify and to satisfy
98. KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 10, at 73.
99. Id. at 79.
100. Schurz Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 982 F.2d 1043, 1054-55 (7th Cir.
1992); see also POSNER, supra note 14, at 672-74.
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consumer demand. He acknowledges the undeniable fact that
television programming executives are people like all others
and have their own tastes and their own politics. Yet when acting as a television executive, rather than as citizen or parent,
the programmer ordinarily subordinates her tastes and values
to the demands of the job. Gitlin suggests that "executives
learn to heed the institutional voice. If they possess any distinct taste, aside from a relish for show-business glitter, they
have to dispel it, or subdue it. To keep taste and market judgment separate is 'professional."'101 And for the television executive, professionalism on the job demands programming decisions that will maximize revenue-revenue generated by the
decisions of advertisers to buy time during the programs in
question. 102
Network executives often say that their problem is simple. Their tradition, in a sense, is a search for steady profits. They want, above all,
to put on the air shows best calculated to accumulate maximum reliable audiences. Maximum audiences attract maximum dollars for
advertisers, and advertiser dollars are, after all, the network's objective.103

Thus, the programming executive sees ''himself as the instrument of the popular will." 104 "The trick is not only to read the
restless public mood, but somehow to anticipate it and figure
out how to encapsulate it in a show."105
In this regard, Gitlin reports the views of a vice-president
for research projects at NBC, who likened the production of
television shows to the production of automobiles. "Most people
do not put on television what they personally like any more

101. GITLIN, supra note 96, at 23-24.
102. "Television executives certainly do not see themselves as opinion leaders. They live in terror of ratings and perceive their basic task as predicting
the public's response." Edward Rubin, Television and the Experience of Citizenship, 68 TEX. L. REV. 1155, 1158 (1990).
103. GITLIN, supra note 96, at 24-25. Muriel Cantor agrees:
The decisionmaking process in the television industry has to be understood in the general construct of commercial television. The main
function of entertainment programs generally is to attract large audiences to sell products; therefore, if a show does not attract a large
enough audience, it often will be dropped. The advertiser wants a
certain number of viewers for his money; in fact, the "cost per thousand" viewers often determines whether the advertiser will stay with
a show.
CANTOR, supra note 92, at 64.
104. GITLIN, supra note 96, at 24.
105. Id. at 203.
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than executives in Detroit make ,cars they personally like."106
The head of the Entertainment Division for CBS, B. Donald
Grant, also compared the production of television shows to the
manufacture of automobiles, and expressed a similar professional ethic: "I have my own values. Everybody has their own
values. The guy who is making Chevrolet cars, let's say, may
have Cadillac tastes, but he's making Chevrolet cars because
he knows that that's what's marketable. And that's basic.
Business is a business."107 AB Krattenmaker and Powe argue
that no distinction exists in fact between the market dynamic
shaping the production decisions of automobile or sneaker
manufacturers and those of television programmers, 108 so
Grant confirms the proposition.109
106. Id. at 24.
107. Id. at 230.
108. See KRATIENMAKER & POWE, supra note 10, at 280-282.
109. Gitlin is emphatic about the extent to which the quest for ratings, for
the "maximum reliable audiences," provides the governing principle and dynamic by which decisions are made about what shows to create, to air, and to
retain. GITLIN, supra note 96, at 25. "Short-sighted guesses of future ratings
are the alpha and omega shaping the shows that take up the prime time of
Americans, the twenty-two hours a week ... when, at any given moment, onethird of all Americans are staring into the blue light." Id. at 11. Network executives admit as much. In response to criticisms about the poor quality of
television programming, networks "insist[] that they simply gave people the
entertainment they wanted." Id. at 12. A vice president for television research at CBS has similarly stated that "I'm not interested in culture. I'm not
interested in pro-social values. I have only one interest. That's whether people watch the program. That's my definition of good, that's my definition of
bad." Id. at 31; see also Roger D. Wimmer & Martha L. Popowski, Program
and Audience Research, in BROADCAST/CABLE PROGRAMMING: STRATEGIES
AND PRACTICES 44, 45 (Susan Tyler Eastman et al. eds., 3d ed. 1989) ("Broadcast and cable programmers are interested in one goal: reaching the maximum
possible audience.").
Television networks have constructed elaborate procedures and mechanisms for predicting market demand for potential programs and for measuring
market "consumption" of existing programs. CANTOR, supra note 92, at 64-65;
see also Wimmer & Popowski, supra, at 45-54. Confirming their abiding objective to create the market-driven message, the networks conduct research on
"every marketable attribute of a show: plots, continuations, concepts, stars,
titles." GITLIN, supra note 96, at 39. According to the executive in charge of
testing for ABC in the early 1980s, a television show "is a machine whose
parts wear out. Its use lies entirely in its marketability; why not let testing
diagnose the faulty elements?" Id. Yet, for all the energy expended in predicting audience demand for different television productions, television executives
view the task of predicting popularity as part science and part art. Id. at 25,
31.
The quest for the surest possible maximum audience explains why
the networks are cautious yet, in their limited way, pluralist at the
same time. Executives want to play it safe, but there are two impor-
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C. ALTERNATIVE VIEWS OF THE TELEVISION PROGRAMMING
DECISION

Some argue that programming executives have not entirely
excluded their personal values from their professional decisionmaking. They suggest, first, that even when they are trying to serve the corporate bottom line, the television elite cannot help but allow their personal values to insinuate themselves into productions. These commentators point to the
content of television programming, especially its evolution over
the past half century, as evidence of a particular political bias.
Second, some suggest that the television elite use their power
intentionally to shape public opinion.
These hypotheses complicate the question of whether television programming decisions respond to the forces of consumer
sovereignty in the way that other entrepreneurial production
decisions do. But consider the significance of the first hypothesis mentioned above. Even if it is true that some television
programming executives unavoidably allow their personal values to shape their business decisions while endeavoring to
maximize corporate profits, they are still trying to construct a
message that responds to the demands of the market. Their attitude, intent, and strategy are not concerned with promoting
their own values and pursuing their own priorities. By this
hypothesis, they do not devote their most important persuasive
resources to the issues of greatest concern to them. I10 In the
programs they choose and the topics they pursue, their goal
remains to maximize profits by satisfying outside forces rather
than their personal values and priorities. Such television programmers may be imperfect business decision makers, but they
remain, at their essence, business decision makers.III
tant qualifications. They are not expert at knowing just how to play
it safe. And if they succeed in playing it too safe, they may bore their
audience to the point of indifference. From these qualifications flow
whatever diversity the networks maintain. The quest for the oflbeat
or for high demographics and prestige, sends them after new material, satisfying some of the creative drives of some writers and producers; then the quest for the mass market clicks back in, flattening
that new material, striving to reduce it to standard proportions.
Id. at 186-87.
110. This is quite unlike decisions to be expected by a participant in pluralist and republican decisionmaking. See infra Part III.B.1.
111. Consider an analogous situation so familiar in debates about the nature of law. If a federal judge, while endeavoring to engage in "neutral" interpretation, cannot help but allow her personal values to shape her decisions,
she is hardly rendered indistinguishable from a legislator or a voter. She may
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Consider, now, the second hypothesis. According to Ben
Stein, who studied television during the 1970s, programming
has manifested a particular (liberal) political orientation. Stein
has suggested that television reflects a consistent perspective
on businessmen (that they are evil), 112 crime (that it is portrayed-inaccurately, in Stein's view-as typically perpetrated
by whites on whites),113 police (romanticized),114 the military
(bureaucratic, mindless, and lacking human decency),115 small
towns (peaceful and lovely on the surface, while hiding evil underneath),116 big cities (that New York is exciting, intense, but
dangerous, while Los Angeles is less exciting, more ''laid-back,"
and less dangerous),117 the rich (superficially lovely, while
be an imperfect judge, and even a poor one, but she thinks about legal issues
that arise during her cases differently from the way she thinks about political
issues when standing in a voting booth. As a judge, her values impede her
goal of neutral interpretation. As a voter, vindicating her personal values is
her goal.
112. BEN STEIN, THE VIEW FROM SUNSET BOULEVARD: AMERICA AS
BROUGHT TO You BY THE PEOPLE WHO MAKE TELEVISION 15-28 (1979).
113. See id. at 29-39. In Stein's view, real-life murderers and rapists "are
usually poor, minority-group people, apparently acting on sudden impulses of
rage and anger," while "robberies and muggings are also usually perpetrated
by young minority-group males" and the victim usually is "another ghetto
dweller." Id. at 30. He continues, "On television, things could hardly be more
different. The typical TV murder involves a well-to-do white person killing
another well-to-do white person.... The criminal is a comfortable middle-class
or upper-middle-class person, even if not a businessman." Id. at 30.
One can quarrel with the accuracy of Stein's views about whites, racial
minorities, and crime. Indeed, he claims that "[i]n the thousands of hours I
have spent watching adventure shows, I have never seen a major crime
committed by a poor, teenage, black, Mexican, or Puerto Rican youth, even
though they account for a high percentage of all violent crime." Id. at 31. But
even if television does not accurately convey the demography of crime, the
question remains whether the television producer and programmer are
portraying personal views of reality, or whether they are reacting to the
public's tastes and preferences. Stein's observations about the content of
television programming with respect to crime is consistent with Gitlin's analysis of how programmers determine which shows to order and to broadcast.
114. See id. at 40-46.
115. See id. at 47-56.
116. See id. at 63-73.
117. See id. at 74-80. Stein himself seems to have no love lost for New
York City, characterizing it as tainted by "the filth, the street killings, the
junkies, the high prices, the cheating, the dirty air, and the other realities of
New York life." Id. at 79. He sees television executives as largely transplanted to Los Angeles from New York, as retaining a wistful bias in favor of
New York, and as expressing that bias in their programming decisions:
The affection that TV writers and producers feel for New York comes
across clearly in shows set in Los Angeles. A person who has lived in
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scheming and unhappy underneath),118 the poor (without flaw
or fault, society's heroes or victims), 119 and the clergy (absent
from primetime television). 120
One might quarrel with the accuracy of Stein's observations about the content of television programming. One might
question, if the observations ever were accurate, 12 1 whether
they remain so. More significant for purposes of this Article's
analysis, however, is the possibility that the political slant that
Ben Stein has detected may reflect not the persuasive agenda
of television programmers, producers, and writers, but the escapist and entertainment agenda of the public. 122 Even a television program constructed purely to satisfy consumer desires
has content reflecting values. Its content, however, like the
content of an automobile, or a pair of trendy sneakers, is a
function of the consumers' values.
It is possible that media corporate managers would choose
to sacrifice profits by endeavoring to affect public values and
perceptions through the expression of their personal opinions
or the opinions of the corporate entity. After all, Mobil purchases op-ed space in the New York Times; CBS could well devote some of its broadcasting time for similar endeavors. But to
posit that such self-expression is the dominant concern of media corporation, or even a substantial concern, strains credulity. Indeed, corporate officers owe a fiduciary duty to shareholders to make business decisions that will maximize
corporate profits. 123 As Posner, Krattenmaker, and Powe suggest, not only is it a reasonable hypothesis that media corporations behave like other profit-seeking corporations in creating
products they anticipate will fare well in the economic marketplace, 124 the hypothesis is supported by the way in which countboth places can easily see that even if a Chicano is shown lounging
next to a palm tree, New York is in the writer's mind.
Id. at 80. Whatever bias this might reveal in the television writer, this passage may help to reveal biases under which Mr. Stein's analysis labors.
118. See id. at 81-91.
119. See id. at 92-99.
120. See id. at 100-04.
121. Stein purported to study programming content from the late 1970s.
See id. at xiv.
122. Even if a market-driven message represented the political agenda of
the public, its dissemination would not qualify as valuable "speech" from a
pluralist or republican perspective. See infra notes 163-73 and accompanying
text.
123. See United States v. Byrun, 408 U.S. 125, 137-38 (1972).
124. See RONALD V. BE'ITIG, COPYRIGHTING CULTURE: THE POLITICAL

2000] SELLING THE MAR,KET-DRNEN MESSAGE

489

less network presidents, programmers, producers, and media
observers speak about the television industry.
III. THE MARKET-DRIVEN MESSAGE AND
THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH
We can surely agree that no one can raise a cry of deprivation of free
speech if he is compelled to prove that there is something more than
naked commercial selfishness in his purpose.
-Then-Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover 125

A. RUPERT MURDOCH, BILL CLINTON, AND MARTIN LUTHER
KING: THE VARIETIES OF COMMUNICATIVE INTENT

What common thread runs through Martin Luther King's
decision to deliver his "I Have a Dream" speech, Bill Clinton's
decision to advocate a middle class tax cut during the early portion of the 1992 presidential campaign, and Rupert Murdoch's
Fox television network decision to present Living Single and
other television shows targeted to the interests of an AfricanAmerican audience? Surely there are differences in how each
man related to the message he chose to convey. Martin Luther
King strongly believed in the content of his message. He intended to persuade as many people as possible of its truth.
Candidate Bill Clinton may have believed in the virtues of a
middle class tax cut. Given his choices as President, however,
it is perhaps more reasonable to suppose that he did not view
such a tax cut as good public policy. If the latter is true, he
chose to advocate the policy to pander to the predicted preferences of voters in the Democratic primaries. Rupert Murdoch
may well be unconcerned-and, indeed, might disagree with
much-about the lives and perspectives of young black professionals in urban America. Yet he seemed to construct a broadcast schedule during the early existence of his Fox television
network for entrepreneurially strategic reasons. He sought to
reach an audience whose entertainment interests were not directly addressed by the other television networks.
Under conventional notions about the freedom of speech,
however, the communicative decisions of each of these men
would be viewed as having indistinguishable constitutional
significance. A governmental regulation that, for example, reECONOMY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 226

(1996).
125. Speech by then-Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover at the National Radio Conference (Nov. 9, 1925), quoted in Kalven, supra note 3, at 16.
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quired Murdoch to broadcast Bill Clinton's advocacy rather
than an episode of Living Single, or one that required Bill Clinton to reprint passages from King's speech in his campaign literature, or to reprint portions of a Living Single script, would
be viewed as intruding on the same constitutionally protected
speaker interests-the right to choose the content of the messages one disseminates.
One can, however, identify real bases for distinguishing the
constitutional value of King's speech, Clinton's speech, and
Murdoch's broadcast. The bases for distinction have nothing to
do with the content of the message conveyed or judgments
about the worthiness of the content conveyed. The distinctions
have nothing to do with the technology employed for disseminating the messages. Rather, the distinctions are rooted in the
nature of the communicative intent of the actor in question.
Indeed, the distinctions depend on two components of the communicator's intent. The first component concerns the intent
involved in a communicator's creation of the content of his message. The second concerns the intent involved in a communicator's reasons for disseminating his message.
Consider, now, two kinds of intent underlying a communicator's creation of the content of his message. For one kind of
expressive content, the communicator constructs his message
by reference to a judgment about what other people want to
hear. This communicator seeks to determine how many people
would want to consume a message or pay money for it. This
communicator is concerned about predicting, responding to,
and profiting from market demand. He interprets the values
and preferences of others and generates the content of his message as a function of this interpretation. This communicator
produces a market-driven message.
For the other kind of expressive content, the communicator
constructs his message by reference to his own conscience, beliefs, and values. This communicator looks within, identifies
what he believes, and articulates those beliefs to others. This
speaker intends to create a speaker-driven message-that is, to
engage in self-expression.126
126. The speaker-driven message is similar to Habermas's notion of "communicative action." The market-driven message falls within Habermas's category of "strategic action." For Habermas, "[i]n communicative action participants are not primarily oriented to their own individual successes; they
pursue their individual goals under the condition that they can harmonize
their plans of action on the basis of common situation definitions." 1 JURGEN
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In addition to these two kinds of intent underlying a communicator's decisions in forming the content of his message,
one might distinguish three kinds of motive for disseminating a
message. Two motives for dissemination seem to have particular significance for the market-driven message. First, one
might wish to sell a market-driven message with the motive to
earn a profit. Disseminators of a market-driven message evaluate what messages consumers crave, construct their "speech" in
the way that an automobile manufacturer might plan a car
design or a cereal manufacturer might plan a product concept,
and seek to sell that message-as-product. Their objective is to
earn a profit from the success of their product in the consumer
market. They are, in this sense, indistinguishable from what
one ordinarily would regard as producers of consumer goods. 127
They are entrepreneurs responding to economic forces in the
HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION: REASON AND THE
RATIONALIZATION OF SOCIETY 286 (Thomas McCarthy trans., Beacon Press
1984) (1981). A person engages in "communicative action" when he has "an
attitude oriented to reaching understanding" in a "process of reaching understanding." Id. In contrast, when engaged in "strategic interaction," "a speaker
acts with an orientation to success and thereby instrumentalizes speech acts
for purposes that are only contingently related to the meaning of what is said."
Id. at 289. Habermas suggested that "strategic action" would include lying,
manipulating, and any intentionally persuasive use of words that does not
honestly articulate the beliefs of the speaker. See id. at 306-07, 333-37. Although he does not address the phenomenon of selling the market-driven message, as opposed to pandering, the former would seem to fall a fortiori into the
category of strategic action. Although selling the market-driven message does
not involve the intent to persuade at all, it does instrumentalize speech "for
purposes that are only contingently related to the meaning of what is said."
Id. at289.
The analysis presented in this Article's analysis does not depend on
Habermas's theory of communicative action and is not derived from it.
Rather, it is tied to traditional strands of American political and constitutional
theory. It so happens, however, that these strands of political theory are concerned with communication as a vehicle for reaching agreement, in the context
of individuals recognized as having certain participatory rights, and that
Habermas's theory of communicative action parses the meaning and implications of communication from a similar perspective. He says that
[i]f we assume that the human species maintains itself through the
socially coordinated activities of its members and that this coordination has to be established through communication-and in certain
central spheres through communication aimed at reaching agreement-then the reproduction of the species ... requires satisfying the
conditions of a rationality that is inherent in communicative action.
Id. at 397 (emphasis added).
127. Ronald Bettig has noted a "commodification of human intellectual and
artistic creativity" on an international scale. BE'ITIG, supra note 124, at 226.
This Article draws a connection between product development and sales by

492

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85:451

economic forces in the regime of consumer sovereignty. Posner,
Krattenmaker, Powe, Gitlin, and Cantor describe the behavior
of commercial television programmers in a way that would fall
within this model of selling the market-driven message.
Second, an actor might wish to pander with a marketdriven message-that is, to curry favor with listeners who already embrace the message and to induce others to embrace it
as well. One might suspect that certain politicians' decisions
about what positions to take, and how to express them, are examples of pandering with a market-driven message. Indeed,
Senator Paul Tsongas accused Governor Bill Clinton of pandering to voters in 1992 with his proposal of a middle-class tax cut.
The third motive for disseminating a message seems to
have particular significance for speaker-driven self-expression.
An actor might be concerned with disseminating his honestly
held views toward the enlightenment of others or of self. In
this pursuit of truth, the actor tries to test his views against
those of others or to persuade others that his views are correct. r2s
One might suspect that certain political activists decide
what to say by reference to their own beliefs and that they
choose to express accurately and sincerely what those beliefs
are. Martin Luther King would seem to fit this model of communicative intent. Similarly, one might suspect that certain
reporters, artists, law professors, and screen writers form their
manufacturers and the development and sale of the market-driven message by
(for example) broadcasters, and it distinguishes these activities from product
advertising by manufacturers.
128. This kind of speaker is even willing to expend his resources in order to
persuade others. Political contributions and campaign expenditures are familiar examples, and the inequalities in speaking power flowing from inequalities
in wealth have been a focus among those concerned with electoral reform. The
Supreme Court has recognized that "virtually every means of communicating
ideas in today's mass society requires the expenditure of money.... The electorate's increasing dependence on television, radio, and other mass media for
news and information has made these expensive modes of communication indispensable instruments of effective political speech." Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (per curiam). It further stated that "the dependence of a
communication on the expenditure of money" does not vitiate its protection
under the First Amendment. Id. at 16. Indeed, the willingness of an actor to
spend money to disseminate an idea, rather than to make money on the sale of
an idea, provides evidence that the actor intends to disseminate a speakerdriven message rather than a market-driven message. Although a speaker
might promote a speaker-driven message concerned with his own material
well-being, such as a message that taxes should be reduced or student loans
should be increased, the content of the message reflects his own views and
preferences, and the material benefit he seeks is not from the sale of the message but the policy consequences of the message.
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message by referring within themselves ·toward persuading
others to embrace their perspective. Such a speaker expresses
a message intended to shape the marketplace of ideas, to
change or reinforce people's views or values, by expressing his
own notion of what is right.129

***

As earlier acknowledged, one might be concerned about the
practical significance of legal categories which focus on an actor's motives and intent. How could the legal system determine
an actor's intent in fact, in order to give real world significance
to categories that distinguish between an actor's decision to
formulate and sell the market-driven message and an actor's
decision to enlighten through self-expression?
Consider four responses. First, the fear that one could
never hope to ascertain reliably an actor's complex purposes
should not abort an essential inquiry into constitutional norms.
Almost any method one might employ in interpreting constitutional text requires identifying values deemed to underlie that
text and exploring their implications. If an actor's purpose is
really what should matter given the constitutionally significant
normative framework, recognizing that normative proposition
is foundational-the basis on which formal and technical doctrine must be constructed. Law, after all, is about the vindication of public values. This is no less true-perhaps it is especially true-for constitutional law.
Second, as suggested in the introduction, exploring the
normative significance of categories of purpose that are pure,
yet rare-such as a purpose to enlighten through speakerdriven self-expression or a purpose to profit entrepreneurially
by selling a market-driven message-enables one to explore the
normative significance of more complex varieties of purpose
that may be far more common.
Third, by identifying an actor's purposes as a linchpin on
which constitutional protection should depend, one can endeavor to construct proof rules by which the legal system could
make determinations about an actor's purposes, specifically designed to account for imperfections in adjudicative fact finding.
Finally, in confirmation of the two foregoing propositions,
one should note that the legal system already contains count129. Of course, even a market-driven message can have an effect in shaping people's ideas. Such unintended effects should be deemed constitutionally
irrelevant. See infra text accompanying notes 155-62, 184-88.
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less contexts in which an actor's purposes have been defined as
legally relevant and in which the difficulties in fact finding
have been accommodated. 130 Both within the law and more informally, human beings are forever being judged by their purposes, and properly so. Our capacity for moral choice is so
much of the human self-image.
Thus, despite the apparent problems involved in determining whether a particular actor was engaged in selling a marketdriven message, pandering with a market-driven message, or
enlightening with speaker-driven self-expression, some patience may be warranted. Once one determines that the categories have normative constitutional significance, one can confront the problems of developing legal doctrines to put those
categories into practical operation.131
A normative constitutional distinction can and should be
drawn between decisions to sell the market-driven message, to
pander with the market-driven message, and to enlighten with
speaker-driven self-expression. Such is the task of the following sections. These sections consider whether an actor's choice
to sell the market-driven message warrants special constitutional solicitude as part of "the freedom of speech." They will
explore this question from the perspective of a First Amendment informed by three normative perspectives: the value of
speech in enabling citizens to engage in democratic selfgovernment; the role of speech in enabling individuals to attain
personal fulfillment and autonomy; and the relationship be-

130. Indeed, federal campaign law restricting contributions to political
campaigns itself requires a determination as to whether a donation was "made
for the purpose of influencing" an election. If so, restrictions apply. If not, restrictions do not apply. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 9032 (1976). The criminal law, of
course, is filled with provisions that make an actor's purposes legally relevant,
and require proof of those purposes beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Court's constitutional law of defamation requires a determination of
whether a defendant speaker acted with "actual malice"-i.e., whether the defendant knew his statements about the plaintiff were false or was reckless as
to their falsity. See infra notes 256-61 and accompanying text.
131. Beyond questions of workable legal doctrine, there is a fourth reason
for paying attention to an actor's purposes and motives when endeavoring to
define communication that should be deemed a valuable part of "the freedom
of speech" worthy of constitutional protection. Principles affect the way in
which people think and talk about issues. If discourse about the freedom of
speech were informed by principles that elevate efforts to enlighten with the
speaker-driven message and that denigrate efforts to sell or pander with the
market-driven message, behavior in the marketplace of ideas might be improved. See infra notes 263-64; 303-05 and accompanying text.
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tween Congress's copyright power and the First Amendment's
prohibition oflaws abridging the freedom of speech.

B. Do CHOICES TO SELL THE MARKET-DRIVEN MESSAGE
DESERVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION AS SPEECH?

1. Democratic Self-Governance Perspectives
A popular Government, without popular information, or the means of
acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or perhaps
both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance: And a people who
mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves with the
power which knowledge gives.
-James Madison132

It is broadly accepted that speech is protected because it is
necessary for democratic self-government. 133 "Democratic selfgovernment," however, is not self-defining. Thus, the following
analysis will consider the normative significance of decisions to
sell the market-driven message from the perspective of two significant strands in American constitutional law that posit the
manner in which our democracy ought to operate: republicanism and pluralism.
In versions of democracy with a republican emphasis, citizens ideally would act in pursuit of the public welfare through
political discourse. Versions of republicanism posit that each
citizen has a right and a responsibility to seek the public welfare through debate and deliberation and to vote according to
his (or her) view of the public welfare.134 Law should be the
132. 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 103 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910).
133. See, e.g., Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) ("Whatever differences may exist about interpretations of the First Amendment, there is
practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment was
to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs."); MEIKLEJOHN, supra
note 26, at 26-27 ("The principle of the freedom of speech springs from the necessities of the program of self-government. It is not a Law of Nature or of
Reason in the abstract. It is a deduction from the basic American agreement
that public issues should be decided by universal suffrage."); SUNSTEIN, supra
note 13, at xvii ("My goal in this book is to evaluate the current system in light
of the relationship between political sovereignty and the free speech principle."); Bork, supra note 26, at 26 (arguing that only "explicitly and predominantly political speech" is entitled to constitutional protection).
134. Versions of republicanism frequently posit that each citizen has an
equal right and equal responsibility to participate in the formation of public
policy. See, e.g., GoRDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 233 (1992) ("Republican citizenship implied equality."). Commentators have built upon this premise of equality in critiquing the Supreme
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community's best collective judgment about rules that will best
serve its long-term public interests.135
By contrast, in versions of democracy with a pluralist emphasis, there is a less ambitious model of citizen behavior. Pluralism forgoes aspirations for a public-spirited deliberation
about public policy. Rather, from a pluralist perspective, democratic self-government provides the mechanisms by which
citizens can pursue self-interest in a process of interaction with
each other-whether cooperative or competitive. 136 Although
Court's invalidation of governmental efforts to limit the impact of powerful
speakers on public discourse. See Bruce Ackerman, Crediting the Voters: A
New Beginning for Campaign Finance, 13 THE AMERICAN PROSPECT (1993),
http://www.prospect.org/archives/13/13acke.html; SUNSTEIN, supra note 13, at
98 (arguing that "[e]fforts to ... ensure that [economic inequalities] are not
turned into political inequalitiesD should not be seen as impermissible redistribution"). This Article pursues a critique of current judicial doctrine that
does not depend on this equality perspective. At the same time, it is not inconsistent with, and could be supplemented by, greater emphasis on equality
in defining the extent to which actors are engaged in "the freedom of speech"
protected by the First Amendment.
135. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 13, at 18 (positing a "central constitutional goal of creating a deliberative democracy"); id. at 20 (suggesting the
need for "broad and deep attention to public issues"); id. (positing a precondition of"political equality" as reflected in "one person-one vote").
136. First Amendment scholars have characterized Justice Holmes's jurisprudence as having been predicated on pluralist premises and Justice
Brandeis's opinions as having reflected republican premises. See, e.g.,
MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 26, at 71-82 (examining Holmes's emphasis on individual self-interest and his resulting belief in competing pluralist interest
groups); SUNSTEIN, supra note 13, at 23-28 (comparing Holmes's conception of
interest groups competing in a marketplace of ideas to advance their selfinterest with Brandeis's more romantic view of communication as civic participation). In Sunstein's view, pluralism and republicanism would have different responses to governmental efforts to promote public deliberation or to
curb inequalities in speaking power derived from inequalities in wealth. See
id. at 28. I suggest that this is not necessarily so. At least with respect to entrepreneurial decisions to sell the market-driven message, pluralism and republicanism can have converging implications.
Furthermore, Sunstein distinguishes between pluralism's marketplace
view of democracy and republicanism's view of "civic competition." See id. at
28. He suggests that from Holmes pluralist perspective, "truth" is defined as
that which "emerges through 'free trade in ideas,'" such that no idea is intrinsically more worthy than another. Id. at 25. "For Holmes, [truth] seems to
have no deeper status." Id. Sunstein also suggests that for Holmes, not only
is politics a "market," but it is a market ''like any other." Id. The former
proposition seems incontrovertible. The second, I suggest, is manifestly wrong
for several reasons. First, to posit that trade in ideas is indistinguishable from
trade in sneakers and cigars ignores that the First Amendment gives the freedom of speech (whether conceived in market or civic terms) a special status.
Second, positing this equivalency between markets in ideas and markets for
products ignores the foundational and, therefore, prior position that rulemak-
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this notion of pluralism is normatively less demanding than is
republicanism, it has its own normative frames of reference. It
posits not only that majorities have the power to rule but that a
majority among "the People" have the right to rule. It encompasses, as well, a norm of political equality that is nearly universally articulated, even if somewhat vaguely: each citizen, as
a member of the sovereign People, has equal status and an
equal right, through the franchise, to contribute to the formation of public policy.137
The republican and pluralist notions of democracy have
been balanced in our constitutional heritage, with each emphasized in different institutional contexts. In The Federalist No.
10, for example, James Madison's fear of "majority faction"
seems to view a pluralist version of democracy as too often descriptive of the electorate's behavior. "A zeal for different opinions," Madison said, has "divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much
more disposed to vex and oppress each other than to co-operate
for their common good."138 Voters might in fact pursue public
policy based on short-term and selfish concerns. 13 9 In doing so,
they might act contrary to "the permanent and aggregate interests of the community." 140 Madison sought to prevent such effects of majority faction through the structure of the nation's
ing processes must occupy. Markets in products require rules. In the American scheme, the Constitution provides rules for making rules-including the
rules by which markets in products are conducted. Third, pluralist democracy
can have deeply normative roots. From such a perspective, it is not necessary
to embrace republican ideals in order to accord society's rulemaking procedures a privileged status-even over its procedures for economic market exchange. For more on Sunstein's treatment of Holmes and pluralism, see infra
notes 175-81 and accompanying text.
137. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 566 (1964) (holding that the
Equal Protection clause "guarantees the opportunity for equal participation by
all voters in the election of state legislators" and prohibits diluting the weight
of votes "because of place ofresidence").
138. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 79 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
139. See WOOD, supra note 134, at 253 ("Madison's Federalist No. 10
was . . . [a] frank acknowledgment of the degree to which private interests .. .
had come to dominate American politics .... Madison and the Federalists .. .
were not modern-day pluralists. They still clung to the republican ideal of an
autonomous public authority that was different from the many private interests of the society."); see also ROBERT H. WIEBE, SELF-RULE: A CULTURAL
HlSTORY OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 13-14 (1995) (stating that American revolutionaries claimed a republican virtue in contrast with British corruption).
140. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 78 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
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legislative process. This suggests Madison's embrace of republican objectives, at least as an ideal toward which governmental
structures and processes should be oriented. Ideally, democratic self-government should pursue "the permanent and aggregate interests of the community."141 If voters cannot be relied upon to act as republican citizens, then at least the government's structure should discourage pluralist efforts to
undermine the republican vision of public policy.142
Furthermore, as suggested in Hamilton's The Federalist
No. 78, a significant part of the Constitution's function was to
provide a method for ensuring that at least the nation's fundamental public policy would respect the republican objectives of
providing for the community and the future, as well as for the
self and the present. Hamilton suggested that the people themselves, in making "the supreme law of the land" in the
Constitution's text, endeavor to make public policy with extraordinary care; and that this carefully crafted policy, enforced
by politically unaccountable judges, is designed to supersede
the decisions of majority factions-that is, decisions by "the
people themselves" reflecting "ill humors" stirred up by "the
arts of designing men." 143 Thus, for Hamilton as for Madison,
pluralist democracy might describe the electorate's ordinary
behavior. Republican democracy was an ideal to be approximated through a range of constitutional structures, devices,
and substantive provisions. 144
141. Id.
142. Senators theoretically approach issues of public policy differently than
do members of the House, in large part because their six-year term of office
provides a longer separation from the momentary impulses of the electorate
than does a Representative's two-year term. Compare THE FEDERALIST No.
63, at 384 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (arguing that the Senate six-year term provides "sufficient permanency ... as a defense to the people against their own temporary errors and delusions"), with THE FEDERALIST
No. 52, at 327 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (arguing that because of their two-year terms, House members have "immediate dependence
on, and an intimate sympathy with, the people"). More importantly for present purposes, people as voters approach life's questions differently than do
people as consumers, in large part because as consumers people make decisions for the self and the moment. As voters, people can make decisions oriented not only toward the future, but focused more on the welfare of the community as well.
143. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 469 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
144. Both the pluralist and republican strands have run through American
thought and discourse about democracy through the years. Robert Wiebe, for
example, describes the rhetoric of labor and farmer leaders from the late nine-
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Constitutional scholars have long noted that the two justices most responsible for modern First Amendment doctrine
had different understandings of the freedom of speech because
each viewed democracy from a different perspective. Justice
Holmes embraced a pluralist perspective of "excessive individualism."145 According to Meiklejohn,
Mr. Holmes sees a human society as a multitude of individuals, each
struggling for his own existence, each living his own life, each saving
his own soul, if he has a soul to save, in the social forms of a competitive independence. Always, therefore, he tends to interpret the constitutional cooperation of one hundred and more millions of Americans, together with past and future generations who belong to the
same community, as if they had no fundamental community of purpose at all. The theory of strife he can understand-but not the theory of cooperation. A nation tends to be, for his mind, a huge collocation of externally related atoms. 146

Justice Brandeis, on the other hand, embraced a perspective that emphasized a more ambitious and optimistic republican notion of the political process. Cass Sunstein, build-

teenth century, at a time when society was understood as becoming increasingly fractured. The rhetoric suggests an optimistic reliance on republican
strands in the American democratic tradition:
The Knights did not speak just for wage earners or the Populists just
for farmers. Each invited all respectable citizens to join in the national revival. Both envisaged sweeping social changes from simple,
peaceful mechanisms: cooperatives, land reform, the subtreasury, bimetalism. Correcting the crucial errors would bring all Americans
together again....
Behind these expectations of wholeness lay the vision of the People, the American citizenry deciding in the common interest.
WIEBE, supra note 139, at 124. He also describes the reliance on the rhetoric
of pluralist difference and equality underlying the expansion of those eligible
to vote during the first half of the nineteenth century. See infra note 171. Republican strands shaped the Progressive movement of the late nineteenth century: "[P]rogressives favored quality, not quantity: better informed, more alert,
less gullible citizens. Their model voter was an individual who approached
political problems as scientific issues to be resolved objectively in the public
interest, then cast his secret ballot accordingly." WIEBE, supra note 139, at
164; see also David Chang, Conflict, Coherence, and Constitutional Intent, 72
IOWA L. REV. 753, 767-75 (1987) (discussing the motive of political selfconstraint as a basis for constitutional mandates).
145. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 26, at 71.
146. Id. at 71-72. Indeed, Holmes's pluralism has been viewed as merely a
description of the way America operated, rather than resting on or promoting
any prescriptive notion. See, e.g., EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF
DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM & THE PROBLEM OF VALUE
168 (1973) (describing criticism of Holmes's "functional approach" to law,
which "led directly to the doctrine that 'might makes right'").
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ing on Meiklejohn's earlier analysis of the distinctive strands in
the thought of both Holmes and Brandeis, observes that
Brandeis thinks that a democracy requires a certain sort of person,
one who takes citizenship seriously.... Hence-in words foreign to
Holmes-Brandeis writes that "the greatest menace to freedom is an
inert people"; hence "public discussion is a political duty"; hence the
free speech principle is connected with faith in "the deliberative
forces" in government. 147

The following sections suggest that from both republican
and pluralist perspectives, decisions to sell the market-driven
message as a commodity may not warrant special protection as
part of "the freedom of speech." Because the Supreme Court
has defined First Amendment interests with respect to both
speakers and listeners, 14 s the following discussion considers
whether both dissemination and receipt of the market-driven
message, when sold for economic profit, should be deemed worthy of special protection as an essential part of "the freedom of
speech" under a republican-oriented First Amendment and a
pluralist-oriented First Amendment.1 49
147. SUNSTEIN, supra note 13, at 27.
148. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) ("[T]he people as a whole retain their ... collective right to have [radio] function consistently with the ends and purposes of the First Amendment. It is the right of
the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount."); see also Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 757 (1976).
149. Cf. PuRCELL, supra note 146, at 5. Purcell suggests that "[d]uring the
nineteenth century . . . [t]he democratic ideal ... was widely accepted as an
axiom of life. Though Americans were unconcerned with elaborate theoretical
justifications, they were nevertheless convinced that democracy was both rationally and morally the best possible form of government." Id. Purcell examines the impact of "scientific naturalism as a philosophical world view"-i.e., of
empiricism, skepticism, and the scientific method of inquiry-on the views
held by American intellectuals about democracy during the first two-thirds of
this century and finds a fundamental erosion of that nineteenth century faith.
Id. at 10-11.
The scientific naturalists would not credit ethical or moral beliefs as anything more than emotion (and, as such, not provably true or false). Id. at 4849. Purcell quotes Eric Temple Bell, once president of the Mathematical Association of America, as having said that "[t]he philosophic theory of values is to
the propagation of bunk what a damp, poorly lighted cellar is to that of mushrooms." Id. at 59-60. "By the early thirties the most fundamental epistemological assumptions of American intellectuals rejected the idea that any prescriptive ethical theory could possess rationally compelling authority." Id. at
73. Said George H. Sabine in 1937, "in politics and ethics one can postulate
what values one chooses[;] consistency will then determine what follows, but it
cannot either rule out or substantiate the postulate." Id. at 199-200.
It was scientific naturalism, and its jurisprudential expression of legal realism, more than conventional justifications of democracy, that endured crisis
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in the late 1930s and the aftermath of World War II. The proposition that
values could be neither demonstrably true nor false was sorely tested by Hitler, and by Stalin, and the emotional revulsion was felt not only by ordinary
folk, but by intellectuals as well. The moral relativism of scientific naturalism
became a target for those, such as Catholics, who were entirely comfortable
with values, as well as for intellectuals who sought somehow to reclaim values
within the perspectives of scientific naturalism. See id. at 159-78.
The naturalistic intellectuals responded to these attacks by arguing that
it was moral certainty that led to totalitarianism; moral relativism actually
supported open and contingent democracy. See id. at 200. Democracy was
justified instrumentally as providing privilege to fewer values than do authoritarian systems, and promoting a freedom of speech which, in a context of
moral relativism, allows political processes at least to resemble the experimental methods of science. Id. at 205. "[D]emocracy alone was based on a rational
and scientific attitude toward human understanding and political morality.
Scientific naturalism necessarily implied an open, diverse, democratic social
order." Id. The "relativist theory of democracy," as Purcell calls these views,
was based on the notion that all ideals (propositions of value) are essentially
equal. This is quite different from the pluralism of the more traditional sortthat all men are essentially equal. Furthermore, Purcell notes that the naturalists' justification of democracy was both prescriptive in this sense and descriptive, as "an empirical description of the social consequences of philosophical relativism and absolutism." Id. at 239.
It is unclear whether the prescriptive or descriptive versions of "the relativist theory -of democracy" would have anything to say about whether the
speaker-driven or market-driven should be viewed as privileged under the
First Amendment. Yet, one might speculate that from the prescriptive perspective, relativist theory might deem it irrelevant whether a person is articulating his own beliefs or packaging those of others, so long as he does not seek
to suppress the beliefs of others. Indeed, the relativist view might welcome
the market-driven message as part of the bread and circuses of our time that
could forestall impulses toward mass ideological movements.
Although there may have been a fundamental difference between the
views about democracy held by "Americans" in the nineteenth century and the
views held by certain American "intellectuals" in the twentieth century, one
must consider the relevance, if any, of such differences for questions about
how the First Amendment should be interpreted. Intellectuals of this ilk neither have been given, nor have they seized, governmental authority. Government, politics, and public policy remain deeply grounded in a priori, unprovable belief. To scientific naturalists, the enterprise of constitutional
interpretation, to the extent that it must be prescriptive, must be nonsense.
Yet whatever claim certain intellectuals might have had to superior insight,
changes in their views concerning the moral basis of democracy would not be
relevant for those who believe, for example, in originalism as the proper
method of constitutional interpretation. For others, who acknowledge that
original intent must somehow be relevant in interpreting constitutional text,
but who believe that modern social circumstances must somehow be incorporated as well, ideological changes could be relevant. What is unclear, however,
is how a notion that the ideology of some intellectual elite has evolved should
affect the task of interpreting the Constitution. Purcell notes that even in the
twentieth century, "the great majority of Americans ... simply acceptO democracy as an ethical good on grounds of tradition, faith, habit, and necessity."
Id. at 169. If participants in the prevailing political culture, :i:Ilcluding gov-
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a. Republican Perspectives
i. On the Interests of the Speaker

From the perspective of democracy with a republican emphasis, not even all self-expression intended to persuade would
be worthy of the highest solicitude. The pursuit of short-term
personal interests through speech intended to persuade others
is at odds with the republican ideal of disinterested deliberation about the permanent and aggregate interests of the
community. Madison surely would not conclude that government should be permitted to prohibit self-interested, speakerdriven self-expression simply because such speech fails to abide
by the ideals of republicanism. Despite this, he would be able
to distinguish between the high value of discourse about the
general good and the lower value of discourse about personal
interest.
One who seeks to sell a market-driven message, however,
has no purpose of participating in public discourse at all.
Rather, the seller of the market-driven message seeks simply to
engage in commerce as a participant not in the marketplace of
ideas, but the marketplace of products. He is neither contributing to the community that with which republican decisionmaking is concerned-each citizen's honestly held views
about the community's interest; nor is he seeking to get from
the community that to which republican decisionmaking views
as his entitlement-the community's careful consideration of
the merits of his views. He is thinking about selling a product.
The product may be formed with words and symbols, but the
ideas conveyed are not being put to uses relevant to republican
democracy and its creation of public policy. He is not concerned
about persuading or being persuaded. Thus, he should be
viewed as no more entitled to the First Amendment's special
solicitude than is the manufacturer of shoes, sailboats, or saunas. ISO
ernment officials, continue to believe (or speak as if they believe) in democracy
in a morally vague, unskeptical, and nonempirical way, it is difficult to justify
the proposition that these intellectuals' skepticism about any moral basis for
democracy should provide the perspective from which the First Amendment's
meaning is constructed.
150. Meiklejohn did not address this question, but did address another that
goes further than is necessary here. For Meiklejohn, even some who express
their own ideas are not engaged in the protected "freedom of speech":
The First Amendment was not written primarily for the protection of
those intellectual aristocrats who pursue knowledge solely for the fun
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Alexander Meiklejohn invoked the republican notion of deliberation as an ideal approach to making public policy and the
town meeting as a model of republican deliberation. Reasoning
from the premise that the town meeting "is a group of free and
equal men, cooperating in a common enterprise, and using for
that enterprise responsible and regulated discussion," 151 Meiklejohn distinguished between mere "speech," which is not protected, and "the freedom of speech," which is protected. For
Meiklejohn, "debaters must confine their remarks to 'the question before the house.' ... If a speaker wanders from the point
at issue, ... he may and should be declared 'out of order.' He
must then stop speaking, at least in that way."152 For Meiklejohn, even a speaker who expresses his heartfelt views about
one issue is not participating in the "freedom of speech" if the
community has agreed to discuss another issue. It follows a
fortiori from this republican perspective that if an actor is not
expressing his personal views at all-let alone his personal
views on "the permanent and aggregate interests of the community"-he is not "cooperating in [the] common enterprise,"
and he is not participating in "freedom of speech.''153
Indeed, Meiklejohn himself suggested that
[t]he radio as it now operates among us is not free. Nor is it entitled
to the protection of the First Amendment. It is not engaged in the
task of enlarging and enriching human communication. It is engaged
in making money. And the First Amendment does not intend to
guarantee men freedom to say what some private interest pays them
to say for its own advantage. It intends only to make men free to say
what, as citizens, they think, what they believe, about the general
welfare. 154

of the game, whose search for truth expresses nothing more than a
private intellectual curiosity or an equally private delight and pride
in mental achievement. It was written to clear the way for thinking
which serves the general welfare.
MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 26, at 45-46.
151. Id. at 23.
152. Id.
153. In discussing deliberation, Meiklejohn emphasized the importance of
articulating all viewpoints rather than enabling all individuals to articulate
their beliefs. Thus, nine people whose views are the same as one already expressed might be denied the opportunity to speak, in favor of one person who
wishes to express views that have not yet been heard. This is a perspective
rooted in republicanism rather than pluralism. See id. at 94-98.
154. Id. at 104; see also SUNSTEIN, supra note 13, at 17-18 (observing that
"[n]ewspapers and broadcasting stations in turn operate largely ... on the
profit principle").
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On the Interests of the Listener

One might object to this suggestion on the ground that although the seller of the market-driven message may not be
concerned with the ideas being disseminated, the consumersor the "audience"-are so concerned. Indeed, the audience
might crave the market-driven message. Furthermore, consuming the market-driven message that has been sold for profit
might affect the way people think, just as can listening to the
speaker-driven message that has been disseminated to
enlighten. Indeed, the Supreme Court has stated that
[i]t cannot be doubted that motion pictures are a significant medium
for the communication of ideas. They may affect public attitudes and
behavior in a variety of ways, ranging from direct espousal of a political or social doctrine to the subtle shaping of thought which characterizes all artistic expression. The importance of motion pictures as
an organ of public opinion is not lessened by the fact that they are designed to entertain as well as to inform. 155

From the perspective of a First Amendment rooted in a democracy with a republican emphasis, however, these objections are
misplaced.
The market-driven message when sold for profit might well
be desirable to people but surely not all that is valuable in the
marketplace of commerce-as is the latest fashion in sneakers
or automobiles-warrants protection as "speech" in the republican marketplace of ideas. Although people might crave the
market-driven message as entertainment and escapism, their
consumption of the message hardly draws upon the responsible
characteristics of the American citizen that forces herself to focus, with discipline, on the difficult task of thinking carefully
about public policy. Indeed, for the audience as republican citizens, what is of distinctive constitutional value is information
about each other's honestly-felt and well-considered views.
Only this information enables people to make collective judgments about the permanent and aggregate interests of the
community. One who seeks to sell the market-driven message

155. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952) (footnote
omitted). Justice Clark continued, "'The line between the informing and the
entertaining is too elusive for the protection of [a free press]. Everyone is familiar with instances of propaganda through fiction. What is one man's
amusement, teaches another's doctrine.'" Id. (quoting Winters v. New York,
333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948)). This Article's analysis is concerned with defining
this "elusive" line in terms of the intent with which speakers speak and listeners listen.
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fails to reveal his views at all, let alone his views about the
general interest. 156
To be sure, the audience might be thinking thoughts, and
want to think particular thoughts, when pursuing television
shows or movies for entertainment. But people think when
they commit crimes, play tennis, use drugs, and have sex, and
they engage in those activities with a goal of having certain
thoughts and experiencing particular feelings. But a republican rooted First Amendment implies a privileged status for
speech in which speaker and listener think specifically about
identifying the permanent and aggregate interests of the community; not for activities simply because they might trigger
thoughts. 157
Furthermore, to the extent that the consumers of the
market-driven message spend their time engaged in such entertainment, they have less time and attention to devote to
speakers who are engaged in self-expression through the
speaker-driven message. Engaging in entertainment is not
equivalent to engaging with one's fellow citizens about community values and public policy. 158 People seek entertainment to
satisfy certain immediate desires. Entertainment displaces an
156. Although the market-driven message does, indeed, contain messages
and convey ideas received by the audience, the content of the market-driven
message is determined by what appeals to large numbers of people for entertainment or escapism. See, e.g., Broadcast Services; Financial Interest and
Syndication Rules, 56 Fed. Reg. 26,242 (1991) (codified at 47 C.F.R. § 73.662)
(removed from C.F.R. in 1996). Thus, the messages are likely to reflect the
short-term and personal desires of the community. These desires may well not
even concern public or governmental matters. Even if disseminators of the
market-driven message intended these ideas in a speaker-driven way (which
by definition they do not), they would be second-class ideas from the republican perspective. The ideas conveyed would not concern the permanent and
aggregate interests of the community.
157. From this perspective, the freedom of speech is not exercised unless
both speaker and listener seek a meeting of the minds, a common understanding, about the general welfare. Meiklejohn expressed such a view, in suggesting that the First Amendment's
purpose is to give every voting member of the body politic the fullest
possible participation in the understanding of those problems with
which the citizens of a self-governing society must deal. When a free
man is voting, it is not enough that the truth is known by someone
else.... The voters must have it, all of them. The primary purpose of
the First Amendment is, then, that all the citizens shall, so far as possible, understand the issues which bear upon our common life.
MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 26, at 88-89.
158. See Collins & Skover, supra note 37, at 1105 ("The human drive for
pleasure, fueled by so many aspects of a highly capitalistic and technological
society, is greatly accelerated by the amusement medium.").
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individual's consideration of his own long-term interest, let
alone his consideration of the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.159
Alexander Meiklejohn and his town meeting are again instructive. For the town meeting as a model of republican decisionmaking processes,
the point of ultimate interest is not the words of the speakers, but the
minds of the hearers. The final aim of the meeting is the voting of
wise decisions .... And this, in turn, requires that so far as time allows, all facts and interests relevant to the problem shall be fully and
fairly presented to the meeting....
. . . What is essential is not that everyone shall speak, but that
everything worth saying shall be said .... Just so far as, at any point,
the citizens who are to decide an issue are denied acquaintance with
information or opinion or doubt or disbelief or criticism which is relevant to that issue, just so far the result must be ill-considered, illbalanced planning for the general good. It is that mutilation of the
thinking process of the community against which the First Amendment to the Constitution is directed. 160

For Meiklejohn, therefore, it would be "out of order" for
"twenty like-minded citizens" each to read the same position
statement at the meeting-even if members of the audience
might wish to hear the same tune sung over and over again. To
do so would add nothing relevant to the community's deliberation and, because time is necessarily limited, could prevent the
consideration of different views that other members of the
community espouse. 161
Thus, consumption of the market-driven message-core activity in the entrepreneurial realm of consumer sovereigntyseems an activity antithetical to the aspirations of citizen behavior in a republican democracy. 162 Given our premises (for
159. Id. ("[A] society that dedicates more than a quarter of every day to
television is less likely to embrace the Madisonian ideals of critical discourse
and civic participation.").
160. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 26, at 25-26 (emphasis in original).
161. Id.
162. Indeed, Meiklejohn belittled discourse intended to shape ideas, and
received by an audience in that spirit, when the mutual concern of speaker
and listener was self-interest rather than the public good. He recoiled against
Holmes's prescription that "the best test of truth is the power of the thought to
get itself accepted in the competition of the market." Id. at 86; see supra notes
133, 142-43 and accompanying text. Pursuant to this Holmesian perspective,
a pluralist perspective,
[w]e Americans ... have taken the "competition of the market" principle to mean that as separate thinkers, we have no obligation to test
our thinking, to make sure that it is worthy of a citizen who is one of
"the rulers of the nation." Each one of us, therefore, feels free to think
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this section) that speech is protected because of its role in enabling the processes of republican decisionmaking, there is no
good reason to accord decisions to sell or to consume the market-driven message a privileged status-especially in the face
of potential government efforts to displace the disseminators of
market-driven messages with those who wish to engage in
speaker-driven self-expression. The point, again, is not that
the government must regulate decisions to sell the marketdriven message under a republican-oriented First Amendment,
but that it may.

b. Pluralist Perspectives
Because republicanism is so far removed from American
political practice, it is a weak and unlikely perspective from
which to define the parameters of the First Amendment's "freedom of speech." People pursue short-term and personal interests pervasively, both in politics and in private interaction.
Thus, a pluralist model of politics provides a far better fit.
The Federalist's notion of pluralism seemed to contain both
descriptive and prescriptive elements. It was descriptive (and,
indeed, disappointed) in noting ways in which voters, through
selfishness or shortsightedness, might fail to pursue the permanent and aggregate int~rests of the community. But The Federalist's view of pluralist democracy is prescriptive when comparing it with circumstances that deviate even more from a
republican ideal. Thus, Madison implies that majority faction
is to be preferred to minority faction, because at least the former vindicates the majoritarian element of "the republican
principle":
If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the

republican principle, which enables the majority to defeat its sinister
views by regular vote. It may clog the administration, it may convulse the society; but it will be unable to execute and mask its violence under the forms of the Constitution. 163

Many versions of pluralism are rooted in an additional
moral notion about the equal political status of each voter.164
as he pleases, to believe whatever will serve his own private interests.
MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 26, at 86.
163. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at

80 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
164. See, for example, Wesberry v. Sanders, where Justice Black, for the
Court, determined that "in its historical context, the command of Art. I, § 2,
that Representatives be chosen 'by the People of the several States' means
that as nearly as is practicable one man's vote in a congressional election is to
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be worth as much as another's." 376 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964) (citations omitted).
Justice Black relied on the proposition that "[o]ne principle was uppermost in
the minds of many delegates: that, no matter where he lived, each voter
should have a voice equal to that of every other in electing members of Congress." Id. at 10. Whatever question there might be as to whether most
(rather than simply many) delegates favored such a principle of political
equality, it seems clear that voter equality has been a long and substantial
strand in American political discourse. Although disagreeing with Justice
Black that the framers intended to mandate "one person, one vote" for congressional elections, Justice Harlan acknowledged that "many, perhaps most,
of them also believed generally . . . that within the States representation
should be based on population." Id. at 27. Justice Harlan also noted that
Congress has periodically enacted legislation under Art. I, § 4 requiring that
congressional districts contain "as nearly as practicable an equal number of
inhabitants." Id. at 42-43; see also WOOD, supra note 134, at 259-61. The
point here is not to establish that Wesberry was correctly decided or that it
was not. Rather, it is that the value of political equality has been a consistent
theme in American thought about democracy, even from a pluralist perspective in which republican ideals were ignored or deemphasized. Cf. Gray v.
Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963) ("The conception of political equality from
the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one thingone person, one vote.").
In 1816, Thomas Jefferson asserted that "a government is republican in
proportion as every member composing it has an equal voice in the direction of
its concerns ... by representatives chosen by himself." Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533, 573 n.53 (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval, in 10 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 1816-1826, at 38 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1899)).
Robert Wiebe describes the development of fractured political parties and
homogeneous local political "lodges" in the 1840s. He notes,
A grudging acceptance of differences sufficed to give 19th century
lodge politics its distinctive form of equality. It was an equality that
had nothing to do with a beliefin everybody's worth or in everybody's
right to his own habits, customs, and faith. It implied no willingness
whatsoever to rub elbows with strange people .... Hate ... played an
important role in defining the culture of lodge politics.
This equality was strictly procedural: preparing for elections, voting, participating in the results, and on round again.... Participation
trained citizens-in effect, it made people citizens.
Decentralization was crucial to this process. So was the general
leveling of authority that generated a sense of all groups holding
some for themselves and no group holding a great deal for any purpose. It was a curious validation of James Madison's faith that in an
extensive republic, suspicious, fragmented factions would police one
another's power....
But what held all this together? The political parties themselves
fell short .... What gave heterogeneity its wholeness in the 19th century, what created unity, pure and simple, out of this diversity, was
the single moment of a general election. Here democratic culture
came full circle. At the beginning, it was the franchise that defined
each white man as the equal of every other, validated his right to selfdetermination, and invested him with public authority. At the end it
was using those same badges of sovereignty that transformed other-
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Unless a voter's neighbors inform him of their desires, he can
decide neither how to persuade them nor how to compromise
with them. To respect the equal political status of each member of the community, therefore, pluralist decisionmaking depends upon exchanges of earnestly held beliefs and ideas.
Such a prescriptive notion of pluralism posits the right of
citizens to pursue their personal and short-term interests
through persuasion and voting.165 Democracy with a pluralist
wise scattered, suspicious men of every type and persuasion into one
governing People.... For that instant, they were the American People. Then the moment passed; they left as they had come, with all
their divisive attachments intact.
WIEBE, supra note 139, at 81-83; see also SUNSTEIN, supra note 13, at 20 (observing that Madisonian democracy is founded on "political equality" and that
"[a]t least in the public sphere, every person counts as no more or no less than
one").
165. It is hardly deniable that democracy in American constitutional law
has rested on a normative foundation. From the Constitution's Preamble, in
which "the People of the United States" claimed the right to create their preferred government, to Justice Marshall's acknowledgment in Marbury v.
Madison that "the people have an original right" to the government they want,
political actors were speaking and acting not as descriptive chroniclers and
combatants wielding raw power but as participants in a normatively rooted
enterprise.
Prescriptive versions of pluralism also frequently posit that each individual has an equal right to participate. See ROBERT A. DAHL, PLURALIST
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES: CONFLICT AND CONSENT 8 (1967). Dahl's
interpretation of the pluralist impulse in America posits the Virtue of "multiple centers of power ... to tame power, to secure the consent of all, and to settle conflicts peacefully ... because constant negotiations among different centers of power are necessary in order to make decisions." Id. at 24; see id. at 40.
Robert Wiebe sees a similar commitment to equality in America's "logic" of
democracy, in both its variant emphases on individual (pluralism) and community (republicanism) even at a time when only white men enjoyed an equal
moral status:
Since all white men governed themselves equally as individuals, all
white men combined as equals to govern themselves collectively. Individually, each white man made his contribution to the whole, an
additive idea about citizenship that could be traced back to Aristotle.
Collectively, all white men formed the governing people, a holistic
idea about civic life that only congealed early in the 19th century ....
WIEBE, supra note 139, at 15.
This notion of political equality is reflected in the way in which the Supreme Court has interpreted the Constitution to allocate voting rights. "One
person, one vote" is a foundational characteristic of pluralist democracy. No
one is entitled to have his personal preferences count for more than those of
his neighbors in the law's accommodation of private interests. In Wesberry v.
Sanders, Justice Black characterized a prevailing view at the Constitutional
Convention: "[N]o matter where he lived, each voter should have a voice equal
to that of every other in electing members of Congress." 376 U.S. 1, 10 (1964).
In Reynolds v. Sims, Chief Justice Warren articulated similar sentiments:
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emphasis responds to the problems created because each individual's consciousness is separated from each of his fellows'.
We are separated beings, with personal values and interests,
and we all wish to maximize the benefits we gain from this life.
Because our desires may conflict, each of us might potentially
limit the extent to which others might benefit from their lives.
Because our desires may coincide, each of us might potentially
help others to increase satisfaction and happiness.
Thus, democracy with a pluralist emphasis is concerned
with providing a system that can, as justly as possible, create
the rules by which the conflicting interests of intrinsically
valuable human beings are resolved. It is also concerned with
providing space within which individuals can communicate
about their concerns and interests, toward maximizing the extent to which those interests are cooperatively vindicated
within the confines of existing law.
i. On the Interests of the Speaker

For pluralist democracy, "speech" is the means through
which each citizen may endeavor to garner support for his preferences.166 Thus, to qualify as "speech," communication must
[E]ach and every citizen has an inalienable right to full and effective
participation in the political processes of his State's legislative bodies.
Most citizens can achieve this participation only as qualified voters
through the election of legislators to represent them. Full and effective participation by all citizens in state government requires, therefore, that each citizen have an equally effective voice in the election of
members of his state legislature.
377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964).
Prescriptive rules of the political process-and the separation of the economic sphere from the more fundamental sphere of politics (the sphere within
which the rules for economic transactions are made)--can be derived from a
premise of political equality and are reflected in the near universal view that
it is permissible and desirable to prohibit vote buying. During the pluralist
trends of the early nineteenth century, when political equality was a driving
theme among "white men," to use Robert Wiebe's phrase, the Governor of New
York proposed in 1852 that a person who tries to bribe a voter should lose his
own franchise. WIEBE, supra note 139, at 71. To corrupt another's expression
of political will, in other words, was such a violation of the rules of the game
that one deserved to be disqualified from playing. Each individual has a right
to pursue his own preferences in public policy, but only to the extent of
exercising one vote.
166. Gordon Wood reports the views held by organizations of New York artisans in 1765: "Self-interest is the grand Principle of all Human Actions ....
And in the great essential Interests of a Nation, ... as every individual is interested, all have an equal Right to declare their Interests, and to have them
regarded." WOOD, supra note 134, at 246 (second emphasis added). Wood
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be undertaken with an intent to persuade others to embrace
the views articulated by the speaker. Activity that is not undertaken with this intent to persuade is not "speech" because it
is not relevant to the goals of pluralist decisionmakingproviding the means by which people can maximize their preferences, as affected by the problems and potential from interaction
with others, through persuasion.161
Robert Bork has reasoned about the meaning of the First
Amendment based on the notion that "the freedom of speech" is
protected because it is necessary for democratic selfgovernment. He has argued that only when speech is "explicitly political" should it be deemed constitutionally protected.168

notes that this was an early statement of notions of "popular pluralistic representation" and "interest-group politics" that "would be more fully developed
over the following decades." Id. at 245-46.
167. Justice White, dissenting in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765 (1978), made a similar point. In First National Bank, Justice
White determined that a Massachusetts statute prohibiting corporations from
expending money to influence the vote on referenda proposals did not violate
the First Amendment. He was concerned that political positions taken by corporations do not necessarily reflect the values of shareholders. Although "investors are united by a desire to make money, ... [t]bis unanimity of purpose
breaks down ... when corporations make expenditures ... designed to influence the opinion or votes of the general public on political and social issues
that have no material connection with or effect upon their business." Id. at
805-06. White suggested, therefore, that "when a profitmaking corporation
contributes to a political candidate this does not further the self-expression ...
of its shareholders in the way that expenditures from them as individuals
would." Id. at 806. Because, in bis view, "[i]deas which are not a product of
individual choice are entitled to less First Amendment protection," id. at 807,
any intrusion on the freedom of speech by the challenged statute was not so
significant as to warrant its invalidation.
168. Bork, supra note 26, at 20. On similar grounds, Chief Justice
Rehnquist has criticized the proposition that the protection of commercial
speech is consistent with the notion that the First Amendment is "primarily
an instrument to enlighten public decisionmaking in a democracy":
I had understood this view to relate to public decisionmaking as to political, social, and other public issues, rather than the decision of a
particular individual as to whether to purchase one or another kind of
shampoo. It is undoubtedly arguable that many people in the country
regard the choice of shampoo as just as important as who may be
elected to ... political office, but that does not automatically bring information about competing shampoos within the protection of the
First Amendment.
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,
787 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); cf. Collins & Skover, supra note 37, at
1105 (expressing concern that television is problematic under the First
Amendment because it makes citizens "less likely to embrace the Madisonian
ideals of critical discourse and civic participation").
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A better view of what should qualify as protected speech
from the perspective of a First Amendment rooted in pluralist
democracy is substantially broader. From a pluralist perspective, "speech" surely does include discussion intended to persuade others about matters of public. policy, for through this
discussion, individuals act to maximize the extent to which
their concerns are vindicated. But, beyond this, a pluralist rationale for protecting speech would extend as well to discussion
intended to persuade others to engage in private transactions
within the confines of existing law and public policy. Of course,
such speech has been treated as protected under conventional
First Amendment doctrine.
The concern of pluralist democracy is with the right of each
individual to maximize the extent to which her preferences are
vindicated in the context of relationships with others-whether
in cooperation or in conflict.169 The reasons for a pluralist concern for public policy-creating rules which, given a context of
conflict and potential compromise among individuals, can provide the greatest satisfaction for the greatest number-apply
with similar force to private interaction within existing public
rules. Indeed, it would be odd if speech intended to induce {legally permissible) private cooperation were deemed unprotected, while speech intended to induce public action were
169. Concern for the ability of each individual to pursue his particular concerns was at the foundation of notions about voting rights and representation
during the American revolutionary era. The notion of"virtual representation,"
in which one empowered element of society-for example, England-was
viewed as naturally and properly taking account of and promoting the interests of another (and powerless) element of society-for example, the colonieswas rejected in favor of demands for actual representation. "Apparently the
interests of the individuals with the community were so peculiar, so personal,
that the only ground and reason why any man should be bound by the actions
of another who meddles in his concerns is, that he himself choose that other to
office." GoRDON s. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 17761787, at 182 (1969) (quotations omitted). Because the justification for actual
representation is the existence of each individual's particular interests and the
right of each individual to pursue those interests through voting, a freedom of
speech derived from that right to vote should encompass the right honestly to
articulate the individual's views and preferences, so that his fellows can meaningfully take account of his desires. It would not extend, however, to "speech"
that expressed other than the actor's own views and preferences. To hold
otherwise would be to permit individuals to endeavor to manipulate the
judgment and votes of others, who have an equal right to the consideration of
their own unique concerns and preferences. One has a right to pursue one's
preferences by voting, and by speaking. This analysis reflects a prescriptive
notion of pluralism, rather than a more descriptive version that could
countenance strategic behavior.
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deemed protected.110 When private cooperation is induced,
public action can be rendered unnecessary. Private cooperation
within existing public rules enhances the satisfaction of the cooperating individuals without harming the interests of the
broader community as reflected in its public rules and policies.171
170. One could, however, sketch such a scenario, based on a notion that
private, voluntary interaction is inferior to public interaction. While such a
notion might be consistent with certain strands of republicanism, a pluralist
focus on individuals and their right to pursue personal desires provides no basis for drawing such a line.
One also might draw such a line by reference to certain class or statusbased propositions. During the individualist and competitive 1840s, a person's
status in the community could vary significantly depending on whether the
person was viewed from an economic or political perspective. Wage earners,
according to Robert Wiebe, were held in low social esteem, and suffered a vulnerable legal status. But as citizens, as political actors, they were the equals
of other citizens:
What did alter the wage earner's democratic standing was to change
identities, then reenter public life through lodges that affirmed their
members' independence: now no longer wage earners but Irish Democrats or Iowa Grangers or Civil War veterans. By making themselves invisible as wage earners, their citizenship lost its ambiguity .... [W]age earners recast themselves in work-neutral terms ...
and acquir[ed] public equality as they did. A democratic problem that
could not be resolved in the working world, in other words, found its
most effective answer in the political world.
WIEBE, supra note 139, at 95-96. In its time, a notion that workers are the
political equals of their fellow citizens, but socially inferior, suffered a deep
internal tension. Even if at one time such a notion could have justified the
proposition that speech directed toward public action is more valuable and
worthy of protection than is speech directed toward voluntary and legal private action, there no longer exists such a prevailing view about the social inferiority or incapacity of persons, at least as defined by reference to categories of
economic activity or other private endeavor.
171. Robert Wiebe suggests that in the first half of the nineteenth century,
Americans emphasized the individual as a participant in democracy and that
in this pluralist sense, "19th century democracy acknowledged no significant
contradictions between individual self-interest and collective action. The People sacrificed no individuality." Id. at 83.
Vincent Blasi argues that political rationales for the protection of speech
provide no basis for viewing nonpolitical expression-such as literature or scientific inquiry-as protected. See Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and Good Character, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1567, 1569-70 (1999). This seems wrong, however, at
least if the political rationale for protecting speech is made in a pluralist,
rather than a republican, context. From the pluralist perspective, any speech
seeking a meeting of the minds between two or mo:i;e people, within the law,
enhances social welfare. Literature, to the extent reflecting a desire by an author to communicate her ideas to the reader, qualifies as valuable. Scientific
inquiry so qualifies as well, as the researcher or theorist seeks truth and to
disseminate her view of truth to persuade, or to be tested by, colleagues.
Indeed, Blasi's own argument as to why speech should be viewed as con-
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Thus, the notion that speech is protected because it is necessary for the operation of democracy with a pluralist emphasis
readily extends to protecting "commercial speech"-that is,
speech which "does 'no more than propose a commercial transaction."'172 From the liberal-pluralist perspective, the communication necessary to enable individuals to make mutually
beneficial bargains within the parameters of existing law is just
as important as is the communication necessary to enable individuals to make decisions about the merits of existing law.173
That communication intended to persuade others about
personal interests and private transactions should be deemed
protected speech for a First Amendment rooted in notions of
pluralist democracy does not at all imply that a choice to sell
the market-driven message should be deemed protected as well.
Decisions to sell the market-driven message do not express the
views or desires of its disseminator. Rather, like the manufacturer of cars and sneakers, the entrepreneur has created a
product by predicting market demand. His purpose is to satisfy
and capitalize upon that market demand.
Although such decisions to respond to anticipated market
demand might be valuable from the policy perspective oflaissez
faire and consumer sovereignty, they are irrelevant from the
perspective of the freedom of speech with a pluralist emphasis.
No one argues that choosing to produce and to sell a car withstitutionally valuable is instrumental in a way similar to the instrumental nature of a pluralist rationale for protecting speech. According to Blasi, "a culture that prizes and protects expressive liberty nurtures in its members certain character traits .... Such character traits are valuable ... not for their
intrinsic virtue but for their instrumental contribution to collective well-being,
social as well as political." Id. at 1569. A pluralist rationale for protecting
speech would not distinguish between self-expression that is expressly political from that which is not. So long as the impetus for self-expression is to persuade others, one committed to pluralist democracy would value the speech as
a potential vehicle for augmenting social welfare.
172. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762 (quoting Pittsburgh
Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385
(1973)).
173. See DAHL, supra note 165, at 17-18 ("If! hold that no one can, as a
general matter, know my goals and values better than I myself, then no doubt
I will insist that the process of making decisions must provide me with a full
opportunity to make my views known; and even if I am willing to leave details
to experts, I do not want anyone else to have more power over the decision, in
the last say, than I do. A solution along these lines might well appeal to me as
the best attainable, given the inescapable conditions ... that my need for human fellowship impels me to live in a society, that I cannot live with others
without sometimes disagreeing with them, and that I must therefore find
some way to adjust our conflicts that will appeal to all of us as fair.").
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out seat belts is speech protected by the First Amendment. No
one argues that choosing to purchase a car without seat belts is
speech. No one argues that choosing to drive a car without seat
belts is speech. These activities are not speech because they do
not involve the expression of one's personal ideas for the purpose of engaging the agreement of others or challenging the
views of others. From this perspective, speech is the debate
about the merits of existing law. Speech is the bargaining for
voluntary transactions within existing law. The transactions,
themselves, however, are not speech.114
Of course, Coase, Posner, and Epstein argue that such voluntary transactions are no less socially valuable than is the
speech that enables people to reach the agreement to engage in
the transaction, and, indeed, that the transactions are no less
socially valuable than is speech about public policy. Yet, even
they attach this value, as a matter of constitutional law, not to
the First Amendment's freedom of speech, but to the Fifth
Amendment's protection of property. Contrary to their views,
the conventional notion holds not only that production and consumption decisions are not part of the First Amendment's freedom of speech, but also that norms of laissez faire are matters
of policy discretion rather than constitutional mandate under
the Fifth Amendment.
The proponents of the "parity" of speech and property markets and those who assert the primacy of speech over property
markets agree that transactions in property are not speech.
Cass Sunstein, however, a proponent of the conventional wisdom, has presented an analysis that blurs the boundaries between speech and property markets. Indeed, he has apparently
endorsed the Krattenmaker and Powe notion that laissez-faire
market policies rooted in norms of consumer sovereignty are
consistent with, and implicit in, the notion that the First
Amendment protects a free "marketplace of ideas."
174. In contrast, urging people to buy a car-an example of so-called
"commercial speech"-is relevant to decisionmaking in a democracy with a
pluralist orientation. Similarly, urging people to buy or watch the marketdriven message is relevant. When such advertising consists of speaker-driven
messages, the actor is seeking to persuade others to act in a way that serves
his interests. Cf. discussion infra Part III.C. Thus, a programming decision to
carry and air Murphy Brown, to the extent animated by a concern to profit
from predicted market demand, would not deserve special constitutional protection from the perspective of a First Amendment rooted in concerns for pluralist democracy. A commercial urging people to watch Murphy Brown, however, could.
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Sunstein says that this view "can be traced to Justice
Holmes's great Abrams dissent, where the notion of a 'market
in ideas' received its preeminent e:xposition."175 He elaborated
on his understanding of this view: "Under the marketplace
metaphor, the First Amendment requires-at least as a presumption-a system of unrestricted economic markets in
speech. Government must respect the forces of supply and demand."176 Sunstein rejects this Holmesian conception of the
marketplace of ideas-as he interprets Holmes-because "it
confuses modern notions of consumer sovereignty in the marketplace with democratic understandings of political sovereignty."177 He argues that "for purposes of assessing the system of free expression, Madison's conception of sovereignty is
the governing one."178
Significantly, Sunstein's version of Madisonian majoritarianism is essentially republican, where citizens debate matters
of public policy with "respect for the facts, a commitment to
reasoned argument, and an effort to reach collectively beneficial outcomes rather than to behave . . . in a narrowly selfinterested manner." 179 Based on this republican understanding
of the First Amendment, Sunstein argues that government
should be freer than it has been to regulate television programming:
Democratic liberty should not be [confused] with "consumer sovereignty." ... People might well choose to view a silly situation comedy
at night, while also enthusiastically supporting a [government] requirement of media attention to public affairs. Their support of that
requirement, operating through democratic channels, could reflect a
reasoned judgment.... [D]emocratic judgments should prevail, so
long as they do not intrude on anything that is properly characterized
as a right. 180

Sunstein thus addresses the relationship between consumer sovereignty and the First Amendment. He suggests that
government should be deemed relatively free to regulate television programming decisions. His analysis is problematic, however, for two reasons.

175. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 169 (1997)
(emphasis added).
176. Id. (emphasis added).
177. See id. at 170-71.
178. SUNSTEIN, supra note 13, at 72.
179. . see id.
180. Id. at 73.
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First, his argument that the First Amendment does not encompass consumer sovereignty is rooted exclusively in the narrow and unrealistic normative framework of republicanism.
Consumer sovereignty may be at odds with a republican pursuit of the long-term general welfare, but so is interest group
politics. Yet, Sunstein does not argue that self-interested political persuasion is beyond the freedom of speech protected by
the First Amendment. Indeed, he neglects the relationship between self-interested persuasion and the First Amendment.
Second, by equating Holmes's notion of the "marketplace of
ideas" with consumer sovereignty, Sunstein cedes Holmes to
Director, Coase, and Epstein. Ironically, Sunstein thus ascribes some plausibility to their assertion that consumer sovereignty is a constitutional norm begging for vigorous protection,
by linking it, at least rhetorically, to this conventional constitutional metaphor of the speech "marketplace." If Sunstein is
correct about the relationship between Holmes's speech marketplace and economic markets in speech, one would need to reject Holmes and pluralism to justify rejecting Coase's views
about the constitutional parity of speech and property markets.
Recall Sunstein's proposition: "Under the marketplace metaphor, the First Amendment requires-at least as a presumption-a system of unrestricted economic markets in speech.
Government must respect the forces of supply and demand."181
But Sunstein's analysis misinterprets the meaning of
Holmes's commitment to the free competition of ideas in "the
market." The facts about which Holmes wrote in his Abrams
dissent involved the prosecution of advocates for the Russian
Communist revolution. Abrams had distributed leaflets urging
American factory workers to stop producing weapons that were
to be used not only in the war against Germany, but also, he
claimed, against the Russian revolutionaries. He was convicted
of "incit[ing], provok[ing], and encourag[ing] resistance to the
United States."
This was unpopular speech, not sold for any anticipated
economic profit, but expressed at great risk to the speakers. It
had nothing to do with entrepreneurial motives to exploit the
economic forces of supply and demand. Abrams had not determined that American factory workers wanted to hear calls for a
political strike and that they would purchase his leaflets in order to enjoy his message. Abrams was not engaged, in other
181. SUNSTEIN, supra note 175, at 169 (emphasis"added).
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words, with the production and sale of market-driven messages
in a regime of consumer sovereignty. Abrams was expressing a
personal viewpoint-and doing so at great risk to himself-and
his purpose was to engage others in communication about right
and wrong.
In finding Abrams's speech constitutionally protected,
Holmes suggested that the First Amendment requires free
space for competition among proponents of different versions of
the truth:
Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly logical. If you have no doubt of your premises or your power and want a
certain result with all your heart you naturally express your wishes
in law and sweep away all opposition. To allow [such] opposition ...
seems to indicate that you think the speech impotent, ... or that you
do not care whole-heartedly for the result, or that you doubt either
your power or your premises. But when men [realize] that time has
upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than
they believe [in] the very foundations of their own conduct[,] that the
ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that
the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted
in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground
upon which their wishes can be safely carried out. 182

Holmes, of course, is talking about a "marketplace" of ideas
in a highly metaphorical sense, having significant distinctions
from an economic market. An economic market involves producers whose calculations constitute supply curves and consumers whose values constitute demand curves. Holmes views
the free trade in ideas as "the best test of truth." When people
test truth, they necessarily are engaged in an exploration of
their own beliefs. Speakers can test truth only when engaged
in self-expression. 183 Listeners can test the truth of ideas only
when exploring what they believe, not when simply experiencing what they enjoy. Indeed, the truth that results when a
thought gets accepted in the "market" does not involve economic transactions at all.
Voters did not pay Newt Gingrich for the privilege of embracing his "Contract with America." The scientific community
did not pay Albert Einstein for the opportunity to embrace his
theory of general relativity. The American people did not pay
Martin Luther King for his prescriptions on racial justice.
These were not relationships between seller and buyer in the
182. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
183. For a consideration of "Socratic" exploration and the "devil's argument," see infra note 228.
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regime of consumer sovereignty. These were relationships
among people seeking some notion of "truth" in a context of
mutual exploration. It was this sort of relationship, not that
between producer and consumer, that Holmes had in mind.
In short, Holmes does not equate the "truth" resulting from
self-conscious argument about the virtues of communism versus the virtues of capitalism with the point of intersection.between a product's supply curve and its demand curve in economic markets. Holmes's pluralist marketplace of ideas would
not--as my foregoing analysis endeavors to suggest--equate
the value of a television programming decision with the value
of a political speech. Indeed, the notion of "truth" Holmes discusses involves determinations of right and wrong among people self-consciously discussing and considering questions of
right and wrong-like Abrams and the factory workers he was
addressing. Neither the commercial television programmer,
nor the manufacturer of trendy sneakers, is engaged in testing
truth through speech when putting together a product to satisfy
anticipated purchaser preferences in the regime of consumer
sovereignty.
Thus, while a notion of free trade in a regime of "consumer
sovereignty'' would view efforts to sell the market-driven message as fully worthy of protection as a property right, such was
not Holmes's view of speech in Abrams. Indeed, Holmes's marketplace concept is tied to the significant second strand of
Madisonian constitutionalism that Sunstein overlooked-the
factional pursuit of self-interest. Madison viewed faction as inherent in politics. Because inherent, the speech engaged in by
factions-self-interested political persuasion-must be viewed
as a component of any "freedom of speech" that is constitutionally protected as necessary for democratic self-government.
Thus, while Sunstein did conclude that consumer sovereignty is
distinguishable from republicanism and its concomitant freedom of speech, he failed to consider whether consumer sovereignty is distinguishable from pluralism and its concomitant
freedom of speech.

***

The foregoing has suggested that from the perspective of
democracy with a pluralist emphasis, speech is the means
through which people can purposefully overcome their separated consciousness. Speech is the means though which both
disagreement and agreement are revealed. Speech is the
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means through which disagreement might be transformed into
agreement through compromise.
Speech enables transactions to occur in the regime of citizen sovereignty-as the discussion that precedes voting and the
enactment of laws. Secondarily, speech enables transactions to
occur in the regime of consumer sovereignty-as the bargaining
that precedes contract's meeting of the minds-so long as those
transactions sought to be induced are within the boundaries of
existing law. Thus, from the perspective of democracy with a
pluralist emphasis, activity does not involve speech unless both
the communicator and the recipient are self-consciously engaged in a dynamic of informing, and learning about, each
other's views.
From the perspective of a First Amendment rooted in democracy with a pluralist emphasis, the freedom of speech is
comprised of efforts, self-interested· or not, to persuade others
through self-expression. It is concerned, in other words, with
communication-communication that can enable individuals to
understand.one another, to identify differences, to reveal commonalities, to find circumstances where law must mediate public conflict and where contract and exchange can exploit private
agreement. Because decisions to sell the market-driven message do not involve this communicative intent, they should be
deemed unprotected by a First Amendment rooted in democracy with a pluralist emphasis.
ii. On the Interests of the Listener

From the perspective of those who receive speech in a democracy with a pluralist emphasis, the constitutionally protected interest is in having access to solicitations, to efforts by
their fellows to inform, to induce agreement, to find common
ground, and to bridge difference. The value of speech is in informing the listener what the speaker believes, or possesses,
that could be of benefit to each. The value of speech is as the
informational vehicle by which utility-enhancing exchanges can
occur. This value is realized only when both the speaker and
the listener participate, anticipating that there could be a meeting of the minds between them. There can be no such meeting
of minds when the disseminator produces or sells, and the audience receives, the market-driven message, because the com-
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municator of the market-driven message has not expressed
what is on his mind at all.184
Joseph Burstyn's passages about the constitutionally protected status of motion picture entertainment suggests potential objections to this analysis:
It cannot be doubted that motion pictures are a significant medium
for the communication of ideas. They may affect public attitudes and
behavior in a variety of ways, ranging from [a] direct espousal of a political or social doctrine to the subtle shaping of thought which characterizes all artistic expression. The importance of motion pictures as
an organ of public opinion is not lessened by the fact that they are designed to entertain as well as to inform. 185

Burstyn thus implies two objections to the proposition that
decisions to sell-and to consume-the market-driven message
should be deemed unprotected (or low value) speech, from the
perspective of the interests of listeners in a system of pluralist
democracy. First, listeners may feel that they benefit from the
market-driven message. Indeed, by definition, the marketdriven message-when produced as a product to be sold for
profit in the regime of consumer sovereignty-is something
that a good number of people want to hear. Second, the market-driven message contains ideas, and the recipient of that
message thinks thoughts because of it.186 Thus, one might argue that the audience's concern for market-driven speech is distinguishable from a consumer's concern for cars and sneakers.
Market-driven speech affects the thinking of those who hear it.
The sale and purchase of market-driven speech may be commerce, but it is commerce in words. From the perspective of a
First Amendment concerned with enabling the processes of
pluralist decisionmaking, these objections do not bear scrutiny.
On the first objection: That people might feel they benefit
from having access to the market-driven message (when sold
for profit) is not a sufficient reason for concluding that from the
perspective of the audience, a First Amendment rooted in the
needs of pluralist decisionmaking should be deemed to accord
to it a specially protected status. People feel that they benefit
from having access to cars, sneakers, prostitution, cigarettes,
184. Cf J. MILL, ON LIBERTY 32 (R.B. McCallum ed., 1946) (writing that
people must hear arguments from those "who actually believe them; who defend them in earnest, and do their very utmost for them," rather than from
others who may merely report the arguments).
185. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952) (emphasis
added).
186. See id.
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and any number of products and services that are routinely
subject to extensive regulation. This, however, does not transform these goods and services into protected speech. To qualify
as valuable and protected "speech" for a First Amendment with
a pluralist emphasis, the communicator must benefit the audience in a particular way-informing them of the communicator's views. Only such honest communication enables the meeting of minds, public or private, that pluralism celebrates.
On the second objection: It is true that the market-driven
message-even when sold for profit-contains ideas and that
the recipient thinks thoughts in reaction to it. But from the
perspective of a First Amendment rooted in pluralist democracy, this also should not be sufficient to qualify the marketdriven message as protected speech within "the freedom of
speech." Anything that humans create contains whatever ideas
underlie the creation. Furthermore, as discussed above, people
think thoughts in response to driving a car (with or without
seatbelts), playing football (with or without a helmet), smoking
cigarettes (with or without spiked nicotine), and every other activity.187 When the audience interacts with a television show, a
movie, or even a book as entertainment or escapism, its relationship to the communication is not relevant to the processes
of pluralist democracy. The audience's use of the ideas cannot
be to find common ground between disseminator (i.e., the television programmer) and listener, because the disseminator has
not expressed his views at all. With no prospect for a meeting
of minds, there is no basis for finding that the audience has a
privileged interest in receiving the market-driven message
from the perspective of a First Amendment rooted in concerns
for pluralist democratic decisionmaking.
Thus, from a pluralist perspective, the relevant dynamic
for analyzing the First Amendment value of an audience's consumption of the market-driven message is one of economic
transaction, by which I mean an exchange of goods for services,
services for money, or other things of value to the participants.
We never have considered such economic transactions to qualify as constitutionally protected speech. Even Director, Coase,
and Epstein do not make such an argument. Whether eco187. To be sure, there can be market transactions involving words and
ideas as commodities. But from a pluralist perspective, speech is not a commodity but a medium. It is not the end, but a means to the end of creating
agreement. A solicitation to purchase market-driven speech is protected. The
market-driven speech itself is not. It is just another commodity.
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nomic transactions should be deemed entitled to vigorous constitutional protection under the Fifth Amendment as a property
interest is an entirely different question. For the First Amendment, however, when deemed concerned with according special
protection to speech because of its essential place in democratic
decisionmaking processes with a pluralist emphasis, this
exclusion of the market transaction from the ambit of protected
"speech" is entirely appropriate.188
2. Personal Fulfillment Perspectives
Republican and pluralist versions of democratic rationales
for protecting the freedom of speech imply that an actor is not
engaged in "speech" unless engaged in self-expression. Selfexpression, in this sense, connotes the communication of an individual's own values, beliefs, and views, for the purpose of
testing those views against others' or persuading others to
adopt those views. The individual looks within, decides what is
most important to her at the time, and candidly expresses her
views to test them against those of others or to persuade others
to adopt them.
Some have argued that whatever the value of selfexpression may be to democratic self-government, self188. While an economic transaction is not "speech," the negotiations and
representations that precede the transaction are "speech." The sale of a pair
of sneakers is not "speech." The negotiations and representations that precede
that sale are "speech." A contract for the sale represents a meeting of the
minds about the issue at hand, the fruit of the negotiations and representations.
Likewise, the "sale" of the market-driven message-through dissemination and consumption-is a transaction in a commodity. Representations urging the sale of the market-driven message involve communication
seeking a meeting of the minds and, therefore, are "speech." Thus, to the extent that a decision to broadcast Murphy Brown represents the sale of a market-driven message, neither the broadcast nor its reception by the consumer
should be deemed part of "the freedom of speech," so far as a First Amendment
rooted in notions of pluralist democracy would be concerned. But the broadcaster's advertisement for Murphy Brown, urging viewers to watch it, could be
protected as "speech." Such expression could indeed communicate the true
views of the actor-the Columbia Broadcasting System. It would be a
speaker-driven message, seeking to induce a meeting of the minds between
speaker and listener, leaving to the listener the decision that determines
whether a meeting of the minds in fact occurs. Thus, the speech is a transaction cost, rather than the commodity which is the subject of the transaction.
This analysis assumes a personification of a corporation that might not be
supportable. Whether corporations should be understood as "persons" for
Fourteenth Amendment purposes, and for First Amendment purposes, is beyond the scope of this Article.
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expression also is valuable because it promotes selffulfillment-i.e., that it is a particularly valuable method by
which individuals achieve self-realization. Thus, a concern for
self-fulfillment could provide a rationale for placing special
value--and, perhaps, constitutional value--on self-expression.
Indeed, the personal fulfillment value was promoted by Thomas
Emerson as a rationale for the protection of speech. 189 It well
fits contemporary impulses toward self-indulgence. Yet, it is a
problematic basis for understanding why the framers of the
First Amendment were concerned about "the freedom of
speech."
Frederick Schauer has noted two difficulties. First, to determine whether a particular choice or activity would qualify
for constitutional protection under the First Amendment as informed by the personal fulfillment value, "the freedom of
speech" must be defined by reference to this particular normative perspective. Second, to justify the proposition that speech
warrants constitutional protection based on the personal fulfillment value, one must identify how "the freedom of speech"
promotes personal fulfillment in a way significantly distinguishable from the way in which other activities contribute to
personal fulfillment.
People gain fulfillment, after all, from a wide range of activities. Some are fulfilled by smoking marijuana. Others are
fulfilled by manufacturing cigarettes, or driving recklessly, or
building tall structures, or paying low wages. Indeed, the relationship between seller and buyer in the context of consumer
sovereignty is one in which each seeks fulfillment, of one sort or
another, from an exchange. Fulfillment in the sense of enjoyment, or satisfaction, from putting one's desires into action fails
to distinguish any notion of speech from other sources of enjoyment or satisfaction.
To justify the view that individual fulfillment underlies the
Constitution's protection of speech, one must posit that there is
something special about speech as a source of individual fulfillment that justifies (and justified to the framers) giving to
that particular source of fulfillment a privileged constitutional
status. 190 Not even Director, Coase, and other proponents of
189. See THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6
(1970).
190. See Frederick Schauer, Must Speech Be Special?, 78 NW. U. L. REV.
1284, 1290-92 (1983) (discussing the significance of self-fulfillment as a ra-

tionale for protecting speech).
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the notion that speech markets and property markets are of
equal value, argue that "speech," ''liberty," and "property'' have
indistinguishable constitutional meaning. Ross Perot might
well have been deeply fulfilled by building his businesses, and
Donald Trump may be deeply fulfilled by building his structures, but neither speech absolutists who embrace the person~!
fulfillment value nor proponents of speech and property market
parity would likely claim that Perot's and Trump's business activities should be privileged as speech under the First Amendment. If the legal category of "speech" in the First Amendment
is to have meaning distinct from the legal category of ''liberty''
or "property'' in the Fifth Amendment, one must identify the
particular sort of personal fulfillment an actor gains by participating in the freedom of speech and why. this. sort of fulfillment
is distinguishable from that gained from other activities.
Schauer suggests that the best case version of selffulfillment as a justification for protecting the. freedom of
speech is an Aristotelian notion of how people should seek fulfillment rather than an Epicurean notion of how people do seek
fulfillment:
This conception of the rich life is derived from ideas of personal
growth, self-fulfillment, and development of the rational faculties.
Under this conception, one who is enjoying the good life may be neither content nor euphoric in the ordinary sense. . . . He should feel
satisfied in the knowledge that he is realizing his full potential. If it
is the power of reason that distinguishes man from other forms of
animal life, then only by fully exploiting this power. can one be said to
enjoy a full life. 191

A purely subjective, Epicurean notion of self-fulfillment would
fail to provide a rationale for according special constitutional
protection to any particular source of self-fulfillment-whether
speech, religion, or the pursuit of property. Indeed, the purely
subjective definition of the good is a char~cteristic of consumer
sovereignty. From this perspective, there may well be a parity-though not an identity-between the markets of speech
and property. What determines whether something is valuable
is whether someone determines that it is valuable to hilnself.
But, as Schauer correctly notes, the Cons.titution's specification of speech for protection-and its additional specification
of religion and property for protection-implies that each has a
politically defined value-not a purely subjective value-that is

191. FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 49

(1982).
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distinct from the others. Invoking an Aristotelian notion of
self-fulfillment-rational self-development-as a justification
for valuing the freedom of speech can provide a political, rather
than purely subjective, basis for identifying that which would
warrant special protection as "speech." Indeed, Schauer finds
an implicit definition of speech in the Aristotelian ideal:
[M]inds do not grow in a vacuum. Intellectual isolationism is almost
wholly inconsistent with intellectual development. . . . mntellectual
self-development comes from communication of our ideas to others.
Our thoughts are refined when we communicate them. Often we have
an idea in some amorphous and incipient stage, but see it develop or
see its weaknesses for the first time when the idea must be specifically articulated in a form intelligible to some other person.
Seen in this light, communication is an integral part of the selfdevelopment of the speaker, because it enables him to clarify and better understand his own thoughts. Communication may also be inseparable from the self-realization of the hearers, the recipients of
communication. 192

This definition of the freedom of speech implicitly distinguishes speech from other sources of self-fulfillment. In so doing, it is consistent with the conventional notion of constitutional law that rejects a parity of markets in speech and
property. It also is remarkably similar to the notion of speakerdriven self-expression, disseminated for the purpose of enlightening self and others, that this Article suggests is the implicitly
proper definition of "speech" for a First Amendment dedicated
to the promotion of democracy with either a republican or pluralist emphasis.
It is, furthermore, a definition of speech that excludes decisions to create a market-driven message, and to sell that message for economic profit. One who manufactures a marketdriven message does not identify his own ideas. He cannot refine his ideas when communicating the market-driven message
to others, because he has not presented his own ideas. The
hearers cannot benefit from discourse about the "speaker's"
ideas, again because the "speaker" has disseminated content
derived externally, rather than from his own beliefs and values.
Thus, whatever rational self-development comes from the selfconscious and interactive search for understanding among
uniquely intelligent human beings cannot come from the sale,
or consumption, of the market-driven message.

***
192. Id. at 54-55.
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Those who believe that "the freedom of speech" is protected
by the First Amendment because of the role that this freedom
plays for individual fulfillment come perilously close to proponents of consumer sovereignty who see a constitutional parity
between markets of speech and property. Part of the value of
consumer sovereignty, after all, is its promise of a mechanism
for satisfying each individual bargainer, according to her own
values. While proponents of consumer sovereignty profess to be
agnostic about whether one source of fulfillment is better than
another-leaving that decision to the individual-proponents of
the freedom of speech based on norms of personal autonomy
must see speech as a special source of fulfillment. Their difficult task, as Frederick Schauer has so effectively pointed out, is
to explain why speech is special and to define what human activities qualify as speech.
Although proponents of property rights based on norms of
consumer sovereignty and proponents of speech rights based on
norms of personal autonomy are all concerned with the value of
individual fulfillment, the boundaries between speech and
property need not be breached. Each is a distinctive constitutional category, implicitly with a distinctive meaning. Speech
absolutists who deny a parity of markets must explain why the
speech they see as absolutely protected is distinguishable from
the property rights they see as minimally protected. Even proponents of consumer sovereignty who urge the parity of markets must respect the legally distinct categories of "speech" and
"property" implicit in constitutional language. Parity of constitutional value does not imply identity in constitutional meaning. Thus, for both the speech absolutists and the proponents
of consumer sovereignty, the fulfillment one gains from engaging in speaker-driven self-expression must be distinguishable
from the fulfillment one gains from selling the market-driven
message.
The foregoing analysis suggests that for both views of constitutional law, one who sells the market-driven message is engaging in activities to which the rights of property-not the
rights of speech-are relevant. The difference between the
speech absolutists and the proponents of consumer sovereignty
is in the constitutional status of property rights. There should
be no difference in their judgment as to whether selling the
market-driven message is an exercise of speech rights or of
property rights.
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3. Copyright Perspectives

The Constitution accords Congress power to "Promote the
Progress of Science and Useful Arts, by securing, for limited
Times, to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries." Commentators have considered whether there is a tension between Congress's copyright power and the First Amendment's prohibition of laws
"abridging the freedom of speech."193 Through the copyright, an
author has the right to forbid the dissemination of his work entirely or to withhold it except upon terms satisfactory to him. 194
Enforcement of this right prevents persons who have not obtained the author's consent from disseminating the copyrighted
"speech." Some have argued that by preventing those who wish
to use or to disseminate another's material from doing so without her consent, copyright abridges of the freedom of speech for
the would-be user, 195 even as it protects the freedom of
speech-more precisely, the concomitant "editorial discretion"
not to speak-for the creator and those to whom she sells her
rights. 196 What, if anything, can copyright reveal about the relationship between entrepreneurial decisions to sell the market-driven message and the freedom of speech?
The copyright power often is understood as having been
granted to Congress toward securing "the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors."197 This economic rationale for copyright is concerned with the benefits derived by the public from the economically motivated creativity
of authors and can thus be understood as expressing the values
of consumer sovereignty. It is based on the behavioral premise
that "the provision of a special reward"-i.e., the limited mo193. See, e.g., 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT§ 1.lO[A], at 1-62.1 to -63 (1988).
194. "Publication of an author's expression before he has authorized its dissemination seriously infringes the author's right to decide when and whether
it will be made public." Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471
U.S. 539, 551 (1985).
195. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 193, at 1-63; cf. Miami Herald
Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256 (1974) ("[The] compulsion to publish
that which reason tells [newspapers] should not be published is unconstitutional." (quotations omitted)); Edward Samuels, The Idea-Expression
Dichotomy in Copyright Law, 56 TENN. L. REV. 321, 395-407 (1989) (discussing authorities that state that copyright arguably protects the holder's First
Amendment rights by safeguarding the interest in not speaking).
196. See Samuels, supra note 195, at 401.
197. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429
(1984) (quotations omitted).
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nopoly rights in their writings and discoveries-would "motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors,'~ to the benefit of the consuming public: 198
The copyright law, like the patent statutes, makes reward to the
owner a secondary consideration.... "The sole interest of the United
States and the primary object in conferring the monopoly lie in the
general benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors." It
is said that reward to the author or artist serves to induce release to
the public of the products of his creative genius. 199

Thus, the author envisioned by this economic rationale for
copyright is one who would not have produced a work but for
the incentive of economic reward. William Landes and Richard
Posner have conceived the author envisioned by copyright in
these economically calculating terms: "For a new work to be
created, the expected return-typically, and we shall assume
exclusively, from the sale of copies-must exceed the expected
cost."200
Authors may, and frequently do, sell their copyright to
publishers, broadcasters, and other mass disseminators of the
authors' works.201 Those to whom the copyright is sold have all
198. Id.
199. Id. (quoting United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131,
158 (1948)); see UJ.. at 477 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Copyright is based on
the belief that by granting authors the exclusive rights to reproduce their
works, they are given an [econoniic] incentive to create, and that 'encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public
welfare through the talents of authors and inventors' .... The monopoly created by copyright thus rewards the individual author in order to benefit the
public." (quoting Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954))).
200. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of
Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 327 (1989) (emphasis added).
Copyright also has been justified by a competing notion that authors have
"natural rights" "to reap the fruits of their creations ... and to protect the integrity of their creations as extensions of their personalities." CRAIG JOYCE ET
AL., COPYRIGHT LAW § l.05[BJ (3d ed. 1994); see PAUL GoLDSTEIN,
COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY 165-70 (1994). Congress and the Supreme Court have
seemed to reject this notion, which would justify Congress's copyright power
"not because [authors] need protection as an inducement for their efforts, but
rather because they deserve protection as an inherent natural right attaching
to the act of creation." PAUL GoLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT§ 1.13.2 (2d ed. 2000); see
also Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 660-61 (1834); R.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th
Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1909), quoted in Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 429 n.10 ("The enactment of copyright legislation by Congress under the terms of the Constitution is not based upon any natural right that the author has in his writings, ... but upon the ground that the welfare of the public will be served and
progress of science and useful arts will be promoted by securing to authors for
limited periods the exclusive rights to their writings.").
201. See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S.
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rights to control the work that had been accorded to the creator. Indeed, in most circumstances, the owner of a copyright
seeking its enforcement is a publisher, broadcaster, or other
sort of entrepreneurial disseminator. For these actors, copyright does not serve to induce creativity; rather, the copyright
induces entrepreneurial investment and sales toward maximizing return on the investment. Yet, the economic rationale for
copyright is still applicable, for through the actions of these entrepreneurs, whose investment is protected by the copyright,
the public gains access to products that otherwise would not be
so readily available.
Is there a conflict between copyright (as informed by an
economic rationale) and the freedom of speech? Does copyright
protect the First Amendment interests of authors (and publishers) at the expense of the speech rights of would-be users? How
should one understand the relationship between copyright and
the freedom of speech?

a. On the Interests of the Creator and Licensed Disseminator of
Works
This Article's analysis has thus far suggested that from the
three normative perspectives underlying "the freedom of
speech"-republican democracy, pluralist democracy, and personal fulfillment-there may well be no reason to view the author and entrepreneur who seek to sell a market-driven message as engaging in activity warranting First Amendment
protection. The author who creates a market-driven message
for the purpose of selling it, and the entrepreneur who buys the
market-driven message for the purpose of selling it, are the
paradigmatic actors envisioned by the economic rationale for
copyright-the author who needs the incentive of reward in the
economic marketplace in order to create, and the publisher who
needs protection for his property in order to invest.202 Thus,
this Article's analysis implies that there may well be no reason
to view their work as part of "the freedom of speech" entitled to
special constitutional protection. From this perspective, then,
the paradigmatic creators and entrepreneurs contemplated by

539, 547 (1985) (explaining the common practice of authors to sell their rights
to publishers).
202. See, e.g., Landes & Posner, supra note 200, at 327 ("For a new work to
be created, the expected return-typically . . . from the sale of copies-must
exceed the expected cost.").
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the economic rationale for copyright are not people engaged in
the freedom of speech.
In contrast, one who seeks to enlighten through disseminating a speaker-driven message--one who engages in selfexpression-has a motive to speak apart from the promise of
economic reward. This is an individual who, like Martin Luther King, is concerned with the search for truth through selfexpression and who is willing to sacrifice time and other personal resources in order to persuade.203 This is not the actor
envisioned by Landes and Posner, who creates a new work only
when the anticipated economic reward exceeds the expected
cost. This actor who, under the foregoing analysis, has the
purest claim to protection as a participant in the First Amendment's freedom of speech does not need the protection of copyright to induce his communication. This speaker would not
seek the protection of copyright-at least for purposes of protecting the scarcity (hence commercial value) of his message-and, indeed, presumably would be pleased if his message were
disseminated as far and as wide as possible. 204 For the paradigmatic speaker warranting First Amendment protection-the
actor who pedagogically engages in speaker-driven self-

203. See King v. Mister Maestro, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 101 (S.D.N.Y. 1963);
Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 194 F.3d 1211 (11th Cir.
1999); supra note 183 and accompanying text. This is not to suggest that persons who are granted copyrights should be viewed as categorically excluded
from the First Amendment's protection of "editorial discretion." In fact, copyright has not been constructed exclusively from an economic rationale. Beyond this, some actors who do engage in speaker-driven self-expression, and
who might seek a First Amendment freedom not to speak, would have an interest in seeking the protection of copyright, so long as the law provided it.
The point is simply that if one relies on an economic rationale for copyright,
the paradigmatic actor warranting copyright protection would be precisely the
entrepreneur seeking to sell a market-driven message who, under the analysis
presented in this Article, is least entitled to the First Amendment's protection.
204. When Universal City Studios sued Sony for copyright infringement
based on the sale of video tape recorders, Fred Rogers, producer and star of
public television's Mr. Rogers' Neighborhood, did not object to home video recording of his program. He was happy that this then-new technology would
enable more people to see, and be influenced by, his program than otherwise
would be the case. See Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 445 n.27. Rogers seems to be
one who believes in the message his program conveys and who conveys that
message for the purpose of enabling others to see his truths. He seems to engage in the creation of a speaker-driven message and disseminates that message to enlighten. In contrast, Universal City Studios was a profit-seeking
corporation. It was concerned with maintaining control over access to its
commercial programming to maintain its scarcity, hence its economic value
and return. See id. at 420.
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expression to enlighten self and others-the economic rationale
for the protection of copyright is irrelevant.2os
205. Again, this is not to argue that no rationale for copyright could warrant protecting one who speaks purely motivated by a desire to enlighten
through self-expression. Rather, it is to suggest that the economic rationale
for copyright does not extend to persons who are motivated to speak by a pursuit of truth rather than by a pursuit of profit. Indeed, some natural right notion that authors should be entitled to control the use of their works by others
could well justify according certain protections of copyright to those engaged in
speaker-driven self-expression. The notion that an author has a right to control the use of his words, to maintain the meaning of his words as he intended,
can even be understood as consistent with republican, pluralist, or selffulfillment rationales for the freedom of speech. But this justification for such
protection is entirely separate from the economic rationale for copyright.
The insistent objection concerned with the complexities of an actor's
mixed motives in the real world must be confronted as well. Even if it is theoretically correct that one who speaks the truth purely as she sees it is the
paradigmatic actor entitled to the First Amendment's protection, and one who
purely seeks. profit by selling the speaker-driven message is the paradigmatic
actor warranting the protection of copyright-and that there is no reason to
extend the protections of one area of law to the other area's paradigm-the
real world is not organized into such neatly defined categories.
As previously suggested, rarely might it be said that an author is motivated purely by a speaker-driven desire to enlighten, with no concern for making money. Few have unlimited resources such that they can devote as much
of their resources as they wish to self-expression. Most people must spend
most of their time earning a living. In doing so, they sacrifice energies that
otherwise might be devoted to self-expression. Authors-even those motivated
primarily by a sense of art-who seek to earn a living through their writing
may sacrifice the purity of self-expression so that their product might be more
attractive to potential buyers. Perhaps no one can engage in pure selfexpression, undiluted or unaffected by the pressures of earning a living. Conversely, entrepreneurs concerned with maximizing the return on their investments might well choose to forgo a project that they view as excessively offensive to their own values, no matter how profitable that project might prove to
be. Perhaps no one engages in pure commercialism, unaffected by some sense
of personal conscience.
That reality is complex, and that motives cannot easily be ascertained,
might justify a decision to create doctrines tending to accord First Amendment
protection to entrepreneurs who sell speech and copyright protection to speakers who seek to enlighten the world. If we cannot reliably apply a category's
theoretical boundaries to real world complexities, then perhaps we should not
try. This is a prophylactic or "breathing space" justification, however, and is
very different from a proposition that entrepreneurs who sell words deserve
First Amendment protection and that speakers who seek to persuade with
self-expression deserve the protection of copyright. See supra notes 184-88,
193-201 and accompanying text.
Yet, concessions to the messiness of reality would be inapplicable to
circumstances in which reality turns out not to be so ambiguous.
Furthermore, such concessions might be achieved through legal doctrines
specifically tailored to minimize the costs of erroneous determinations of fact.
In short, the messy reality justification for a prophylactic decision extending
copyright protection to the speaker not motivated by profit, and First
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This Article has suggested that proponents of free economic markets should disentangle their notions that commercial television programmers are properly treated both as economic actors in the regime of consumer sovereignty and as
speakers exercising "editorial discretion" protected by the First
Amendment. Rather, whatever constitutional interest against
regulation such programmers have is properly conceived as a
property interest protected by the Fifth Amendment. The
analysis now also suggests that copyright-to the extent that it
covers actors because of, and relevant to, an underlying economic rationale-does not protect First Amendment speech
interests of either authors or publishers. Rather, it protects
their property interests in maximizing the return on their
investment.
Does this proposition intensify a concern that copyright
compromises the First Amendment? Does copyright infringe
the constitutionally protected freedom of speech of would-be
users simply for the sake of protecting the property interests
(rather than the speech interests) of authors and publishers?

b. On the Interests of Users
The analysis developed thus far would suggest that any
putative copyright violator's First Amendment rights should be
understood as depending on his motive for dissemination. If
the nonauthorized disse.minator does not personally believe in
the message contained in the copyrighted work and is not concerned with its dissemination to enlighten others, he is not concerned with engaging in discourse about which a First Amendment with either a pluralist or a republican emphasis would
have special concern. He is, furthermore, not engaged in Aristotelian self-expression, such that the personal fulfillment rationale for the freedom of speech would be applicable. Indeed,
if the nonauthorized disseminator views the copyrighted work
simply as a product to be offered in the economic marketplace
and sold for a profit, a pluralist, republican, or Aristotelian
tection to the speaker not motivated by profit, and First Amendment protection to the entrepreneur who uses words, leaves room for other ways of dealing
with the messy reality problem. In contrast, justifying First Amendment protection for the entrepreneur, and copyright protection for the actor seeking
enlightenment, on the proposition that each actor deserves the protection of
both areas oflaw would render the parsing of mixed motives and factual complexities irrelevant. The point here is to challenge this notion of just desserts
and to suggest the importance of endeavoring to parse motives, however complex that task might be.
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rooted First Amendment should be no more concerned with
state enforcement of the copyright holder's property right than
it would be with state enforcement of any law prohibiting the
theft of private property.206
The proposition that "the freedom of speech" and copyright
can be understood as envisioning paradigmatic actors with very
different motives and intent is reinforced by the doctrine of
"fair use." "Fair use" defines circumstances in which it is not a
violation of copyright for unauthorized persons to disseminate
or otherwise to use copyrighted material. Congress has identified four factors that are
especially relevant in determining whether the use was fair ... : (1)
the purpose and character of the use; (2) the nature of the copyrighted
work; (3) the substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; (4) the effect on the potential market for or
value of the copyrighted work. 207

The first factor is concerned with the putative violator's
reasons for using the copyrighted material. In the preamble to
§ 107, Congress has identified six purposes for which an unauthorized user may have acted that would establish eligibility
for a finding of "fair use": "purposes such as criticism, comment,
news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research [are] not an infringement of
copyright."208 The Supreme Court has noted that in evaluating
206. The analysis applies as well for state imposition on the liberties of an
authorized disseminator of an author's copyrighted work. Indeed, this is the
scenario which has been the primary concern of this Article-state imposition
on the discretion of broadcasters who have purchased authors' copyrights or
who are authorized disseminators of authors' copyrighted works. If the government were, for example, to mandate free prime-time television broadcast
time for political candidates, it arguably would have displaced market-driven
decisions to sell a product with speech higher on the hierarchy of values encompassed by "the freedom of speech"-speaker-driven messages disseminated
to enlighten.
Of course, one might suspect that many political commercials are not examples of the speaker-driven message intended to enlighten. Political candidates notoriously pander to the electorate, creating market-driven messages
with polls and focus groups, with the intent to benefit on election day from an
existing distribution of values. For consideration of whether an effort to pander with the market-driven message should be deemed worthy of special constitutional protection, whether it should be deemed more worthy than efforts
to sell a market-driven message, and whether a candidate's pandering in a political advertisement is constitutionally distinguishable from a corporation's
pandering in a product commercial, see infra Part III.C.
207. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560-61
(1985).
208. 17 u.s.c. § 107 (1992).
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"the purpose and character of the use" under factor one, "[t]he
[inquiry] here may be guided by the examples given in the preamble to § 107, looking to whether the use is for criticism, or
comment, or news reporting, and the like."209
Furthermore, § 107 indicates that "the commercial or nonprofit character of an activity, while not conclusive with respect
to fair use, can and should be weighed along with other factors
in fair use decisions."210 Indeed, an actor's commercial intent to
sell copyrighted material for profit weighs against a finding of
"fair use." "The fact that a publication was commercial as opposed to nonprofit is a separate factor that tends to weigh
against a finding of fair use. '[E]very commercial use of copyrighted material is presumptively an unfair exploitation of the
monopoly privilege that belongs to the owner of the copyright."'211
Thus, when purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research are pursued for
profit, the Court has seemed concerned about the degree to
which a potential infringer was motivated by the statutorily favored purposes, and how much it was motivated by a bare concern for profit. In Harper & Row Publishers Inc. v. The Nation,
for example, the Court found that one magazine's use of passages from Gerald Ford's memoirs (which were licensed to another magazine), did not constitute "fair use." In considering
the purpose of the use, the Court determined that a purpose of
news reporting, per se, did not necessarily weigh in favor of defendant's use. Indeed, this defendant, The Nation, had admitted a "purpose of scooping the forthcoming hardcover and Time
extracts."212 Thus, "The Nation's use had not merely the incidental effect but the intended purpose of supplanting the copyright holder's commercially valuable right of first publication.''213 Because "[fJair use distinguishes between a true
scholar and a chisler who infringes a work for personal profit,"
The Nation's commercial motive, underlying its news reporting
purpose, for using the copyrighted material weighed against a
209. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578-79 (1994) (quoting 17 u.s.c. § 107).
210. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 66 (1976).
211. Harper & Row Publishers Inc., 471 U.S. at 562 (quoting Sony Corp. of
Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984)) (alteration in original).
212. Id.
213. Id.
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finding of "fair use."214 The Court has, therefore, at least intimated that while purposes such as criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research may qualify a use
as fair, a motive to enlighten, rather than one simply to profit,
must underlie these purposes.
One can understand these congressional choices and judicial interpretations as consistent with the hierarchy of First
Amendment norms developed in this Article. When undertaken in a noncommercial context; the six purposes Congress
has listed can all be understood as reflecting a purpose to
enlighten with speaker-driven self-expression. Research and
scholarship are paradigmatic examples of an actor's search for
truth. Publication of research and scholarship are paradigmatic examples of an actor's purpose to induce others to embrace-or to challenge-his understanding of the truth. And so
it is with the purposes of criticism, comment, reporting news,
and teaching-particularly when undertaken in a noncommercial context. 2 1s When pursued in a noncommercial context,
these purposes provide the strongest version of factor one-"the
purpose and character of the use"-to support a finding of "fair
use." These purposes to enlighten by disseminating one's true
beliefs-these pedagogical objectives-have been identified by
Congress as having a social value higher than either a copyright holder's commercial objectives (which must be tempered
by "fair use") or another nonauthorized user's commercial objectives (which are far less likely to qualify as "fair use").
Thus, when viewed from a perspective resting on an economic rationale, copyright is concerned with assigning priori-

214. Id. (quotations omitted); see also Ass'n of Am. Med. Coils. v. Mikaelian, 571 F. Supp. 144 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (finding an admission exam preparation course's use of copyrighted questions had a commercial rather than an
educational purpose), affd mem., 734 F.2d 3 (3d Cir. 1984).
215. These activities frequently may be pursued for profit. It does not necessarily follow, however, that the critic, the reporter, the commentator, or the
scholar chooses to disseminate a market-driven message rather than to engage
in self-expression. One reporter, who works for a paper with a strong sense of
journalistic ethics, may believe that what she reports is true, yet seek to profit
from disseminating her information. Another reporter, who works for a paper
that presents sensationalism to lure readers, may well not believe her reporting, but write what she (or her editor) believes the public wants to read. The
latter engages purely in market-driven expression for sale; the former engages
in mixed purposes of disseminating truth, but does so in an institutional context that seeks to profit from the fact that there is an economic market for the
truth. For a discussion of the First Amendment hierarchy of values given the
reality of mixed motives, see infra Part III.B.
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ties to the competing property interests of entrepreneurial creators, publishers, and users. It accommodates First Amendment
concerns in part through notions of "fair use," which tend to
view those seeking to enlighten self and others through
speaker-driven self-expression as entitled to a right of fair
use.216 Prohibiting entrepreneurial users from using copyrighted material does not impinge on First Amendment concerns, because the entrepreneurial user-under this Article's
analysis-is not engaged in the freedom of speech. Permitting
pedagogical users engaged in self-expression to use copyrighted
material as a "fair use" does not impinge the freedom of speech,
because there is no impingement.211
In short, in defining the law of "fair use," congressional
choices and judicial interpretations imply the hierarchy of
norms that this Article's previous analysis has sought to reveal:
a purpose to enlighten with a speaker-driven message is more
socially valuable than is a purpose to sell a market-driven message-notwithstanding the Director-Coase view about the "parity" of markets. 21s This Article has suggested reasons to justify
216. It is widely understood that copyright mitigates potential tension with
the First Amendment through the notion that only particular forms of expression are protected, while ideas are not. See, e.g., Samuels, supra note 195, at
322-23 n.1.
217. In addition to "the purpose and character of the use," a finding of"fair
use" depends on "(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a
whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work." 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1995). One can understand the remaining three factors relevant to finding "fair use" as consistent with-if not
derived from-the proposition that self-expression for enlightenment is more
socially valuable than is an entrepreneurial decision to sell a market-driven
message. In particular, factors (3) and (4) can be understood as indicia of
whether one who uses copyrighted material does so with the purpose of
enlightenment through self-expression, or with the purpose of profiting from
selling a market-driven message. The larger the portion of a work used, the
less likely that the user is engaging in self-expression. The larger the effect on
the potential market for the copyrighted work, the more likely that the user is,
in fact, acting with the commercial purpose of affecting the copyright holder's
market.
218. A finding that a user acted with a noncommercial purpose does not, of
course, mandate a finding of"fair use," nor does finding a commercial purpose
preclude a finding of "fair use." See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose-Music, Inc., 510 U.S.
569, 584 (1994). Congress might well have concluded that even noncommercial uses of copyrighted material could excessively undermine the value of that
material to the copyright holder. It also might well have concluded that certain commercial uses might only marginally undermine the copyright holder's
economic value, thus serving the economic rationale for copyright both by hav-
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this proposition not just as a matter of policies that may underlie our copyright law, but as a matter of First Amendment prescription, rooted in notions of the freedom of speech derived
from pluralist, republican, and personal fulfillment perspectives.
C. DO CHOICES TO PANDER WITH THE MARKET-DRIVEN
MESSAGE DESERVE SPECIAL CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION?
POLITICIANS AND THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH
[P]andering pays no regard to the welfare of its object, but catches
fools with the bait of ephemeral pleasure and tricks them into holding
it in the highest esteem.
-Plato219

One might object to this Article's analysis on the ground
that its suggested constitutional devaluation of decisions by
television programmers to sell the market-driven message
might imply a similar devaluation of decisions by politicians to
pander to voters with the market-driven message. Any suggestion that a politician warrants the First Amendment's solicitude only when earnest and forthright in expressing her true
beliefs, one might argue, is too far removed from conceivable
reality to be seriously contemplated. Furthermore, if political
pandering and entrepreneurial selling with the market-driven
message are of equally low constitutional status, then mandating free television time for political candidates would seem to
show favoritism for one type of low-status message over another and, therefore, might violate the prohibition of contentmotivated regulations.220 These objections require considering
whether there are reasons to attribute distinguishable constitutional value to a politician's pandering with the marketdriven message and a television programmer's selling of the
market-driven message.
ing induced the original author to create, and by enabling a secondary author
to use the original work-both to the benefit of the consuming public and
norms of consumer sovereignty. Whatever particular balance Congress might
have struck, the analysis suggests that pedagogical uses of material for
speaker-driven self-expression are more likely to outweigh a copyright holder's
commercial interests than is a competing entrepreneurial use.
219. PLATO, GoRGIAS 46 (Walter Hamilton trans., Penguin Books ed.
1980).
220. For a consideration of whether content-motivated regulation of efforts
to sell the market-driven message should be permissible under the First
Amendment, see infra Part V.A.
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This Article has identified two components of an actor's intent in disseminating a message: first, the intent with which
the actor develops the content of his message; and second, the
purpose for which the actor disseminates that message. Both
the politician's pandering and the entrepreneur's selling disseminate the market-driven message-that is, a message the
content of which is determined by predicting market demand.221
The politician's pandering and entrepreneur's selling can
be distinguishable, however, on the second element of communicative intent: the reason for dissemination. A politician who
panders with the market-driven message may not believe what
he is saying, but he does seek to persuade others about the virtue of the message. A politician seeks to secure as many votes
as possible. Thus, Bill Clinton advocated a middle class tax cut
during his quest for the democratic nomination in 1992 and
aired television commercials seeking votes on that basis. Four
years earlier, George Bush advocated a constitutional amendment "to protect the flag" against arsonists and aired television
commercials seeking votes on that basis.
An entrepreneur who sells the market-driven message does
not care whether the purchaser embraces any particular ideas
or values expressed. Rather, he is concerned with whether the
consumer will be sufficiently attracted to the product-whether
because of the stars, the characters, the setting, the stories-to
"purchase" it in the first place and, perhaps, with whether the
consumer is so satisfied with the product that she will want to
"purchase" another version of it in the future. Thus, Rupert
Murdoch presented Living Single and other programs geared
toward an African-American audience. He may well not have
been sympathetic to the messages conveyed (whatever they
might have been) and was probably unconcerned with whether
people embraced those ideas. As a rational profit maximizer in
the regime of consumer sovereignty, Murdoch wanted ratings
for his fledgling network. He wanted viewers to consume the
programs as entertainment and advertisers to purchase the
programs as products. He identified an underserved compo-

221. The market of values and preferences from which the pandering politician seeks to benefit is different from the market of values and preferences
from which the entrepreneur seeks to benefit. Politicians speak to people in
their capacity as voters; entrepreneurs speak to people in their capacity as
consumers. For more on the proposition that the same individual thinks differently about the same questions depending on the context in which she
places herself, see infra note 223 and accompanying text.
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nent of the viewer market and sought to create and to sell entertainment products that would meet otherwise unfulfilled
market demand.
Indeed, the point about the absence of communicative intent--the intent to persuade with an intended message-in
selling a market-driven message is reinforced when one recognizes that a politician's pandering has an analogous event in
the context of commerce: the commercial advertisement.
Through the advertisement, the seller wishes to persuade an
audience of the merits of some product. This is the difference
between commercials advertising Living Single and the program itself. The seller wishes to persuade an audience of the
value of some idea. A seller might, or might not, believe his
message: that watching Living Single is the best way to spend
half an hour after dinner, or that Coke is "The Real Thing," or
that people will be better off for having joined "The Pepsi Generation." Advertising a product that was developed through
market research is functionally equivalent to advertising a
politician's positions that were developed through focus groups.
Each seeks to capture and build upon predicted market demand.
Thus, whether there is some inconsistency in treating the
politician's pandering as protected by the First Amendment,
while denying such protection to a commercial television programmer's efforts to satisfy consumer demand, is not revealed
simply by noting that both actors seek to use the market-driven
message. Indeed, the Article has thus far considered only the
appropriate status under the First Amendment of speakerdriven self-expression and entrepreneurial decisions to sell the
market-driven message.
Because part of the earlier analysis stressed the importance of speaker-driven self-expression-Le., that a speaker actually believe the truth of the messages she conveys-as a condition of value under the First Amendment, it would be helpful
to consider the implications of this proposition for the proper
constitutional status of the politician's pandering. The full
question at this point would consider the constitutional status
of the politician's pandering and the entrepreneur's pandering-Le., an entrepreneur's advertising that does not express
his actual beliefs about his product, but instead conveys a message, designed to persuade, that he thinks his audience would
want to hear.
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1. Political Pandering versus Entrepreneurial Pandering from
a Republican Perspective: "The Arts of Designing Men"
Democracy with a republican emphasis values the expression of one's honestly held views about "the permanent and aggregate interests of the community." Pandering, whether political or entrepreneurial, satisfies neither condition. First,
pandering does not involve self-expression. It involves, in this
sense, a lie. Second, both political and entrepreneurial pandering also seem unlikely to be designed to appeal to notions about
the permanent and aggregate interests of the community. The
pandering politician appeals to concerns and impulses at the
forefront of voters' minds-the here and now rather than the
permanent; the interests of the self rather than those of the
community. Thus, a strict application of the republican ideal
would find neither the politician's pandering nor the entrepreneur's pandering particularly worthy of protection as part of
the freedom of speech. In The Federalist No. 78, Alexander
Hamilton spoke of "the arts of designing men" as inducing the
electorate to support "dangerous innovations" adverse to the
long-term and general welfare.222
The pandering commercial advertiser seeks to appeal to
concerns even farther removed from the republican ideal.
When politicians construct a market-driven· message with
which to pander, they are attuned to polling data which taps
into people's attitudes as voters about matters of public policy.
When an entrepreneur constructs a market-driven message to
advertise a product for sale, they are attuned to people's values
as consumers seeking immediate gratification for the self.
Thus, the pandering politician taps into audience values that
are, at least arguably, more forward-looking and community
oriented t1ian does the entrepreneur who advertises a product,
or who sells the market-driven message. In short, the "market"
relevant to the marketplace of ideas for the pandering politician is not the same as the "market" relevant to the marketplace of products for the entrepreneur's market-driven message.
Consider the responses to President Clinton's difficulties
with the Monica Lewinsky affair. ·The public-at-large reacted
very differently to the Lewinsky story depending on whether
people were asked about its importance to the nation in a pub222. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 469 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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lie opinion poll or were given the opportunity to watch a seemingly endless supply of television programs devoted to the subject. Pollsters found that when questioned about matters of
public policy, people minimized the significance of the scandal
and wished the matter to be dropped. They were responding as
citizens. Television ratings, however, indicated that when seeking entertainment, people were quite interested in hearing
more about the matter. They were acting as consumers.
That people have different responses to the same information when presented in different contexts is entirely reasonable.
Indeed, that people might approach issues in a more disciplined
manner when raised in a context explicitly concerned with public policy than when raised in a context touching simply on
life's everyday private choices is implicit in so much of the theory of representative government on which much of the American system rests.223
Although neither actor engages in self-expression and neither seeks to communicate about the permanent and aggregate
interests of the community, it does not necessarily follow that a
politician's pandering with a market-driven message and an
entrepreneur's pandering with a market-driven advertisement
are equally valueless in the context of the freedom of speech in
a democracy with a republican emphasis. From this republican
perspective, a politician's pandering is far from ideal because
she fails to express her own views about the permanent and
aggregate interests of the community. Indeed, she is not even
necessarily parroting the majority's notions of the long-term
general welfare, because people as ordinary voters are more
likely to think about public policy from a short-term and personal perspective. Yet, one might argue that from a republican
perspective, pandering to the public policy impulses of a majority of the electorate is more valuable than is an advertisement
for a television program or for a can of Coke. Although Rupert
Murdoch's advertisement for Living Single involves communicative intent, his communication is not about matters of public
policy at all, let alone about policy as conceived with reference
to the long term and general welfare.

223. See supra note 142; cf. David Chang, A Critique of Judicial Supremacy, 36 VILL. L. REV. 281, 295 (1991) (arguing that people might create constitutional provisions "to enforce a greater commitment to certain values ...
than they can trust themselves, and their legislative representatives, to respect" (emphasis omitted)).
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2. Political Pandering versus Entrepreneurial Pandering from
a Pluralist Perspective

As earlier suggested, republicanism is an unrealistically
demanding normative framework from which to develop the
meaning of the First Amendment's freedom of speech. Though
Madison in The Federalist No. 10 and Hamilton in The Federalist No. 78 articulated a republican vision of ideal political behavior, they recognized that a more shortsighted and selfcentered pursuit of interests is inevitable in real life. The constitutional design had to account for and accommodate the pluralist impulses of the people.224
The Supreme Court has defined commercial speech as
"speech which does no more than propose a commercial transaction."225 As earlier suggested, the larger objective of pluralism is to enable individuals to maximize the extent to which
their concerns are vindicated, given the problems of conflict
among them or the possibilities created by cooperation among
them. From this perspective, speech designed to induce voluntary private transactions within the confines of existing law as
much serves the pluralist objectives as does speech designed to
induce agreement about public policy-that is, policy defining
those private transactions should be regulated. Thus, pluralism, unlike republicanism, readily attaches value to honestly
expressed statements proposing a commercial transaction. The
matter at issue now, however, is the status of entrepreneurial
pandering-the proposal of a commercial transaction that does
not reflect the seller's true views about the merits of the product he is offering.
Developing a sense of the relative value of a politician's
pandering versus an entrepreneur's pandering from the perspective of democracy with a pluralist emphasis requires sensitive and careful analysis. As earlier suggested, the larger objective of pluralism is to enable individuals to maximize the
extent to which their concerns are vindicated, given the problems of conflict among them or the possibilities created by cooperation among them. 226 Only the truthful articulation of
one's personal values and priorities enables others to determine
whether to agree, to contest, or to compromise. Only the truth224. See supra notes 163-65 and accompanying text.
225. See, e.g., Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973).
226. See supra note 164.

544

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85:451

ful articulation of one's beliefs enables others to determine how
to respond and how to persuade. Dishonesty in articulating
one's personal perspective fails to respect the equal right of
each member of the political community to contribute to the
formation of public policy. One who does not express his true
views and values, according to his own priorities, precludes a
true meeting of the minds between himself and his audience.
This point suggests that any form of pandering, whether by
politician or by entrepreneur, may not warrant protection as
part of the freedom of speech relevant to democracy with a pluralist emphasis.
The point holds with respect to entrepreneurial pandering.
Consider statements that entrepreneurs might make in advertising their product. Assume that corporate executives decide
to disseminate the message that "cigarettes are not harmful to
your health." Assume that they make these statements, not believing them to be true, but believing that making the statements will strike a chord with consumers, inducing them to
make a purchase. Should this statement be deemed protected
as part of "the freedom of speech" from a pluralist perspective?
It should not. The pluralist perspective posits the equal
right of individuals to pursue their interests through speech
and to make decisions that maximize personal welfare, given
the problems created by conflict and the possibilities created by
agreement. Understanding the nature of disagreement, or how
to attempt forging a meeting of the minds, requires that the
advertiser express his honest beliefs about the product being
advertised.
Established doctrine concerning the constitutional status
of false statements can be understood as roughly consistent
with this analysis. In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., considering
the extent to which the First Amendment limits legislative discretion to impose liability for defamation, the Supreme Court
said the following:
Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea.
However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition
of other ideas. But there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact. Neither the intentional lie nor the careless error materially advances society's interest in uninhibited, robust, and wideopen debate on public issues. 227

227. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974) (quotations
omitted).

2000]

SELLING THE MARKET-DRIVEN MESSAGE

545

The distinction between a statement of fact and the statement
of an idea is elusive and, in my view, unproductive. Individuals
and society have as much.at.stake in the articulation of propositions of fact, true or not, as in the articulation of ideas, so long
as the speaker believes what she is saying. There was value in
the Ptolemaic notion that the earth is at the center of the universe, because it reflected what Ptolemy-and those, like the
Pope, who were persuaded-actually believed. There was value
in Galileo's notion that the sun is at the center of the solar system, because it reflected what Galileo-and those persuadedactually believed. The Ptolemaic view was not more valuable,
and the Galilean view less, simply because the Pope viewed the
former as true and the latter as false. Indeed, one cannot determine whether a viewpoint of fact is false or true unless it is
articulated and scrutinized. Galileo's speech, therefore, had
value despite having been initially viewed as false; Ptolemy's
speech had value despite having ultimately been viewed as
false. The value lies in each speaker's honest expression of his
views, endeavoring to enlighten self and others, in a selfconscious exploration of the truth.
Although the Gertz Court may have been misdirected in its
effort to distinguish the constitutional status of "facts''. and
"ideas," its suggestion that "the intentional lie" and "the careless error" do not warrant protection as part of "the freedom of
speech" was suggestively promising. Persons who express
ideas, believing them to be false, necessarily are not engaged in
self-expression for purposes of enlightening self and others.22s
Persons who express ideas, with reckless disregard for their
truth or falsity, also are unconcerned about promoting understanding. Persons who express ideas carelessly are more concerned about winning than about promoting understanding.
Where an entrepreneur seeks to induce a sale, to persuade another person of the virtue of a product or a choice, a pluralist
respect for the equal right of that person to his preferences
would mandate the truthful expression of one's beliefs.
Is the same conclusion warranted with respect to the politician's pandering with the market-driven message? More
careful attention to the politician's role in our democracy might
suggest a different conclusion. A politician's role-arguably-is
228. This is not to suggest that "Socratic" expression of statements one believes to be false should be deemed unprotected. The fundamental enterprise
of Socratic dialogue, of course, is to deepen understanding and the search for
truth.
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one less involving speaking for herself in contests about public
policy and more involving speaking for, or asking to speak for, a
majority of the community. Indeed, a tradition of debate has
questioned how a legislative representative should make decisions in voting on matters of public policy. Should she exercise
independent judgment and make the case for her decisions to
her constituents? Should she vote according to her interpretation of her constituents' present or anticipated preferences?
The former notion is more rooted in republican notions of representation; the latter is in the spirit of pluralist notions of democracy. 229
To the extent that the political candidate-and, even more
so, the government official-is a representative or proxy for the
larger part of the community, pandering to existing or predicted values can be understood as part of the process by which
members of the community communicate, and seek a meeting
of the minds, among themselves. Whether the politician panders to the impulsive and selfish side, or to the deliberate and
magnanimous side, she enables a discourse about issues that
might separate people, or link them together, as lawyers in litigation enable their clients to engage in a discourse which they
are otherwise unable to pursue.
This analysis suggests that from the perspective of a First
Amendment with a pluralist emphasis, a politician's pandering
with the market-driven message has value. That value is a
function of the politician's unique role as representative-as
proxy for the people. Indeed, significantly, the politician's
rights and responsibilities in voting-and speaking-for the
community are not a function of the pluralist's empowerment of
each individual citizen and the conditions and limitations of
that empowerment. As a member of the legislature, the representative's right to vote is different from that of the ordinary
citizen-both in its basis and its extent. Thus, the politicianas-representative-to-be derives a right to vote as a member of a
legislature from her status as elected representative ''by, of,
and for" the community. As a member of the legislature, the
power attached to the right to vote is not simply to choose the
personnel of government; indeed, she has become part of the
229. The Federalist No. 52 (James Madison) suggests that the House was
designed to promote representation intimately tied to voter preferences; The
Federalist No. 63 (James Madison) suggests that the Senate was designed to
promote the exercise of independent representative judgment. See supra note
142.
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personnel of government. Rather, her power to vote is to participate directly in the creation of public policy. In contrast,
from a pluralist perspective, the individual citizen has a right
only equal to that of all others to have her preferences taken
into account. For the individual citizen, honesty in selfexpression is essential if fellow citizens are to be able to account properly for their neighbors' concerns. It is a condition
that implicitly attaches to each citizen's equal status and equal
right to contribute to the formation of public policy. Thus, from
this reading of democracy with a pluralist emphasis, pandering
by a politician can play an essential role in government as it
should work and is, therefore, worthy of protection as part of
"the freedom of speech."

3. Political Pandering versus Entrepreneurial Pandering from
a Personal Fulfillment Perspective
Earlier analysis suggested that however weak selffulfillment may be as a rationale for according constitutional
protection to the freedom of speech, an Aristotelian notion of
developing the power of reason provides the least implausible
version.230 From this perspective, an individual must be engaged in self-expression for purposes of enlightenment to qualify as engaging in this particular freedom of speech. Neither
the pandering politician nor the pandering entrepreneur is engaged in such expression. Neither is engaged in activity relevant to rational self-development. Neither explores his own beliefs with others by articulating them for others to hear and to
respond. From this perspective, neither would warrant the
First Amendment's protection.
4. Political Pandering versus Entrepreneurial Pandering from
the Perspective of Congress's Copyright Power
The paradigmatic actor contemplated by the economic rationale for copyright needs an economic incentive to create-an
incentive that would be diluted if law did not prohibit others
from pirating the creator's work. The actor who constructs a
market-driven message for sale is such an actor to which the
copyright power is relevant. The actor who seeks to enlighten
self and others through the expression of her beliefs does not
need economic incentive to speak and is not one to whom the
copyright power is relevant. Indeed, such persons are often
230. See supra Part ill.B.2.
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willing to expend personal resources of time, money, and reputation in endeavoring to seek truth with others.23 1
That Congress has been given the power to protect copyright, but is prohibited by the First Amendment from abridging
the freedom of speech, does not appear particularly relevant for
analyzing the constitutional status of political versus entrepreneurial pandering. Political panderers seek to persuade others
about the truth of their positions. They seek political power,
not economic reward, from pandering with the market-driven
message. Indeed, they seek money contributions to spread
their word. In contrast, entrepreneurial panderers-those who
advertise their products or services in terms that they do not
actually believe-seek economic reward from inducing consumers to make purchase decisions.
Both political and entrepreneurial panderers have something in common, however, that distinguishes their advertisements from market-driven messages for which copyrights are
sought. Both panderers would be happy if their advertisements
were repeated, verbatim, as often and as widely as possible.
This is quite unlike the copyright holder, who seeks to restrict
others from disseminating his product to maintain its scarcity
and, therefore, its economic value. Thus, the copyright perspective distinguishes decisions to create and to sell the market-driven message from decisions to pander politically or entrepreneurially with the market-driven message. It does not,
however, provide a basis for distinguishing the politician's pandering from the entrepreneur's pandering.

***

The foregoing has suggested that from the perspective of
personal fulfillment, there is no basis for extending First
Amendment protection to either form of pandering. Furthermore, Congress's copyright power does not provide a basis for
distinguishing political from entrepreneurial pandering. At
least from the perspective of democracy with a pluralist emphasis, however, and perhaps from the perspective of democracy with a republican emphasis, there is reason to accord constitutional value to the politician's pandering while denying
such value to the entrepreneur's pandering. Thus, the political
rationales for protecting the freedom of speech-in particular,
the more plausible pluralist perspective-can draw a meaningful distinction between political pandering and entrepreneurial
231. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
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pandering with the market-driven message. These conclusions
supplement earlier analysis suggesting that entrepreneurial
decisions to sell the market-driven message do not warrant protection under the First Amendment from the perspective of republican democracy, pluralist democracy, individual fulfillment, or Congress's copyright power.232
IV. DOCTRINAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE UNPROTECTED
DECISION TO SELL THE MARKET-DRIVEN MESSAGE:
MANDATING FREE TELEVISION TIME
FOR POLITICAL CANDIDATES

A.

BROAD CONSIDERATIONS

Free-market arguments that television programmers
should be treated as are other entrepreneurs in a regime of
consumer sovereignty are inconsistent with the proposition
that they should also be treated as are speakers under the First
Amendment. The entrepreneurial motives underlying decisions to create a message-as-product, and relationships with
others as seller to buyer, are otherwise understood as property
interests to be protected under the Fifth Amendment, rather
than speech interests to be protected under the First Amendment. The First Amendment's freedom of speech is concerned
with a different set of values than those encompassed by the
notion of consumer sovereignty. Whether one considers the
definition of "speech" from the perspective of democracy with a
republican emphasis, democracy with a pluralist emphasis,
autonomy in the development of the rational self, or the implications of economic rationales for Congress's copyright power,
the freedom of speech extends to efforts to enlighten self and
others through the honest expression of one's actual beliefs. It
232. If this analysis about the low constitutional status of an entrepreneur's decisions to sell the market-driven message is persuasive, but the effort
to distinguish the politician's pandering from the entrepreneur's pandering is
not, one might explore the permissibility of regulations, for example, placing
conditions on the kinds of advertisements that politicians could present-especially if given free television time. For now, however, the analysis will
proceed from the premise that, from a pluralist perspective, one can persuasively distinguish between entrepreneurial pandering with the market-driven
message as unprotected by the First Amendment and political pandering with
the market-driven message as protected by the First Amendment. This leaves
intact the earlier analysis suggesting that entrepreneurial decisions to sell the
market-driven message should not be viewed as part of the First Amendment's
freedom of speech.
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does not extend to efforts to anticipate the consumption desires
of others, to construct products that satisfy those desires, and
to sell such products for profit-no matter how much the products created might look like speech or, indeed, might constitute
speech, if undertaken with different purposes.
The analysis suggests, therefore, what one might call the
"market-driven message principle"-a principle denying protection under the First Amendment to entrepreneurially motivated decisions to construct and to sell market-driven messages. It is now appropriate to consider how this principle
might be implemented in practice. The following sections will
consider issues arising in the enforcement of the market-driven
message principle in the context of proposals to mandate free
television time for political candidates.
Proposals to require broadcasters and cable operators to
provide free time for political advertising have been quite modest. In early 1997, for example, Representative Slaughter introduced the "Fairness in Political Advertising Act of 1997."233
This bill would impose on television broadcasters a duty to provide at least two hours of free air time to candidates for statewide or national office during each even-numbered year.234
Furthermore, the bill would require that the time be allocated
in segments of ''varying lengths of not more than 5 minutes nor
less than 10 seconds"235 and that "at least one-half is broadcast
during the hours of 7:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m."236 The FCC would
be obliged not to renew the license of a broadcaster that fails to
comply with these requirements. 237 The legislation also directs
the FCC to promulgate regulations imposing the same obligations on cable operators.238
The National Association of Broadcasters, among others,
opposes this legislation on policy and constitutional grounds.
In particular, the NAB argues that mandating free air time violates the constitutionally protected "editorial discretion" of
broadcasters. 239

233. H.R. 84, 105th Cong. (1997).
234. Id. § 2(c)(2)(A).
235. Id. § 2(c)(2)(B).
236. Id. § 2(c)(2)(C)(i).
237. Id. § 2{c)(l).
238. Id.§ 3.
239. See Dan Morgan, A Made-For-TV Windfall; Candidates' Air Time
Scramble Fills Stations' Tills, WASH. POST, May 2, 2000, available at 2000 WL
19606800.
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The requirement that broadcasters set aside two hours per
national or statewide candidate, in five second to ten-minute
intervals, during primetime hours could affect the broadcasters
in two ways. First, the broadcaster might simply replace a paid
commercial with a legally-mandated unpaid political commercial. Second, the broadcaster might replace time otherwise devoted to programming with an unpaid political commercial
while endeavoring to sell and fill regularly slotted paid commercial time.
Under the first scenario, the broadcasters' programming
choices would be unaffected. They would not be able to claim
plausibly, therefore, that their editorial discretion to select programming has been abridged at all. Broadcasters might argue
that they possess privileged "editorial discretion" to choose the
advertising they will broadcast. A recognition that even their
programming decisions reflect entrepreneurial decisions to
manufacture and to sell the market-driven message for profitand that such decisions do not warrant protection as speech
under the First Amendment-mandates rejecting any notion
that the decision about to whom to sell their air time qualifies
as protected "editorial discretion." Whatever protection such
sales decisions have are properly understood as arising under
the Fifth Amendment's protection of property, rather than the
First Amendment's protection of speech.240
240. Broadcasters have argued, and the Supreme Court has agreed, that
regulations intruding on their discretion to select advertisers does impinge
"editorial discretion" protected by the First Amendment. In CBS, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, the Court considered whether the FCC was
obliged under the First Amendment to prohibit broadcasters from refusing to
carry paid political or public advocacy advertisements. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
Noting that "Congress intended to permit private broadcasting to develop with
the widest possible journalistic freedom consistent with its public obligations,"
id. at 110, Chief Justice Burger's plurality opinion determined that "(t]he licensee's policy against accepting editorial advertising cannot be examined as
an abstract proposition, but must be viewed in the context of its journalistic
role," id. at 118.
In CBS, Inc. v. FCC, CBS, ABC, and NBC challenged an FCC order to accept a thirty-minute paid political advertisement from President Carter's reelection committee. 453 U.S. 367 (1981). They argued that accepting the advertisement would disrupt regular programming and offered to sell five
minute time slots instead. Id. at 372. Although the Court rejected the argument that the Commission had "unduly circumscrib[ed] their editorial discretion," its analysis proceeded from the premise that the choice of advertisers
does involve editorial discretion protected by the First Amendment. Id. at
395-96. The Court determined that the regulation at issue was not unconstitutional because of specific physical characteristics of broadcast frequenciesin particular, the need for regulation to prevent broadcast chaos, and the scar-
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Under the second scenario, the broadcasters' programming
choices would be affected. Rather than the forty-six or so minutes per hour of programming presented during prime time,
broadcasters might be left with forty minutes per hour of programming. Thus, for several weeks every two years, NBC
might have to produce and broadcast episodes of ER with six
(or so) fewer minutes of story, as would CBS with its Diagnosis
Murder. Perhaps Friends or Frasier or other half-hour series
might have to skip a broadcast week.
Given the current doctrinal premise that the programming
decisions of television broadcasters are exercises of "editorial
discretion" protected by the First Amendment, media corporations claim that such regulations violate the First Amendment
on several grounds: first, the regulations arguably discriminate
against some speech and in favor of other speech based on content; second, the regulations arguably violate what can be
called "the Buckley admonition"; and third, the regulations arguably compel broadcasters to speak against their will.241
This Article's suggestion that the entrepreneurially motivated decision to sell the market-driven message does not qualify for protection as "speech" under the First Amendment would
dispose of each of these arguments. To regulate such programming decisions by mandating the broadcast of free political advertising would no more necessarily violate the prohibition against content-motivated government action than does
the regulation of other categories of "unprotected speech"-such
as obscenity, defamation, or fighting words.

city of broadcast frequencies; Id. at 395-97. These are the factors on which
the Red Lion Court relied in upholding the "fairness doctrine." Red Lion
Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 396-401 (1969).
Of course, as has been noted, the proposition that physical characteristics
of the broadcast spectrum justifies treating broadcasters differently from other
speakers under the First Amendment has been severely undercut not only by
technological advances but by the incisive analysis of free-marketeers such as
Director, Coase, and Epstein. See supra notes 17-21, 28-30, 36 and accompanying text. If the Court were to accept their arguments discounting the significance of the physics of broadcasting, then broadcasters could be deemed
entitled to the full gamut of protections under the First Amendment-including the "editorial discretion" to choose advertisers. If the Court were to
accept my argument, however, that entrepreneurial choices to sell the marketdriven message should not be understood as "editorial discretion" protected by
the First Amendment at all, then technological changes, or changes in our understanding of the significance of technology, would be irrelevant.
241. E.g., Turner I, 512 U.S. 622, 649-59 (1994); Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 247 (1974).
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Indeed, mandating free time for political candidates during
primetime hours does not regulate with reference to the content of the displaced television programs. It regulates only by
reference to time periods when the programs air. The time selected for mandating free time for political candidates is based
on the fact that the television entrepreneurs have created the
maximum possible audience during those hours by successfully
responding to the forces of consumer sovereignty.242
Second, a principle denying protection as speech to decisions to sell the market-driven message also can dispose of "the
Buckley admonition." As discussed above, this principle, articulated by the Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo, has long vexed
efforts to reform political campaigns:
['l']he concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is
wholly foreign to the First Amendment, which was designed to secure
the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources and to assure the unfettered interchange of ideas
for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the
people.243

The Buckley admonition proscribes efforts to redistribute
speaking opportunities when such reforms involve displacing
the "speech" of those who, in the absence of the regulation,
would speak. The Buckley admonition, however, does not address the permissibility of efforts to enhance speaking opportunities for some that intrude on the non-speech interests of others.
Third, viewing the programming decisions of commercial
television corporations as entrepreneurial action in the regime
of consumer sovereignty also helps to dispose of arguments that
mandating free time for political candidates would force the
television businesses to speak against their will. Indeed, as
discussed above, the Supreme Court has shown a vastly greater
willingness to tolerate regulations that require non-speaking
property owners engaged in commerce-such as, for example,
the owner of a shopping center244-to grant access to speakers
242. For consideration of whether it should be deemed permissible for the
government to engage in content-motivated regulation of entrepreneurial decisions to sell the market-driven message, see infra notes 270-88 and accompanying text.
243. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976) (per curiam) (quotations
omitted).
244. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 88 (1980); see supra
text accompanying notes 81-83.
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than to tolerate regulations that require speaking property
owners not to speak245 or to convey the messages of others. 246
Furthermore, one can connect this point to the concerns
raised by the Buckley admonition. Compelling a shopping center owner to grant access to speakers does not displace any
speaking the shopping center has been doing and increases the
quantity of public discourse.247 Compelling a television station
to displace entrepreneurial decisions to sell the market-driven
message to grant access to speakers also does not displace any
speaking the television station has been doing and increases
the quantity of public discourse. Compelling a traditional
newspaper editor to carry a certain message, however, may impinge on that speaker's chosen message by displacing his
speech and replacing it with that of someone else.248 The Buckley admonition, concerned with an actor's personal First
Amendment rights,249 is not compromised in the former situation. It is compromised in the latter.
245. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 143.
246. E.g., Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Group of
Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995) (holding that a state may not require
parade organizers to include a group expressing a message with which the organizers disagree); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714-17 (1977) (holding
that a state may not require the display of the state motto on private property
by persons who disagree with it).
247. Pruneyard, 447 U.S. at 85-88.
248. Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256-58 (1974). This
point assumes that, as a matter of fact, the content decisions made by newspaper editors are not driven by entrepreneurial considerations. Whether the
assumption holds true in general, or for particular newspapers, might be contested. My point here is not to suggest a blanket proposition that all newspaper editors engage in speaker-driven self-expression and are, therefore, protected. Indeed, the market-driven message principle would hold that if a
newspaper editor makes decisions about the content of the paper predominantly for entrepreneurial considerations responding to the forces of consumer
sovereignty, she would be engaged in activity not protected as speech under
the First Amendment, but as property under the Fifth.
249. Cf. Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S.
727, 812-15 (1996). Justices Thomas, Rehnquist, and Scalia determined that
cable television operators maintain personal rights of speech not held by
broadcasters under existing-but unstable-doctrine:
In Turner, by adopting much of the print paradigm, and by rejecting
Red Lion, we adopted with it a considerable body of precedent that
governs the respective First Amendment rights of competing speakers. In Red Lion, we had legitimized consideration of the public interest and emphasized the rights of viewers, at least in the abstract.
Under that view, "[i]t is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the
right of the broadcasters, which is paramount." After Turner, however, that view can no longer be given any credence in the cable context. It is the operator's right that is preeminent.
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***

Despite all this, a principle denying protection to entrepreneurially motivated decisions to sell the market-driven message leaves room for putative "speakers" to claim that they are
concerned with enlightening self or others through selfexpression and, therefore, are entitled to the First Amendment's greatest protection. Such a claim would create an issue
of fact. If a court determined, as a matter of fact, that the
broadcaster was concerned with enlightening through disseminating a speaker-driven message, then the traditional notion of
protected "editorial discretion," and its established strongly
protective doctrines, would be applicable. If, however, a court
determined that the broadcaster was concerned with selling a
market-driven message, then the constitutional concerns about
intruding on its protected interests would fade. Established
doctrine, which depends on and emerges from those concerns,
would have to be supplanted.
Broadcasters also might concede that market-driven concerns enter into their programming choices and into their
choices of which commercial advertisements to carry. They
might claim, however, that programming decisions involve a
complex amalgam of a media corporation's market-driven and
persuasive speaker-driven objectives. Rupert Murdoch, for example, vetoed the production of a movie about Clarence Thomas and Anita Hill. The movie would have been potentially
profitable for his Fox television network, but offended his personal values. 250
To the extent that programming decisions are made with a
measure of speaker-driven concerns, a broadcaster might argue, they warrant a measure of protection as part of the First
Amendment's freedom of speech, even under the market-driven
message principle. To deny protection because broadcasters
are entrepreneurs as well as speakers arguably would allow the
market-driven message principle to devour speech that otherwise warrants protection.
Id. at 816 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis
added) (quoting Red Lion Broad Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969)). This
proposition presupposed that the activity in which cable operators are engaged
qualifies as "speech" for purposes of the First Amendment.
250. See Bernard Weinraub, Hill v. Thomas, Again in the Court of Senate
Opinion, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1999, available at 1999 WL 30478819 (asserting
that Murdoch opposed the film because he "was a friend of Justice Thomas
and believed that Justice Thomas had been railroaded at the confirmation
hearings").
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Such a claim would require consideration of both a normative question and a practical question. One must determine in
a normative sense whether a broadcaster who makes programming decisions with a hybrid motivation warrants protection as a participant in the freedom of speech. Furthermore,
one must determine how to answer the factual question of
whether a broadcaster was acting simply to sell a marketdriven message, purely to enlighten with a speaker-driven
message, or for hybrid considerations.

B. THE CLAIM OF HYBRID MOTIVATION:
NORMATIVE ISSUES OF CONSTITUTIONAL SIGNIFICANCE

In response to an intrusion on their programming discretion, justified in part on the ground that they are concerned
with selling a market-driven message, broadcasters could argue: the government cannot know what was in the mind of
Rupert Murdoch or Brandon Tartikoff. It does not know what
is in the mind of the CBS Board of Directors. Network executives have political values and concerns. They do try to contribute responsibly to public awareness and public discourse,
even while paying attention to market share and the bottom
line. When you intrude on our programming discretion, by displacing minutes or episodes of ER, or Friends, or Frasier, you
are taking away time in which we are indeed engaged, at least
partially, with a concern for enlightening with a speaker-driven
message. That is still an intrusion on our editorial discretion,
and one which compromises constitutional values.
This is an argument that concedes what could hardly be
denied-that television programmers, at least in part, are concerned with selling a market-driven message. Yet it seeks to
claim a corner of the First Amendment's protective blanket, by
asserting, in the fashion of Ben Stein, 251 that broadcasters endeavor to enlighten with speaker-driven self-expression to the
extent that the market will bear.252 At this point, however, at
least while operating within the principle that would deny protection to the market-driven message, the broadcasters admit
to being imperfect First Amendment claimants.
251. Stein argued that television programmers pursue an ideologically motivated persuasive agenda. See supra notes 112-22 and accompanying text.
252. Cf BE'ITIG, supra note 124, at 36. Bettig has an ambiguous view
about the extent to which the capitalists who own the mass media endeavor to
shape public ideology in a way that serves their interests or to shape their
product in a way that fits the existing tastes and values of the consumers.
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Assuming, for now, that broadcasters make primetime programming decisions in part because of both entrepreneurial
and pedagogical considerations, the Fairness in Political Advertising Act of 1997253 would impinge partially on both constitutionally unprotected and protected choices. Intruding on programming decisions, therefore, would involve circumscribing a
degree of protected "editorial discretion." Furthermore, it also,
arguably, would partially violate Buckley's foundational admonition that "restrict[ing] the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly
foreign to the First Amendment."254
One can respond to these points in several ways. First, one
might argue that any influence of market-driven considerations
undermines, if not obliterates, the value of putative speechfrom the perspective of republicanism, pluralism, or selffulfillment, all of which place value on self-expression. When
one decides what to say by reference to external considerations,
one does not express one's true values, perspectives, and priorities.
This extreme position begs a rather obvious response. Few
people speak without considering how their message will play
in public. A professor might decide not to make a particular
point at a faculty meeting if he anticipates a negative response.
A citizen similarly might decide to remain silent at a town
meeting. If speech must be purely speaker-driven to warrant
special constitutional protection, very little of what people actually say is worthy of protection indeed.
This suggests that such a purist position is untenable and
leads to a second response to a broadcaster's assertion of hybrid
motivation. One might posit that the more purely a statement
reflects a motive for enlightening with a speaker-driven message, the more valuable and worthy of constitutional solicitude
it is. The more purely a statement reflects a mo~ive to profit
from the sale of a market-driven message, the less valuable as
speech and less worthy of protection it is as speech. Along such
lines, one might posit that there are different ways in which a
person with hybrid motivation can take account of speakerdriven and market-driven considerations.
First, one's primary motive could be pedagogical-to
enlighten oneself or others by engaging in speaker-driven self253. H.R. 84, 105th Cong. (1997).
254. Buckleyv. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976) (per curiam).
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expression. A speaker would like to press his highest priorities
but might choose to censor his remarks, or forgo some of his
preferences, based on an anticipated audience response. Second, one's primary motive could be entrepreneurial-to profit
economically by selling market-driven messages. An actor
would like to disseminate a product that she anticipates will
generate the most revenue, but might choose to censor her
product, or forgo some profits, because the "speech" otherwise
disseminated would excessively offend her personal values.
Thus, so long as one's motive for speaking is to enlighten,
whatever one says purposefully expresses one's personal values, preferences, and priorities. When one's motive for "speaking" is entrepreneurial, it is only what remains unsaid that
purposefully reflects one's values, preferences, and priorities.
When the entrepreneur acts, what is "said" reflects the desires
of consumers when those desires are within the limits of tolerability for the entrepreneur. Rupert Murdoch, for example, decided to present Living Single because he believed it would find
a market, not, one would suppose, because it expressed his
views of truth. He decided not to present a movie about Clarence Thomas and Anita Hill because the project offended his
personal values, not because he thought it would fail to find a
market.
A democratic rationale for protecting the freedom of
speech, whether with a republican or a pluralist emphasis,
would find no special reason for protecting the dissemination of
messages that are merely tolerable to the actor, rather than affirmatively reflecting the actor's preferences and priorities. So
with the rationale of self-fulfillment. Thus, if television programmers decide what to air based on market-driven factors,
and decide not to air some projects based on speaker-driven factors, their activity is predominantly market-driven and not
"editorial discretion" worthy of special constitutional solicitude.
In summary, one might posit that if one's impetus to speak
is to enlighten self or others through the expression of personal
views, and one's impetus for self-censorship is rooted in market-driven considerations, one's speech remains worthy-or
more worthy-of special constitutional solicitude. Conversely,
if one's impetus to "speak" is to profit from the sale of marketdriven messages, and one's impetus for self-censorship is rooted
in personal notions of truth and propriety, one's "speech" is
unworthy-or less worthy-of special constitutional solicitude.
In the higher value scenario, one's principle for selecting mes-

2000]

SELLING THE MARKET-DRIVEN MESSAGE

559

sages is speaker-driven; one's principle for exclusion is marketdriven. For the lower value scenario, one's principle for selecting messages is market-driven; one's principle for exclusion is
speaker-driven. This analysis suggests a hierarchical continuum of value within a framework of a First Amendment informed by republican democracy, pluralist democracy, or personal fulfillment.
C. PROBLEMS OF PROOF; BURDENS OF PROOF
In determining how to construct doctrine for the adjudication of an actor's intent, it is critically important not only to
consider factors relevant for proving the actor's intent, but
also-and more fundamentally-to consider who should bear
the burden of proving the actor's intent. In our present context,
one must consider whether the government should bear the
burden of proving that the actor was engaged primarily in unprotected activity (i.e., entrepreneurial decisions to sell the
market-driven message) or whether the actor should bear the
burden of proving that he was engaged primarily in protected
activity (i.e., decisions to enlighten with speaker-driven selfexpression).
This section will confront the burden of proof question in
two ways. First, it will explore the implications of an established context in which an individual's claim to First Amendment protection depends on a factual determination of bona £ides: defamation actions. 255 Second, it will address in a more
255. One can successfully assert a claim that a government regulation burdens the Free Exercise of religion only when the activity regulated is "conduct
motivated by sincere religious belief." Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res.
of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 893 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment); see also Thomas v. Review Bd., Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450
U.S. 707, 716 (1981) ("The narrow function of a reviewing court in this context
' is to determine whether there was an appropriate finding that petitioner terminated his work because of an honest conviction that such work was forbidden by his religion."). Thus, established doctrine in this area requires exploring a constitutional claimant's values and beliefs, toward determining whether
she was expressing those beliefs in a particular context, just as would the
market-driven message principle I have suggested in this Article. Most Free
Exercise claims, however, have not been opposed by the government on the
ground that the claimant's interest was based on concerns other than sincere
religious belief. E.g., Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Prot. Ass'n, 485
U.S. 439, 447 (1988) (noting that the Government did not dispute "that the
Indian respondents' beliefs are sincere"). Thus, the Free Exercise context may
not allay the concerns some might have about whether such a principle concerned with an actor's bona :tides can be implemented effectively. See United
States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-87 (1944).
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general and systematic way factors to consider for allocating
burdens of proof in constitutional adjudication.
1. Learning from the Defamation Analogy
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court
ruled that a public official could not recover "damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he
proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice'-that
is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard
of whether it was false or not."256 Speech is defamation and is
unprotected by the First Amendment, depending on the
speaker's intent. Where the speaker does not intend to express
his beliefs-whether by speaking with a knowledge of falsity or
a lack of concern with whether his statements are true-he
may be liable in a defamation action by a public official.
The New York Times Court determined that the plaintiff
bears the burden of proving that the defendant acted with a belief that his statements were false or without caring whether
his statements were true. Furthermore, such proof had to
amount to more than a preponderance of the evidence. Rather,
the plaintiff must prove the defendant's "actual malice" with
"convincing clarity."257 This section will explore both the substantive notion that a speaker who acts with "actual malice"
has not engaged in protected speech and the procedural notion
that the plaintiff in a defamation action bears the burden of
proving "actual malice" by "clear and convincing" evidence.
The substantive notion that an actor does not engage in
protected "speech" when he speaks believing his statements are
false, or not caring whether they are true, can be understood as
closely related to the notion that selling, or pandering with, the
market-driven message is of low First Amendment value. Like
one who sells or panders with a market-driven message, one
who speaks with "actual malice" has not engaged in selfexpression. He has not expressed his views about how the
world is or should be. From the perspective of pluralist notions
of democracy, such communication does not warrant protection
because the actor fails to respect the right of his fellows to account accurately for his views. One who speaks with "actual
malice," like one who purveys the market-driven message, has
expressed ideas that cannot possibly be the basis for a meeting
256. 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
257. Id. at 285-86.
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of minds between speaker and listener, simply because the
speakers are not expressing what their minds believe.258 From
the perspective of republican notions of democracy, one who
speaks with actual malice, like one who purveys a marketdriven message, has no thought or interest in deliberating
about the permanent and aggregate interests of the community. From the perspective of personal fulfillment, one who
speaks with actual malice, like one who purveys a marketdriven message, has not engaged in the self-expression that can
promote an Aristotelian development of the rational self.
More important for present purposes than a normative
congruence between denying protection to "actual malice" and
to decisions to sell the market-driven message is the enforceability of both principles in practice. The notion of actual malice in defamation actions, and the requirement that it be
proved by clear and convincing evidence, has been workable.
To the extent that the legal system can cope with the task of
adjudicating whether the plaintiff has proved (by clear and
convincing evidence) that a defendant in a defamation action
has acted with "actual malice," it would seem able to cope at
least as well with the task of adjudicating whether the government has proved (by clear and convincing evidence) that a television broadcaster or cable operator has chosen programming
during a certain time period because of unprotected entrepreneurial motives to sell market-driven messages for profit.
The New York Times Court justified placing a heavy burden of proof on the plaintiff in a civil defamation action in large
part because of concern about excessively "chilling'' protected
speech:
A rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth
of all his factual assertions-and to do so on pain of libel judgments
virtually unlimited in amount-leads to a ... "self-censorship." Allowance of the defense of truth, with the burden of proving it on the
defendant, does not mean that only false speech will be deterred ....
Under such a rule, would-be critics of official conduct may be deterred
from voicing their criticism, even though it is believed to be true and
even though it is in fact true, because of doubt whether it can be
proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do so. They tend to
make only statements which "steer far wider of the unlawful zone."
The rule thus dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public de258. Indeed, one might suspect that in many circumstances, the dissemination of allegations with "actual malice" might be motivated by an entrepreneurial concern to sell a market-driven message. If a headline will sell newspapers, then use it (thus, entrepreneurially market-driven), regardless of
whether it is true (thus, "actual malice").
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bate. It is inconsistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments.259

One can assume that it is sensible to consider whether one
or another rule of liability and burden of proof may discourage
or encourage the "'unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.'"260 One also can assume that the New York Times burden
of proof was necessary to avoid a constitutionally problematic
chill of expression that a speaker believes to be true. 261 It does
not follow from such concerns, however, that a putative speaker
must always be insulated from regulation by favorable burdens
of proof to avoid "chilling" constitutionally valuable speech.
Consider the behavioral pressures that would be created by
a regime in which television broadcasters bear the burden of
proving that their primetime programming choices are speakerdriven, intended to express truth, rather than market-driven
and disseminated as a product. It seems unlikely that the
broadcasters would forgo broadcasting altogether. This is quite
unlike the "chill" anticipated by the Court in New York Times,
whereby potential critics of government action would steer
clear of expressing criticism altogether, for fear of tort liability.
The broadcaster is engaged in the business of broadcasting.
The regulation in question imposes not tort liability, but a loss
of control of discrete broadcasting time periods and a possible
loss in profits. Unless this possibility of lost profits fundamentally undermines the broadcasting business, it is not plausible that broadcasters would choose to forgo the very activity
which produces their profits, simply because they have lost control of a portion of broadcasting time. 262
259. Id. at 279 (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)).
260. Id. at 269 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).
261. For a discussion of the problematic notion that there is no constitutional value in a false statement of fact, see supra notes 227-28 and
accompanying text.
262. In an analogous context, the Supreme Court has determined that
"commercial speech"-that is, commercial advertising-is hardier than political speech. One who disseminates a commercial advertisement generally is
pursuing a high priority-his livelihood. See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy
v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 772 n.24 (1976) ("Since advertising is the sine qua non of commercial profits, there is little likelihood of its
being chilled by proper regulation and forgone entirely."). This strong incentive to disseminate the message contrasts with that of the person who might
think about discussing a public issue. Similarly, commercial broadcasters
have a high incentive to disseminate their programming, which, after all, is
1
the basis of their livelihood.

2000] SELLING THE MARKET-DRIVEN MESSAGE

563

Rather, if the prospect of governmentally-mandated free
air time for political candidates were to have any behavioral influence on broadcasters, it seems more likely that it would influence them to exercise their "editorial discretion" in a way
that, in appearance if not in actuality, selects programming for
speaker-driven expressive purposes, rather than because of
market-driven entrepreneurial considerations.263 If broadcasters were influenced to disseminate more speaker-driven messages, instead of selling market-driven messages, then "the
freedom of speech" is arguably enhanced, because more speech
is better than less.
On the other hand, if broadcasters were influenced to pretend to disseminate more speaker-driven messages, and courts
were unable to determine in constitutional adjudication that
programming displaced by regulation is market-driven and,
therefore, without special First Amendment protection, broadcasters would reclaim the "editorial discretion" otherwise lost
under the market-driven message principle. This analysis thus
suggests that so far as "chill" is concerned, regulation permitted under the market-driven message principle would have either a positive or a neutral impact on the freedom of speech.264
2. The Market-Driven Message and Burdens of Proof
These benign expectations about the problem of "chill" ordinarily associated with regulations of speech allow one to focus
on other considerations relevant to allocating burdens of proof
for issues of material fact in constitutional adjudication.
Courts and scholars have generally paid too little attention to
burdens of proof in constitutional adjudication. 265 Some space
will be devoted here to the subject.
263. Broadcasting corporations might well create new executive positions,
perhaps "Corporate Policy Directors" or "Corporate Message Officers," whose
responsibility it would be to develop (or appear to develop) the company line
on matters of public policy, which would be translated (or appear to be translated) into television programming. Whatever role, real or apparent, these
"Corporate Policy Directors" might play in programming decisions, one could
hardly doubt that traditional programming executives would continue to focus
on market research and market share and continue to play a central role in
making ultimate programming decisions.
264. If, however, media corporations were encouraged to disseminate
speaker-driven messages-i.e., their corporate view on the way things are and
should be-questions concerning the propriety and desirability of their control
of such massive speech resources could be intensified. For a discussion of issues of private power and speech, see SUNSTEIN, supra note 13, at 234-40.
265. See David Chang, Discriminatory Impact, Affirmative Action, and In-
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A burden of proof is necessary-indeed, adjudication is
necessary-because courts lack perfect knowledge about legally
relevant facts in disputes between members of the community.
The burden of proof determines which party prevails in the face
of uncertainty about a legally relevant fact. With uncertainty
comes the possibility of error. Thus, burdens of proof are vehicles through which the legal process can endeavor to avoid erroneous decisions. In the context of constitutional adjudication,
a court might find erroneously that a challenged policy is unconstitutional or find erroneously that a challenged policy is
not unconstitutional.
In thinking about how to allocate the burden of proof as a
mechanism for avoiding erroneous legal decisions, judgments
about the relative evil or harm from each kind of erroneous decision can be one relevant factor. Is it worse erroneously to uphold a policy and thereby wrongly to permit an intrusion on the
freedom of speech, or, is it worse erroneously to invalidate a
policy and thereby wrongly prohibit the electorate from enforcing the policy that its representatives have determined should
govern?
Relying on this normative factor to justify a decision allocating the burden of proof in constitutional adjudication must
always be difficult. Constitutional values restricting legislative
discretion are, by definition, important constitutional values.
But valid electoral discretion is an important and foundational
constitutional value as well. Whether a judicial decision
wrongly intrudes on the freedom of speech or wrongly intrudes
on legislative discretion, a foundational constitutional value
has been wrongly compromised. Whatever difficulty judges and
scholars have identifying constitutional values (e.g., whether
"the freedom of speech" is predicated on values of democratic
self-governance only or concerns of personal fulfillment as well)
is compounded when the focus must be refined and the weight
(as opposed to the mere existence) of the putative value must
be identified.
The difficulty in weighing the relative significance of a constitutional value limiting democratic discretion and the value of
valid democratic discretion is particularly acute with respect to
the freedom of speech. Indeed, to the extent that the freedom of
speech is protected to promote effective democratic self
nocent Victims: Judicial Conservatism or Conservative Justices?, 91 COLUM. L.
REV. 790, 835 n.153 (1991).
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government, wrongly intruding on legislative discretion impinges the very object of the First Amendment's concern. If a
court wrongly upholds a law against a First Amendment challenge, then the freedom of speech-which exists to make democratic processes work-is wrongly compromised. If, however, a court wrongly invalidates a law against a First
Amendment challenge, then valid democratic discretion, which
the First Amendment is designed to promote, has been compromised.
This difficulty is even further compounded when the particular regulation at issue reflects a legislative judgment as to
how the democratic processes can be improved. Under such
circumstances, an erroneous invalidation of a regulation
wrongly denies the electorate a policy which its representatives
have determined would improve democratic processes, in the
name of a constitutional provision itself concerned with ensuring the proper operation of democratic processes. How difficult
it must be to declare that the erroneous invalidation of the electorate's choices in the Fairness in Broadcasting Act, 266 for example, would be worse, or better, than erroneously failing to
invalidate that policy would be.
But another consideration can be helpful in thinking about
allocating the burden of proof in constitutional adjudication.
For an issue of fact that is legally significant for proving unconstitutionality, if one can make a judgment that in a certain
category of circumstances, it is more likely than not that this
fact has occurred, it would make sense, in cases where such circumstances exist, to place the burden of disproving that fact on
the government. Conversely, if one can identify a category of
circumstances in which it seems more likely than not that this
fact has not occurred, it would make sense, in cases where such
circumstances exist, to place the burden of proving that fact on
the challenger.
Consider one context in which this probabilistic perspective
for allocating the burden of proof with respect to a constitutionally relevant fact has been dispositive. Racial classifications
challenged under the Equal Protection clause are presumptively unconstitutional. The government bears a heavy burden
to rebut that presumption. Part of the rationale for this presumptive unconstitutionality of racial classifications is (1) the
normative understanding that if a law was enacted because of
266. S. 742, lOOth Cong. (1987); see supra text accompanying note 50.
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racial prejudice, it is unconstitutional; and (2) the procedural or
predictive understanding that laws using racial classifications
more likely than not were enacted because of racial prejudice.
As Chief Justice Burger explained in Palmore v. Sidoti, racial
classifications are presumptively unconstitutional because they
are "more likely to reflect racial prejudice than legitimate public concerns."267
Consider whether one might employ this predictive, probabilistic kind of analysis in determining how to allocate the
burden of proof with respect to the question of fact that is constitutionally relevant under the market-driven message principle. One may ask: Did a putative speaker disseminate what
purports to be protected speech primarily with an intent to
enlighten with speaker-driven self-expression or primarily with
an entrepreneurial intent to sell a market-driven message? In
addressing this question, one might identify indicia suggesting
a probability of an actor's pedagogical purposes as well as indicia suggesting a probability of entrepreneurial purposes. Such
indicia would ideally involve matters of fact that are easily
proved or about which there is unlikely to be dispute. When
indicia suggest a probability that an actor seeks to sell a market-driven message, the actor would bear the burden of proving
otherwise by reference to other evidence.
Suppose, for example, that the government can establish
the following facts, by clear and convincing evidence, about a
broadcaster subject to the free primetime political advertising
provisions of the Fairness in Broadcasting Act:
1. The broadcaster is a profit-seeking corporation. This
factor does not by itself suggest anything about the likelihood that a given message is pedagogically or entrepreneurially motivated but could help to suggest such
motivation in conjunction with other factors.
2. The product from which the broadcaster seeks to make
a profit is the sale of advertising time during its programming. This factor implies that the broadcaster
views its programming as a J>roduct that must be made
appealing to advertisers and, ultimately, to consumers.
Because advertisers are looking for the maximum audience, they would want to purchase commercial time during popular programs. In order to ensure that their programming is popular with the viewing audience and,
therefore, appealing to advertisers, the broadcaster
would act reasonably by tailoring its programming to
the anticipated desires of the viewing audience. AB it
267. 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984).
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makes sense to suppose that broadcast corporations behave in a reasonable, profit-seeking fashion (as do other
profit-making corporations), it makes sense to infer a
likelihood that profit-making broadcast corporations
that sell commercial time to advertisers construct or select their programming as market-driven messages.
3. The broadcaster charges the highest rates for, and
makes the Zar/lest profits from, the sale of advertising
time during primetime" hours-i.e., hours in which
more people watch television than during another other
daily time period. The higlier the rates charged for advertising time, the more likely that the broadcaster is
concerned primarily, if not exclusively, with making a
profit. The greater the profit motive, the more likely
that the broadcaster has constructed or selected its
primetime programming as market-driven messages for
sale.
4. The broadcaster selects programming to present by
reference to predicted audience ratings, market research,
and other bases from which to anticipate popularity.
When the broadcaster relies specifically on fuformation
concerned with predicting audience demand in selecting
pro~amming, it is reasonable to infer its concern with
selling a market-driven message.
5. The broadcaster selects programming to retain, and to
cancel, by reference to measured audience rati!l:gs, market research, and other indicia of popularity. When the
broadcaster relies specifically on mformation concerned
with predictin~ audience demand in retaining or canceling programmmg, it is reasonable to infer its entrepreneurial concern with selling a market-driven message.
If the government can establish these facts about a broadcaster that challenges regulatory intrusion on "editorial discretion" (such as through the Fairness in Political Advertising
Act26B), it is reasonable for an adjudicating court to erect a presumption that the broadcaster is primarily concerned with selling a market-driven message and, therefore, engaged in
commercial activity for which the First Amendment should be
deemed to provide no special protection. The broadcaster
would remain free to rebut this presumption, and assert a constitutional immunity from regula,tion, by proving that its general approach to primetime programming, or its approach to
particular primetime programs, is primarily to enlighten with a
speaker-driven self-expression.269 One might expect such re268. H.R. 84, 105th Cong. (1997).
269. On the other hand, suppose that the following facts are established
about an actor who claims to be engaged in the protected dissemination of
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buttal to be a difficult task and, I suggest, one that is appropriately so.
Indeed, it is not self-evident that the government should
bear the burden of proving these indicia of market-driven motivation. If one asserts a constitutional privilege, one arguably
bears some sort of burden to establish that the privilege has
been infringed. Yet perhaps the fact that the actor is engaged
in the dissemination of words and pictures justifies a presumption that he is engaged in protected "speech." Lawyers,
judges, politicians, and ordinary people surely have always assumed as much. From a predictive perspective, it perhaps
makes sense to suppose that, in general, people who are engaged in using words and pictures are probably doing so to engage in "the freedom of speech"-that is, to engage pedagogically in self-expression. To the extent that this prediction does
make sense, it is reasonable to place the burden on the government to prove the existence of circumstances in which that
prediction is untrue or in which a contrary prediction is warranted. Such is the point of placing the burden on the government to prove the five indicia of market-driven entrepreneurial
motivation. Where the state can meet this burden, it makes
sense to presume that the actor, more likely than not, is engaged in predominantly entrepreneurial activity. Thus, based
on a probabilistic perspective, where the government proves the
existence of these five indicia of market-driven motivation, the
burden should shift to the actor asserting a First Amendment
privilege to prove that it was acting predominantly with a protected purpose of enlightening with speaker-driven selfexpression.

market-driven messages:
1. The actor is expending money to disseminate the putative speech,
without receiving profit-making compensation in return for the dissemination of that speech. See supra note 182.
2. The actor does not conduct market surveys before deciding what
to say.
3. If the actor is an organization, its membership has been drawn
together by a common idea, and the putative speech in question is an
expression of that common idea.
These facts would tend strongly to support an inference that the actor was engaged in speaker-driven self-expression.
For a discussion of categories of evidence from which reckless disregard
for truth may be inferred in the analogous context of defamation, see, e.g.,
Gyong Ho Kim, Evidentiary Behaviors Constituting Reckless Disregard for the
Truth, 20 COMM. & LAW 39, 48-50 (1998).
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V. BROADER IMPLICATIONS OF THE UNPROTECTED
DECISION TO SELL THE MARKET-DRIVEN MESSAGE
A. CONTENT-MOTIVATED REGULATION OF THE UNPROTECTED
MARKET-DRIVEN MESSAGE

Joseph Burstyn Inc. v. Wilson invalidated a state scheme
requiring that a film be licensed before it could be exhibited "for
pay or in connection with any business."270 One might take the
foregoing analysis to suggest that if a distributor or movie
house presents a film as a market-driven message for sale, it
should be deemed not to warrant special solicitude under the
First Amendment and could be subject to such a licensing provision, as well as a wide array of other regulations.
But the market-driven message principle should not necessarily be taken so far. Indeed, even if one accepts the notion
that decisions to sell the market-driven message should not be
deemed to be part of "the freedom of speech," the government
should not be free to regulate such decisions in a contentmotivated way. This part will first examine how this notion relates to existing judicial doctrine, and then explore why the
regulation of unprotected activity-i.e., sale of the marketdriven message-for content-motivated reasons nevertheless
should be viewed as constitutionally problematic.271
1. Unprotected Speech and Content-Motivated Regulation:
Doctrinal Considerations
In R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul, the Supreme Court considered
a First Amendment challenge to a state statute that imposed
criminal penalties for displaying a symbol '"which one knows or
has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm, or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion, or
gender.'"272 The Minnesota Supreme Court had determined
270. 343 U.S. 495, 497 (1952) (quotations omitted).
271. This Article's analysis will likely be of interest to those supportingand opposing-Al Gore, Joseph Lieberman, and William Bennett in contemplating the regulation of media portrayals of violence based on concerns about
the effects of such speech on children and others. See, e.g., Gore Takes Tough
Stand on Violent Entertainment, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2000, at Al. This section should be a caution, however, that any contemplated regulations must not
be motivated by disagreement with the content perceived in market-driven
messages, even though manufactured as products for sale.
272. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 380 (1992) (quoting ST. PAUL.
MINN., LEGIS. CODE § 292.02 (1990)).
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that this statute applied only to "expressions that constitute
'fighting words' within the meaning of Chaplinsky''273-and, as
such, "not within the area of constitutionally protected
speech.''274
Justice Scalia determined, however, that even with respect
to such categories of unprotected speech, the government may
not engage in discriminatory regulations motivated by the content of ideas expressed:
[T]hese areas of speech can, consistently with the First Amendment,
be regulated because of their constitutionally proscribable content (obscenity, defamation, etc.) .... [T]hey may [not] be made the vehicles
for content discrimination unrelated to their distinctively proscribable
content. Thus, the government may proscribe libel; but it may not
make the further content discrimination of proscribing only libel critical of the government.275

Scalia identified two circumstances in which a selective
regulation of "unprotected speech" is permissible. First, the
government may regulate when the basis for the regulation
"consists entirely of the very reason the entire class of speech at
issue is proscribable."276 Under such circumstances, he suggests, there is "no significant danger of idea or viewpoint discrimination."277 Second, the government may regulate a "content-defined subclass of proscribable speech" when that
subclass is "associated with particular 'secondary effects' of the
speech, so that the regulation is 'justified without reference to

273. Id. at 381 (paraphrasing In re Welfare ofR.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507, 51011 (Minn. 1991)).
· 274. Id. at 383 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957)).
In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, the Supreme Court identified "fighting
words" as one of several categories of speech that are unprotected by the First
Amendment:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech,
the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to
raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or "fighting"
words-those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to
incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has been well observed
that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas,
and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit
that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality. Resort to epithets or personal abuse is
not in any proper sense communication of information or opinion
safeguarded by the Constitution.
315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (quotation omitted).
275. R.A V., 505 U.S. at 383-84.
276. Id. at 388.
277. Id.
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the content of the ... speech.'"278 Again, Scalia says, such a basis "for distinction refute[s] the proposition that the selectivity
of the restriction is 'even arguably conditioned upon the sovereign's agreement with what a particular speaker may intend to
say.'''279
Thus, if a court were to embrace the suggestion that decisions to sell the market-driven message should be deemed unworthy of the First Amendment's special solicitude, it would
not follow, at least as a matter of established doctrine, that the
government could regulate programming decisions in a contentmotivated way. Rather, finding that an actor is engaged in
selling a market-driven message would simply eliminate concerns that a content-motivated regulation displacing that actor's "editorial discretion"-such as the Fairness in Political
Advertising Act280_would involve, in the words of Buckley v.
Valeo, "restrict[ing] the speech of some elements of our society
in order to enhance the relative voice of others.''281

2. Unprotected Speech and Content-Motivated Regulation:
Normative Considerations
Justice Scalia has noted why the First Amendment has
been deemed to prohibit content-motivated regulations of
speech. "The rationale of the general prohibition . . . is that
content discrimination 'raises the specter that the Government
may effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace."'282 Such a concern about the government's purposeful policing of public discourse emerges from two very different
scenarios. First, government officials might seek to suppress
criticism of themselves or their policies and thereby separate
themselves from the majority of the electorate by undermining
the processes of accountability. Second, government officials
might respond to the community's conventional values and seek
to effectuate prevailing impulses to purge public discourse of
unpopular minority viewpoints.

278. Id. at 389 (quoting Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48
(1986)).
279. Id. at 390 (quoting Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 555
(1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting in part) (citation omitted)).
280. R.R. 84, 105th Cong. (1997).
281. 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976) (per curiam).
282. R.A V., 505 U.S. at 387 (quoting Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of
N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991)).
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Both scenarios of content motivation contradict the implications of a First Amendment designed to protect speech for the
sake of democratic self-government. For government officials
to seek to short circuit the processes of democratic accountability transforms them into a minority faction, to use Madison's
framework, and prevents the operation of the otherwise available cure for minority faction-that is, the principle of majority
rule inherent in "the republican principle."283
When government policy reflects the censorship impulses
of the broader community, the problematic nature of contentmotivated regulation is somewhat more complex. From a republican perspective, all viewpoints about "the permanent and
aggregate interests of the community'' should be heard. In
Meiklejohn's words, purposefully purging public discourse of
such viewpoints about which to deliberate is a "mutilation of
the thinking process of the community.''284 From a pluralist
perspective, purposefully denying people a right to express
their viewpoints, no matter how unpopular, contradicts the
proposition that each voter is entitled to an equal political
status and a right to express her earnestly held views toward
endeavoring to test her own views and to shape the views of
others. 285
Yet, one might ask how these concerns are implicated if the
government were to pursue a content-motivated regulation of
decisions to sell market-driven messages. After all, the foregoing analysis has suggested that entrepreneurial decisions to
sell the market-driven message warrant no special constitutional protection, in part because its disseminators lack a purpose of participating in public discourse. So long as those who
wish to engage in self-expression by disseminating speakerdriven messages remain free to do so, how is democracy with
either a republican or pluralist emphasis compromised by the
content-motivated suppression of activity that does not qualify
as protected speech?
Although the market-driven message does not contain the
ideas and priorities of its disseminator, it does contain ideas. If
the government were to determine which market-driven mes283. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 80 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961); see supra text accompanying note 163.
284. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 26, at 26.
285. See supra notes 163-81 and accompanying text. For an illuminating
discussion of difficulties in justifying protection for unpopular extremist
speech, see generally LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY (1986).
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sages could not be disseminated, according to the values and
priorities of government officials, the government will be engaging in censorship for the purpose of shaping public values.
Indeed, whether the values underlying the censorship are concerned with insulating officials from electoral accountability or
with vindicating the communities mores against unpopular
views, content-motivated censorship of broadcasters' marketdriven messages involve governmental efforts to shape public
opinion. To be a bit more precise, content-motivated censorship
of broadcasters' market-driven messages would reflect governmental efforts to prevent public opinion from being influenced
in certain ways-to channel, through the placement of ideological barriers, the evolution of public values.286
Thus, the fact that the government might limit its contentmotivated censorship to (unprotected) market-driven speech
does not dispose of concerns about the potential for a dominating control of the ideas to which people are exposed. Ifmarketdriven messages constitute most of the messages that are disseminated through the mass media, and if government were
free to shape the ideology of television entertainment in a content-motivated way, the risk that the government could effectively "drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace"
would seem to exist, even though the regulations would not intrude upon protected speech interests of either the broadcasters
or the audience. 287 Given the nature of the mass media-its
command of the public's attention in a persistent quest for entertainment-the risk remains that through purposeful manipulation of programming content, government could become,
essentially, a behemoth participant in public discoursedisplacing a group of entrepreneurially motivated private gatekeepers by a politically motivated public gatekeeper.288

286. To censor, in a content-motivated way, Murphy Brown's criticism of
Dan Quayle (arguably a content-motivated action of the sort that seeks to circumvent processes of accountability) would be an exercise of purposeful control by the government over ideas to which people are exposed. Similarly, to
censor, in a content-motivated way, Murphy Brown's celebration of unmarried
motherhood (arguably a content-motivated action of the sort that seeks to effectuate the community's favored values) would be an exercise of purposeful
control by the government over ideas to which people are exposed.
287. RA. V., 505 U.S. at 387 (quoting Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of
N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991)).
288. For a discussion of the dangers of government domination of public
discourse, see generally MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GoVERNMENT SPEAKS:
POLITICS, LAW, AND GoVERNMENT EXPRESSION IN AMERICA (1983).
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***

In contrast to these hypothetical efforts to discriminate
among market-driven messages for content-motivated reasons,
one can understand a proposal like the Fairness in Political
Advertising Act289 as quite a different enterprise. First, the Act
does not distinguish between programming that is to be displaced by free advertising time for political candidates by any
reference to content. Rather, broadcasters are directed to provide air time during primetime hours. This sort of selectivity
focuses on a factor indicating a likelihood that the programmers whose discretion would be displaced intended to create a
market-driven message, and to sell it. As such, the regulatory
intrusion on primetime programming satisfies Justice Scalia's
notion that the government may select which subcategories of
unprotected speech to regulate by reference to the factor which
renders the "speech" unprotected. In other words, the element
that renders the market-driven message unprotected is its underlying motivation. Programming disseminated during primetime hours is more likely than programming disseminated at
other times to have been shaped and selected because of market-driven factors. It is more likely to reflect decisions to sell
the market-driven message for profit rather than to enlighten
through self-expression.
Second, the government can justify its choice to focus on
primetime programming by reference to "particular 'secondary
effects' of the speech, so that the regulation is 'justified without
reference to the content of the ... speech."'290 The "secondary
effect" of primetime programming is its potential to reach the
maximum possible audience. It is presented at times when
many people have the opportunity, and have developed the
· habit, to watch television. A desire to present the speech of political candidates, by displacing the market-driven speech of
television broadcasters, at a time when the largest possible audience is available does not suggest an effort to censor the programming that otherwise would be presented in a contentmotivated way. As Justice Scalia noted, when the government
justifies a regulation of "unprotected speech" by reference to
such "secondary effects," it "refute[s] the proposition that the
selectivity of the restriction is 'even arguably conditioned upon

289. H.R. 84, 105th Cong. (1997).
290. R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 389 (quoting Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.,
475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986)).
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the sovereign's agreement with what a speaker may intend to
say."'291
Third, the Fairness in Political Advertising Act does not
raise either of the two normative concerns about contentmotivated regulation. By displacing popular (primetime) entertainment programming, it cannot readily be understood as reflecting an effort to silence minority dissent. Furthermore, by
providing time for political candidates to communicate with the
public, it can facilitate, rather than undermine, the processes of
electoral accountability.
Fourth, unlike the content-motivated censorship of entrepreneurial decisions to sell market-driven messages, the Fairness in Political Advertising Act envisions replacing activity
that is not part of "the freedom of speech"-i.e., the broadcasters' sale of market-driven programming-with activity at the
core of concerns for democratic self-government. The protected
speech of the broadcaster has not been impinged, because the
broadcaster was not engaged in protected speech. But the
quantity of speech, of purposefully persuasive communication,
has been enhanced, as political candidates use the opportunity
to express their views to the voters-their potential constituents. Thus, Buckley's admonition that the government may not
"restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to
enhance the relative voice of others" is not violated.292 Furthermore, by augmenting the amount of protected speech, by
replacing entertainment through which people seek to escape
life's difficult realities with speech about the issues of the day~
the Act would facilitate opportunities for the voters to deliberate about their own interests and values and those of their fellow citizens.

B. CULTURAL CRITIQUES OF CO:Ml\IBRCIAL TELEVISION
Ronald Collins and David Skover have argued that uses of
modern telecommunications media, both by those who control it
and by its audience, are alien to the classical, Madisonian First
Amendment's conception of a responsible citizenry actively engaged in deliberative discourse. They give several reasons for
this proposition.

291. Id. at 390 (quoting Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 555
(1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting in part) (citation omitted)).
292. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976) (per curiam).
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First, they suggest, the content of television programming
is rooted in entrepreneurial motives. ''With profit maximization as the governing norm, television distorts traditional First
Amendment values by associating the lowest passions with the
highest ideals."293 Second, "the economics and aesthetics of
commercial television have profound influence" on political
speech.294 Political candidates employ the methods of commercial advertising, and "the gulf between important political expression and pure amusement nearly vanishes."295 Third, advertising on television exploits and promotes the public's
pervasive pursuit of pleasure and entertainment.296 Commercial television thrives in our culture of "self-indulgent ... consumption."297
Collins and Skover see modern American culture as posing
a new threat to the First Amendment, entirely different from
the classical fear of governmental manipulation. It is a threat
of a disengaged, unthinking, passive, pleasure-pursuing citizenry to whom reasoned discourse is unappealing and irrelevant. Based on this proposition, they frame a First Amendment "paradox": "To save itself, the traditional First
Amendment must destroy itself." The government must be allowed to regulate commercial television-"governmental
'abridgment' of expression"-to address the cultural threat to
the classical version of free speech. But with such governmental abridgment, they say, First Amendment protection collapses
into First Amendment tyranny. 298
They propose a different response to the paradox: abandon
the classical understanding of the freedom of speech as a starting point, in favor of an understanding rooted in modern
American cultural values and practices.
The animating spirit of the cultural approach is that, once we confront the reality of First Amendment hypocrisy, we will no longer
wish to perpetuate it. On the one hand, we may restructure life, law,
and discourse in order to actualize Madisonian ideals. On the other
hand, we may give up all Madisonian pretenses and romp in a debauched dystopia.299

293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.

COLLINS & SKOVER, supra note 37, at 16-17 (quotation omitted).
Id. at 16.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 4 (quotations omitted).
Id. at 215.
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Under the former, they see American culture as transformed.
Under the latter, they see the First Amendment as transformed, protecting all sorts of "communication" enthusiastically
and without apology:
When we feed on TV and video soma for an average of some fortyseven hours weekly, consume the fruits of a yearly advertising budget
of $149 billion, splurge some $10 billion annually to gorge our insatiable sexual appetites, and more, we are unlikely to tolerate a First
Amendment regime that is intolerant of such pleasurable practices. 300

Collins and Skover have suggested exploration of a "cultural approach" to the First Amendment.301 The "cultural approach" would look not to scholars' views of history for giving
meaning to the First Amendment; rather, it would look to
scholars' views of popular culture to determine the meaning
that the practices of the American masses give to "the freedom
of speech." ''The cultural approach recognizes that First
Amendment values are to be determined as much by what We
the People practice as by what they, the elite, preach."302 Thus,
they explore-but do not (quite yet) advocate-a new conception of the First Amendment that would replace the classical
approach and that would embrace as valuable (and constitutionally protected) the commercial cuJture that the masses embrace as valuable.
Collins and Skover present a powerful critique of American
culture and demonstrate how far we are from a republican conception of political community. But consider two objections to
their suggestion that the classical First Amendment is incompatible with, and irrelevant to, modern American culture.
First, their notion of the classical, Madisonian First
Amendment is republican. As this piece has also suggested,
republican ideals of deliberation about the public good are indeed offended by the commercialism and escapism that characterize modern mass media. Like Cass Sunstein and his analysis of commercial television, however, Collins and Skover
disregard the less normatively demanding pluralist strains in
American constitutional tradition.
They do not explore
whether a more modest version of classical First Amendment
theory, rooted in democracy with a pluralist emphasis, would
also view most mass communications activity as unprotected
and, if so, which aspects, and why.
300. Id. at 213.
301. See id. at xxi.
302. Id. at 214.
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The founders' republican view was always aspiration.
They recognized that in everyday behavior, citizens would not
pursue "the permanent and aggregate interests of the community" and that government would be beset by faction. The national legislative structure and the supremacy of constitutional
law were structural devices to approach the republican ideal
better than unvarnished political behavior otherwise would. 303
Our modern pleasure-seeking culture deviates far less from
the pluralist reality that The Federalist No. 10 recognized than
from the republican ideal to which it aspired. Furthermore, the
freedom of speech was to be pursued, and protected, in politics
as practiced-in other words, in democracy with all its pluralist
shortcomings. The freedom of speech necessary for pluralist
self-government empowers each member of the community to
pursue self-interest through persuasion, to deal with the problems posed by disagreement, or to take advantage of the opportunities provided by agreement and cooperation. Thus, this
classical pluralist understanding of politics and the First
Amendment does not deviate from the realities of American political behavior so much as does republicanism. 304
Of course, so much of what is presented on television has
nothing to do with political behavior or even, more broadly,
with the pursuit of self-interest through persuasion. And this
leads to a second objection to the Collins and Skover analysis:
in a circular way, they assume that the pervasive telecommunications pleasure and entertainment practices of Americans are,
and must be, popularly understood as "speech" protected by the
First Amendment. A First Amendment that denied protection
to so much of what Americans understand to be "speech," they
argue, would be so alien to American culture as to be incompatible with and irrelevant to our culture.
One might acknowledge that interpreting a constitutional
provision in a way that starkly deviates from prevailing values
303. See supra notes 163-63.
304. Indeed, our government is still a representative democracy. This, in
itself, is a republican characteristic that recognizes the distinction between
private impulse and public action. Beyond this, our government is still a representative democracy circumscribed by constitutional limits and judicial review. These are republican characteristics that recognize the distinction between short-sighted public action and public actions in pursuit of "the
permanent and aggregate interests of the community." See supra notes 16363. If one is to question whether classical notions of the First Amendment are
inconsistent with popular American culture, then one must question whether
constitutionalism in general is inconsistent with popular American culture.
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is perilous in practice and questionable as a matter of interpretive theory. But, as just suggested, Americans remain committed to electoral democracy, at least of the pluralist variety. A
First Amendment whose reach is limited to protecting those activities relevant to pluralist democracy-including selfexpressive efforts to persuade in private transactions-would
hardly be alien to American norms. It might give a legal meaning to the word "speech" different from an ordinary or lay understanding. But that is true of the words used in many legal
provisions.
Thus, the second reason for rejecting the enterprise of employing the values of mass culture as the exclusive basis for
generating the meaning of the First Amendment reflects, perhaps, a more conventional notion of law than Collins and
Skover may have. This perspective does not surrender the
meaning of law-especially constitutional law-entirely to the
practices of mass culture. The legal meaning of words and the
popular meaning of words may well be different. Simply because people might understand television broadcasts or pornographic pictures to be speech should not necessarily determine
that such broadcasts and pictures should be deemed speech for
specific legal purposes. Similarly, even without reference to
law, simply because people may find certain activities enjoyable
does not necessarily mean that those activities are valuable for
all purposes, at all times, in all contexts. There is a time and
place for everything. This truth is acknowledged even in mass
culture.
Thus, if Collins and Skover were to assert that the classical
First Amendment-understood not as republican, but with a
pluralist emphasis-deviates too far from prevailing cultural
understandings about what is valuable and what is "speech,"
they would need to posit that ordinary Americans are unable to
understand that words can have different meanings in different
contexts and, indeed, that activities can be differently valuable,
depending on the context in which one is acting. Yet, the people surely are capable of making a distinction among valuable
activities. The people surely are capable of understanding that
even though playing basketball, for example, might be enjoyable, it is not necessarily part of the First Amendment's freedom of speech, simply because it has that sort of value; that
even though watching a basketball game on television may be
enjoyable, it is not necessarily part of the First Amendment's
freedom of speech, simply because it has that sort of value; that
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even though watching ER on television may be enjoyable, it is
not necessarily part of the First Amendment's freedom of
speech, simply because it has that sort of value.
The "First Amendment paradox" that Collins and Skover
see is too stark. The First Amendment need not "destroy itself
to save itself." There need not be draconian regulation, such as
a politically impossible Prohibition of television that some
urge,305 to forge republican citizens from pleasure-seeking zombies. Republican citizens were never possible, as Madison recognized. Pluralist citizens were possible, and remain so. Furthermore, on the other side, the pursuit of pleasure during our
ever-expanding leisure time need not overwhelm the realm of
politics, persuasion, and self-interested discourse. Simply because Americans spend so much time on entertainment, simply
because entertainment interests compete with interests rooted
in competitive or cooperative interaction, need not mean that
the interest in pluralist self-governance must be destroyed. After all, people had daily concerns that diverted them from politics in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Those diversions might have been work, or family, or religion, or
whiskey, rather than leisure and self-conscious entertainment.
But they were diversions from politics nevertheless.
These diversions, however, unlike watching television,
were not popularly conceived as speech. They did not present a
danger of overwhelming our understanding of "the freedom of
speech" protected by the Constitution. The danger to "the freedom of speech" comes not jui::;t from the popular mindset, but
from a failure of the leadership that the trained legal mindset
exists to provide. Most of our fellows steeped in modern American culture, it seems, can still comprehend the differences between expressing personal values, and playing to an audience.
They still can understand the differences between pursuing
persuasion and pursuing entertainment. And if informed of it,
they could comprehend-even embrace-a principle, and its
underlying rationale, that the First Amendment protects selfexpression intended to persuade, but does not protect entrepreneurial decisions to sell designed to play to an audience.
Thus, the First Amendment need not destroy itself to save
itself. The First Amendment need only define itself to save it305. See, e.g., George Anastoplo, Self-Government and the Mass Media: A
Practical Man's Guide, in THE MAsS MEDIA AND MODERN DEMOCRACY 161,
223-24 (Harry M. Clor ed., 1974) (arguing for the abolition of television as a
means of enlarging the freedom of speech).
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self. More precisely, those charged with responsibly interpreting constitutional provisions need to define "the freedom of
speech" that warrants special constitutional protection. Scholars, lawyers, and judges need to reveal the option to the electorate and their representatives that the people might, if they
choose, command the use of mass communications technologies
for self-expression and other activities relevant to democratic
self-government. Those who define the terms of the constitutional order must acknowledge that the people might choose to
create space for speech that is protected by the First Amendment, by displacing entrepreneurial market-driven activities
that are not; that reform might start on a small scale, by mandating free time for political candidates; that these choices, if
made carefully, can be constitutionally permissible. For if
scholars, judges, and, ultimately, political leaders fail in this
definitional responsibility, those who control the channels on
our television sets-by exercising entrepreneurial discretion,
rather than the "editorial discretion" that they claim-can long
control the channels through which the freedom of speech otherwise might flourish.
CONCLUSION
Proponents of economic deregulation argue that television
programmers should be treated both as are other businessmen
in the regime of consumer sovereignty and as are other speakers under the First Amendment. Some argue further that
property rights under the Fifth Amendment are just as fundamental as are speech rights under the First Amendment, and
should be protected just as vigorously. This latter argument
has not shaken the conventional wisdom that political rightsincluding the freedom of speech-are constitutionally foundational, whereas property rights are politically derivative. Almost all who adhere to this conventional view about the relationship between speech and property-as well as those who
urge the "parity" of markets-accept the proposition that television programmers exercise "editorial discretion" protected by
the First Amendment.
This Article has challenged this point of agreement that
connects those who assert the constitutional parity between
speech and property and those who assert the constitutional
primacy of speech over property. It has suggested that the programming decisions of commercial television businesses should
not qualify as "editorial discretion" protected by the First
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Amendment to the extent that they involve entrepreneurially
motivated decisions to manufacture and to sell market-driven
content.
The significance of human actions is often determined by
the purposes for which they are undertaken. The rationale for
free economic markets is predicated on notions of incentives
and human purposes in response to those incentives. The quest
for economic reward in exchanges with freely acting consumers
will induce producers to create and sell products that serve the
desires of those consumers.
This Article has tried to show how four different normative
frameworks relevant to the First Amendment's freedom of
speech also elevate human purposes as the definitive factor distinguishing "speech" from other actions. It also has tried to
show that the purposes and choices relevant to entrepreneurial
responses to market incentives in the regime of consumer sovereignty are distinct from the purposes and choices relevant to
republican democracy, pluralist democracy, personal fulfillment, and the implications for the First Amendment of economic rationales for Congress's copyright power. For each of
these four normative contexts relevant to defining the freedom
of speech, choices to enlighten self and others through speakerdriven self-expression-rather than choices to sell products
that satisfy anticipated consumer demand-are worthy of protection under the First Amendment.
Those who urge the constitutional parity of speech and
property markets do not-and should not-argue that speech
and property are the same thing. Their arguments about the
worth of property rights and the value of human choices responding to economic incentives can stand on their own ground.
Those who deny the constitutional parity of speech and property markets clearly recognize that speech and property are not
the same thing. They recognize, at least implicitly, that the
choices relevant to economic markets are not the same as the
choices relevant to the freedom of speech. But they have failed
to apply this insight to the programming decisions of commercial television corporations. What appears to be speech is, fundamentally and essentially, property-property that has been
molded in the way that any entrepreneur molds his product. It
is a product shaped by economic market incentives. It is a
product governed by the behavioral pressures of consumer sovereignty. Choices to create and to sell this product should be
understood as property interests protected under the Fifth
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Amendment, rather than as speech protected by the First
Amendment.
To identify choices and activities that lack special constitutional protection as speech is not to determine that they lack
special worth. It is, rather, to determine that their worth is to
be debated and resolved in the political processes that the Constitution both protects and circumscribes. An individual's desire to serve in the military is widely understood to be worthy.
But it has not been deemed a matter of special constitutional
entitlement. A corporation's desire to pursue a policy of affirmative action in hiring and promotion might be viewed as
laudable-and, not so long ago, widely praised. But that choice
has not been deemed a matter of special constitutional entitlement. Commerce is, of course, a valuable human activity.
Consuming products for entertainment, for escapism, and for
relaxation, are widely cherished activities. But, at least as a
matter of conventional legal understanding, the sale and consumption of products have not been deemed to be matters of
special constitutional entitlement. The worth, desirability, and
permissibility of most aspects of our lives are to be determined
politically.
And so it would be for those who wish to sell the marketdriven message under the perspective presented in this Article.
To determine that choices to sell (and to consume) the marketdriven message lack special solicitude under the First Amendment is not to determine that these choices are without value.
It is simply to determine that they are without the kind of special value as speech that warrants insulating them from being
weighed in the political process against competing values.
Self-expression, the expression of one's views, values, and
priorities, is essential to a definition of what should qualify as
speech for a First Amendment dedicated to the processes of
democratic self-government or to Aristotelian self-fulfillment.
Democratic decisionmaking, whether with a pluralist or republican emphasis, requires that voters know the views of their fellows, to determine where agreement exists, where compromise
can be found, and where concession need be made. Only selfexpression can enable others to account adequately for the actor's views. Only when the actor chooses to express his own
views does his choice have relevance to his right to participate
in the processes of democratic self-government, or to the special
role speech can play in personal fulfillment, and qualify as having claim to special solicitude under the First Amendment.
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A desire to sell the market-driven message does not involve
its disseminator's self-expression in a quest for truth. A decision to sell a market-driven message is a decision to respond
entrepreneurially to the values of others. To the extent that
the programming decisions of television broadcasters-so much
of what today occupies the means of effective communicationare so likely to be market-driven in an entrepreneurial way, refuting their claim to constitutional privilege can open a range of
otherwise unthinkable options for reforming political campaigns and for enriching public discourse.
The "market-driven message principle" would reject the
proposition that entrepreneurially motivated decisions to sell a
market-driven message qualify for special solicitude as "editorial discretion" protected by the First Amendment. This Article
has pursued the implications of the market-driven message
principle in the context of relatively modest proposals to provide free television time for political advertising. It has explored how judicial doctrine might be constructed both to serve
the normative foundations of the market-driven message principle and to resolve the practical difficulties of adjudicating legal issues that require determination of an actor's intent.
It is so important that our imagination be liberated from
petrified assumptions about what qualifies as "speech" and our
political will freed to pursue measures that go beyond providing
free advertising time for candidates. It is important because
democracy in America is ailing. The First Amendment, rooted
as it is in concerns to preserve and promote the processes of
democratic self-government, should be a vehicle for resurrecting the discourse that is essential for democracy, not for burying it under mounds of commercial transactions masquerading
as "speech."
It is, therefore, important to think as carefully as we can
about what "speech" should mean, to distinguish what may
merely be politically desirable from that which is constitutionally essential. The production and consumption of entertainment are merely desirable, and debatably so, at that. The expression of self by individuals and groups to inform their
neighbors what they believe, and their neighbors' thoughts and
expression of those thoughts in response, are constitutionally
essential. The representation of views in the community by political candidates is constitutionally essential. With these distinctions drawn, the electorate, through its representatives,
could be freed to determine that market-driven programming,
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pleasant and entertaining though it might be, should at times
be displaced, so that the people might yield less to the impulses
of self-indulgence and focus more on the rights and responsibilities of self-governance.
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